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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION^  
We are facing changing economies in the world. Governments make 
policies to influence changes in the economies, or even changes in the 
nature of the economies. People are adjusting their behavior in response 
to the changes, especially to the structural changes in the economies. 
Economists are trying to keep pace with these changes by using economic 
principles to get pictures of the changing behavior and structure. To 
understand the changes in the economies, one should look at the past 
economic structure, at the current economic structure, and even forward 
to the structural changes that may occur over time as a consequence of 
the current policies or their alternatives. This is a very difficult and 
Important task. 
Statement of the Problem 
A new structure has emerged in socialist economies during the last 
25 years. The Soviet Union, the East European countries, and, finally, 
China have begun their own economic reforms. Although the manifestations 
of these reforms may vary from time to time and from country to country, 
the basic measures of the economic reforms can be seen in several ways : 
decentralizing management, reducing control of ownership, price reform, 
opening free markets, encouraging individual initiative, more concern for 
consumer welfare, etc. From the point of view of operational mechanisms 
T^he data used in this chapter are mainly from: Chinese State 
Statistics Bureau, 1987; Agricultural Yearbook Editing Committee, 1986, 
1987; FAO, 1988a, b. 
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in the economy, the transition from a traditional planned economy to a 
mixed economy--which combines the dual features of planned and market 
economies--is the most meaningful and interesting structural change in 
the socialist economies. 
The above situation leads to key questions for all economists. 
First, what is a planned economy and what is its operational mechanism? 
More specifically, what roles are played by the plan and the market, and 
what .characterizes the behaviors of the government and the people in a 
planned economy? Second, what is a mixed economy and what is its 
operational mechanism? Particularly, what roles are played by the plan 
and the market(s), respectively; how do the plan and the market(s) relate 
and Interact with each other; and what characterizes the behaviors of the 
government and the people in a mixed economy? Finally, what is the 
difference between basic features of planned and mixed economies ; and 
what are the differences between the behaviors of the government and the 
people in a planned and a mixed economy? 
In attempting to answer the above questions, the author will 
concentrate on the Chinese economy. This is because the Chinese economy 
is the second largest in socialist countries and because the Chinese 
government has applied a series of policies to promote economic reform. 
Although China has been engaged in Its economic reform for only ten 
years, it has moved further toward a mixed economy than many of the other 
socialist countries and has achieved greater success In some respects. 
Furthermore, this study will deal with only the grain economy in 
Chinese agriculture. One reason is that agriculture plays such an 
3 
important role in the Chinese economy. China has been predominantly an 
agrarian country throughout history. Feeding over one billion people, or 
21.7% of the world's population, with only 6.9% of the world's arable 
land, China remains one of the largest agricultural economies in the 
world. In today's China, about 80% of the population lives in rural 
areas, about 50% of the labor force is engaged in the agricultural 
sector, and about 33% of the GNF is contributed by the agricultural 
sector. On the other hand, agriculture supplies much raw material to 
processing Industries, provides considerable savings for sustained 
investment in a growing industrial sector, and, generally, earns some 
foreign currency for purchasing equipment in international markets. In 
this sense, the Chinese government has recognized agriculture as the base 
of the national economy. 
In addition, agriculture plays an important role in economic reform 
in China. Agriculture, as an experimental sector, was chosen by the 
Chinese government for a major breakthrough in economic reform, and the 
success of agricultural reform led to economic reform in the industrial 
sector as well as in other sectors. The depth and breadth of economic 
reform in the agricultural sector are far beyond those in other sectors. 
The transition from a collective to an individual economy in agriculture 
has been almost completed throughout the whole country except for the 
ownership of land. Agricultural households can sell their products in 
reopened free markets after the government procurement contracts are 
satisfied. The improvement of agricultural efficiency and productivity 
provides a secure base for further growth of the rest of the economy and 
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a continuously rising standard of living--In short, for further economic 
reform. 
Within agriculture, the grain economy is the most Important. The 
grain sector was recognized as a treasure with which to manage the 
country in all past Chinese dynasties. At present, the Chinese govern­
ment still thinks of grain as the base of the base (agriculture) of the 
national economy. To encourage grain production, to ensure grain supply, 
and to sustain an increasingly huge population seems to be a long-run 
goal for the Chinese government. The Importance of the grain economy in 
China can be understood from the following three aspects: 
1. Consumption aspect.. Grain is the most important commodity in 
Chinese consumption. On the average, Chinese spend about 50% 
of their income on food consumption, and about 80% of their 
caloric intake and 30% of their protein intake comes from food 
grain. In addition, China has been the largest consumer of 
food grains in the world because it has had the largest 
population. For food grain only, the Chinese consumed 270 
million metric tons, which was almost 15.3% of the total grain 
produced in the world in 1987. 
2. Production aspect. Grain is the most important product in the 
agricultural sector of China. Generally, about 80% of the 
arable land in China is intensively used for annual grain 
production. In addition, China is one of the largest producers 
of grain In the world. For instance. In 1987, China was the 
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2 largest producer for rice (38.6%) , the largest producer for 
wheat (17.0%), the second-largest producer for corn (17.3%), 
the third-largest producer for soybeans (12.1%), and the 
largest producer for grain generally (20.1%) in the world. 
Trade aspect. Grain is the most important good in China's 
agricultural trade. To import some grain can help the Chinese 
government balance domestic demand and supply, guarantee 
political security and improve the standard of living for the 
people. To export some grain can help the Chinese government 
obtain valuable foreign currency to pay for equipment needed 
for industrial modernization. In the international grain 
market, China has been very active and played an important 
role. For example, in 1987, China's grain import and export in 
3 
trade volume were ranked third (9,9%) and eighth (2.5%) in the 
world, respectively. In the same year, China was the second-
largest buyer for wheat (13.4%); the third-largest buyer (4.6%) 
and the fourth-largest seller (9.6%) for rice; the third-
largest buyer (8.1%) and the fourth-largest seller for corn 
(6.1%); and the fifth-largest buyer (7.6%) and the third-
largest seller (5.9%) for soybeans. 
2 
The numbers in the parentheses in this paragraph indicate the 
corresponding percentage of volume of the world product. 
3 
The numbers In the parentheses in this paragraph indicate the 
corresponding percentage of volume traded in the world market. 
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Besides, the grain economy represents well the features of planned 
and mixed economies. Due to the importance of the grain economy, the 
Chinese government applied a series of rigid policies to control grain 
consumption and production. From the late 1950s, only the state grain 
market had existed in the country. After more than 20 years' experience 
with that system, the government eventually shifted under the economic 
reform from a planned to a mixed grain economy and opened a free market 
for grain as a supplement to the state market. At present, dual markets 
for grain, i.e., the state market and the free market, coexist. Conse­
quently, dual prices, i.e., a state market price and a free market price, 
coexist. The government even discussed the possibility of a completely 
open free market for grains, with only free market price as the signal to 
guide grain consumption and production. Thus, studying the Chinese grain 
economy can help people learn the features of planned and mixed economies 
and, in turn, learn more about the features of the Chinese grain economy 
Itself. 
To study the Chinese grain economy, a theoretical grain model for 
China will be developed. This work can be used by the Chinese government 
to appraise policy alternatives, and to make decisions on further 
economic reforms in the agricultural sector and, therefore, in the 
national economy. 
Objective of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to conduct theoretical analyses 
of the Chinese grain economy, more particularly, to develop a theoretical 
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framework for both planned and mixed economies. The associated specific 
objectives are: 
1. To construct a theoretical grain model for China, and to 
evaluate the interaction between the domestic and International 
markets for both planned and mixed economy assumptions. 
2. To build a rationing system into the grain modeling framework 
and to make theoretical analyses of the rationing effects on 
both the domestic and international markets in both planned and 
mixed economy scenarios. 
3. To build both domestic prices, including state market and free 
market prices, and international prices into the grain model­
ling framework to make theoretical analyses of the effects of 
these prices on both domestic and international markets in both 
planned and mixed economy scenarios. 
Organization of the Study 
The study is organized as follows: 
Chapter II reviews all of the relevant theoretical literature, 
discusses controversies and the limitations of the previous studies, and, 
finally. Indicates the direction of this study. 
Chapter III presents the theoretical framework of a Chinese grain 
model for a planned economy by both mathematical and graphical analysis. 
The behaviors of urban households (urban consumers) and rural production 
teams (rural consumers and producers) In the domestic market are treated 
separately. The behavior of the government in the International market 
8 
is described. The urban demand, the rural demand and supply, and the 
import demand (or export supply) for grain are derived. Comparative 
statics is used to provide analysis of alternative policies of key 
instruments. The roles of the state market and the international market 
in the planned economy are stressed and analyzed. 
Chapter IV presents the theoretical framework of a grain model for a 
mixed economy by using mathematical and graphical analysis. Similarly, 
the behaviors of the urban households (urban consumers) and rural 
households (rural consumers and producers) in the domestic markets, 
including both the state market and the free market, are treated separ­
ately, and the behavior of government in the international market also is 
described. The urban demand, the rural demand and supply, and the import 
demand (or export supply) for grain are also derived. Comparative 
statics also are used to provide analysis of alternative policies. Last, 
the roles of the state market, free market and international market in 
the mixed economy are discussed and analyzed. 
Chapter V constructs a complete grain model of China containing 
features of both a planned and a mixed economy. The domestic state 
market is controlled by state monopoly power and is assumed in disequi­
librium, whereas the domestic free market is competitive and is assumed 
in equilibrium. The international markets are assumed to be competitive 
and/or imperfectly competitive. 
Chapter VI includes a summary of the analyses, comparison of policy 
alternatives, conclusions, and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The review of literature in this study is classified into three 
sections: the urban household model, the agricultural household model, 
and the international trade model. The review is mainly focused on the 
theoretical contributions that are related to this study. Following 
that, the limitations of the previous studies for both the planned grain 
economy and mixed grain economy are discussed. 
Urban Household Model 
In agreement with early works done by several economists such as 
Davenant (1699), Gregory King (1696), and others, Adam Smith wrote in 
1776, "Price varies directly as the quantity demanded, which depends on 
price." 
The foundation of preference theory was built by Daniel Bernoullli 
in the 1730s. Later in the eighteenth century, Smith provided the 
proposition that the demand curve is downward sloping. Edgeworth (1881) 
defined a cardinal utility function and derived the indifference curve. 
After that. Fisher (1892) and Pareto (1906) established the modem theory 
on the assumption of ordinal utility. 
An outstanding contribution of the period was made by Engel in 1857. 
He formulated the relationship between income and particular categories 
of expenditure. Walras (1874) presented a "theory of demand" and ob­
tained demand as a function of all prices and income from a model of 
utility maximization by assuming cardinal utility. In the late nine­
teenth century, Marshall (1890) introduced the concept of the elasticity 
I 
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of demand. 
Finally, Slutsky (1915) showed that the assumption of ordinal 
utility and other restrictions guarantee a utility maximum subject to a 
budget constraint. He also obtained a "Slutsky matrix" possessing 
symmetry and other characteristics. In 1934, Allen and Hicks redis­
covered the Slutsky model independently. 
Hicks gave an example of rationing demand in his famous Value and 
Capital in 1939. Several articles were published during World War II in 
British Journals. Scitovsky (1942) mentioned primary conditions for 
maximum utility under rationing. Nicholson (1942-43) used a two-
dimensional geometric argument to describe the consumers' behavior under 
rationing. A general approach to demand under rationing was worked out 
by Samuelson (1947) and Graff (1948). 
Malmquist (1948) investigated the aggregation problem of demand 
under rationing. He derived expressions for collective income, price, 
and ration elasticity of demand for a rationed good in terms of in­
dividual demand elasticities. Assuming random differences in indi­
viduals' tastes, Tobin (1952) revisited Malmquist's argument and studied 
the relation between the collective and the individual's demand. 
Tobin and Houthakker (1951) provided a basic theory of consumer 
behavior for straight rationing by using the traditional Lagrangian 
method to maximize constrained consumer's utility and did comparative 
statics for changes in demand under rationing due to changes in some 
demand parameters Including the ration itself. They discussed the effect 
of a change in income on demand with rationing and compared it with the 
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effect of a change in income on the same demand but without rationing. 
Tobin (1952), In his survey paper, had summarized a series of 
theoretical and empirical findings for a rationing demand system from 
World War II. Glower (1965) and Barro and Grossman (1971) used general 
disequilibrium to approach the consumer's behavior under a rationing 
system. Malinvaud (1977) and Muellbauer and Portes (1978) also extended 
rationing theory to provide equilibria that depend on properties of the 
demand and supply system under rationing. 
Follak published his two papers in 1969 and 1971 and applied theory 
to the case in which the ration is just binding. Howard (1977) developed 
Tobin's rationing framework into a more general case by using the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions and making some acceptable assumptions (such as strict 
equalities). He derived different demand functions for a representative 
consumer whose rations are not binding except for one and made some 
comparative statics. This is a theoretical improvement. 
Beaton (1978) expressed a hope that the duality theory can be used 
to generate empirically estimable demand functions under both rationing 
and nonrationing in the same way. Neary and Roberts (1980) developed a 
new approach by minimizing a constrained expenditure function to get a 
compensated constrained demand function and then used partial derivatives 
based on duality theory to derive elasticities of demand under a ration­
ing system. Hausman (1979) developed a solution procedure that is used 
for a unique optimum given the maximization of the function on a convex 
budget set. His general principle used in the analysis of piecewise 
nonlinear budget sets is to have the consumer choose the most preferred 
12 
consumption point on each budget segment, determine the corresponding 
utility of that consumption, and then consume at his maximum utility 
across all segments. 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) even discussed a modified AIDS (Almost 
Ideal Demand System) to project a demand system under rationing. Later, 
Deaton also introduced rationing into a modified LES (Linear Expenditure 
System). 
Not much theoretical work has been done on demand under a rationing 
system in a socialist country. In his early work, Market Control and 
Planning in Communist China. Perkins (1966) described the movement from a 
market economy to a planned economy in China during the 1950s. His 
conclusion for scope of market control is that the importance of markets 
declined after planned control. He discussed why the government used 
(formal) rationing for a number of key commodities such as grain and 
cotton textiles. He laid a foundation for further research on the topic, 
but he did not give any mathematical expression for the structural change 
in this classical book for the Chinese planned economy. 
Making the analysis of the Chinese economy. Chow (1985) pointed out 
the differences between planned and mixed economies. He also tried to 
use demand rationing to explain the planned economy. After comparing 
working hours of workers under rationing with those under an alternative 
purchase tax system (without rationing), he concluded that the rationing 
system discourages the worker from working as much as before. He did not 
express the mixed economy mathematically. 
Tong-eng Wang (1980) used a graphic analysis to explain the changes 
in demand under rationing in China but neglected the difference in the 
shape of the demand curves under planned and market economy assumptions. 
Terry Sicular (1988) examined interactions between the markets and 
the plan in the context of the Chinese agricultural sector. She derived 
urban consumers' demand, which is a function of a free market price 
vector, wage income plus government transfer, or the benefit consumers 
obtain from the dual markets (state and free markets) and dual prices 
(state and free market prices). From there, she drew her main conclusion 
that the aggregate demand for an agricultural product in a mixed economy 
is directly affected only by free market prices and not by state market 
prices (planning). Overall, this work is a major theoretical improvement 
for the Chinese economy. She did permit urban consumers to have free 
choices in both the state market (up to the rationing level) and the free 
market in her urban demand model; but as the case stands, her results 
always lead to urban consumption in the state market being strictly equal 
to the ration. That means, she did force urban consumers to use up their 
coupons, by assuming the equilibrium solution. This may not well reflect 
the real situation in the urban areas in China during the 1980s. 
Agricultural Household Model 
The first usage of the word 'supply' as an economic term in English 
appeared in 1767. Stewart mentioned that supply is found to be in 
proportion to demand. Soon after that, Adam Smith (1776) wrote, "Price 
varies directly as the quantity supplied which also depends on price." 
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Walras (1874) was the first to express quantity supplied mathemati­
cally as a function of more than one price. All of his supply functions, 
however, were derived from a utility maximization. Marshall (1890) laid 
the foundation for a theory of cost and supply. His most important 
contribution to the theory of supply was his concept of the time period, 
especially the short run and the long run. 
Hicks (1939) was the first to derive the output supply function from 
a profit maximization, in his Value and Capital. Later, Samuelson 
(1947), in his Foundations of Economic Analysis, also discussed the 
problem of a profit maximization subject to a production function. 
In about the last twenty years, economists developed the so-called 
agricultural household model to describe the behavior of rural households 
that are both consumers and producers. The important issue is recogniz­
ing the owner's time as a scarce resource. 
Becker (1965) provided a new approach with his theory of the 
allocation of time. He used utility maximizing subject to constraints of 
expenditure (including time spent in consuming) and a production function 
to combine both consumption and production activities into a household 
model. Although his main interest was focused on labor supply of the 
household, he founded a theoretical basis for the household model and, 
therefore, the agricultural household model. 
After that, Lancaster (1966) studied consumer theory under an 
assumption that consumption is an activity in which goods, singly or in 
combination, are inputs and in which the output is a collection of 
characteristics. He found his model to be richer in explanatory and 
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predictive power than the traditional model. Muth (1966) considered the 
hypothesis that commodities purchased on the market by consumers are 
inputs into the production of goods within the household. 
Hymer and Resnick (1969) concentrated on the necessary condition for 
using a household model. They assume that the leisure and labor demand 
are not choice variables. Then they found that there are two virtual 
prices for labor and goods, respectively. Thus, there are two equali­
ties on supply and demand rather than one. They thought of relaxing the 
assumption, in other words, assuming that a labor market may be assumed 
to exist, or that the consumption and the production for the household 
are dependent on each other. After 1975, World Bank and Stanford Univer­
sity staffs have developed agricultural household models that combine the 
consumption and the production with the labor supply of the household. 
Some theoretical works have been completed on the rural demand and 
supply under rationing and procurement in the Chinese economy. Without 
using any mathematical expression, Perkins (1968) also introduced the 
transition from the market economy to the planned economy in rural areas 
in China during the mid-1950s. He discussed the Interaction of the 
market and plan in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Walker (1984) studied grain procurement and consumption in China. 
He provided plenty of data that had been carefully collected from all 
possible publications including Journals, news, and other sources. Where 
data was missing, his work was very helpful in furthering research on 
rural demand and supply, as well as on urban demand. 
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Chow (1985) Illustrated the rationing system in China. He examined 
a demand system with rationing for the Chinese economy and discussed 
relationships between the rural consumption and production for agricul­
tural households. Later he did distinguish between urban consumption and 
rural consumption and tried to explain urban-rural income redistribution 
in China. He used an aggregate production function to model Chinese 
agriculture. 
Wang (1980) used a normal supply curve to graph China's situation 
and tried to explain the price policy of the government, but neglected 
the difference in the shape of supply curves in both market and planned 
economies. 
Sicular (1983) first provided an agricultural household model for 
the Chinese planned economy. She assumed that the households' behaviors 
were represented by a utility maximization subject to a budget, the 
production function, and a quota constraint. On a theoretical basis, she 
conducted analysis for the team behavior with and without a quota. 
Although she tried to use alternative unrestricted utility maximization 
with the exact same first-order conditions to replace the restricted 
utility maximization, there was a minor mistake in her work so that the 
first-order conditions for both the utility maximization problems were 
not identical as she wished. 
Using her early work, Sicular (1988) published a paper in the 
Journal of Political Economy in which the interaction between the markets 
and plan in the Chinese mixed economy was examined. At this 
time, she applied a modern aggregate agricultural household model to 
represent the agricultural sector in the economy. According to her 
result, the rural demand function is a function of the free market price, 
income plus an extra term that is named a lump-sum transfer and equals 
the sum of the quota levels times the difference between the market and 
state prices. On the other hand, the rural supply function Is identical 
to what would exist in the absence of planning, in other words, the 
market economy. As mentioned before it) urban household models in this 
chapter, by this kind of aggregation and assumption for equilibrium 
condition, she could ensure the results derived. The general rural 
demand and supply functions may not be properly specified for the Chinese 
mixed economy without allowing for the differences in activities of 
agricultural households in the market(s). 
International Trade Model 
James Mill (1804) was the first to formulate the theory of compara­
tive advantage and explain its practical meaning in terms of cost ratios. 
David Rlcardo (1817), in his famous On the Principles of Political 
Economy and Taxation, gave an explicit formulation of the theory and 
attempted to spell out the implications of trade theory so that the 
theory became well known as the Ricardian theory. 
Later in the nineteenth century, John S. Mill (1909; the first 
edition published in 1848), the son of James Mill, completed the theory 
by taking account of the role of reciprocal demands to explain how the 
exact international terms of trade would occur between the two closed 
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economy equilibrium price ratios of two commodities by means of recipro­
cal demand in each country. Mill described this situation as the 
equation of international demand. 
To make an attempt to reduce a complex problem to a more manageable 
form by isolating one sector of the economy or one (or several) commodi­
ties in the economy, the partial equilibrium model was developed in the 
tradition of Alfred Marshall (1890). The partial equilibrium model also 
is often vised for the international trade of agricultural commodities. 
Not much theoretical work has been done on international agricul­
tural trade in the Chinese economy. Perkins (1967), in his paper, "The 
International Impact on Chinese Central Planning," pointed out the basic 
strategy of international trade for Chinese planners. He also mentioned 
the limited size of trade due to the self-sufficiency of the Chinese 
economy and limited availability of foreign currency for the Chinese 
government. 
Surls (1984) suggested several possible explanatory variables that 
affect China's grain trade levels. He identified the factors as the 
urban grain demand and supply balance, world grain market prices, the 
balance of payments situation, trade policy, and economic priorities. He 
even tried to use an econometric model to verify the determinants of 
grain trade for China. 
The World Bank (1985a, 1985b) publication, Long-Term Development 
Issues and Options for China, used a material-balance table to simulate 
the trade behavior of the Chinese government. The basic consideration Is 
that foreign trade, in particular sectors, is adjusted in each period to 
fill the gap between the domestic demand and supply. Other projections, 
such as Noh (1983), or Carter and Zhong (1988), followed the same idea to 
form a balance sheet to predict grain trade trends for China. 
Discussion of Limitations 
As just mentioned, the theoretical derivations of grain models for 
the Chinese economy so far are unsatisfactory. For the current inves­
tigation on the demand and the supply functions for both planned and 
mixed economies, the theory is not well constructed. In particular, the 
roles of both state and market price mechanisms in either planned or 
mixed economies are not completely clear. Both the theoretical and 
empirical results are still open to question. Therefore, it is necessary 
to discuss the limitations of previous studies and hence to indicate 
further developments required for this study. 
The planned grain economy 
What is the proper modelling framework for the planned grain economy 
in China? More specifically, what is the role of the state price 
mechanism for the planned grain economy in China? These questions are 
still not resolved. The reasons can be understood from the discussion in 
this study. 
Behaviors of the urban households and the urban grain demand It 
is widely accepted that the domestic demand for food grain in the Chinese 
planned economy can be divided into two sections ; urban demand and rural 
demand. The former is derived from urban households' behavlor(s), where­
as the latter is mainly derived from behavior(s) of production teams. 
still, some technical problems need to be solved. It has been 
obvious that the behaviors of urban households are classified into 
different types of groups by their situation relative to the ration in 
the state market. Allowing for the difference in types among the urban 
households, how to aggregate the individual demands into urban grain 
demand in the planned economy has not been discussed. Therefore, the 
correct specified functional form for the urban grain demand, which has 
to Include all proper factors that influence or change the demand, has 
not yet been set up. Furthermore, the right shape of the urban grain 
demand function in the Chinese economy has not been traced out. Finally, 
the role of the state price of grain in the planned economy has not been 
clearly described. 
To solve these problems, we suggest using the two-stage aggregation 
method in this study. First, we have to derive different individual 
demand functions by distinguishing different types of urban households' 
behaviors, then aggregate the individual demands into the group demand by 
assuming that all individuals within the group are identical, and, 
finally, into the total urban demand in the planned economy. Working in 
this way, the aggregate urban grain demand function contains all of the 
proper factors that reflect the real situation correctly and makes its 
shape and the role of the state price mechanism much clearer. 
Behaviors of the state farms and the agricultural production teams 
and the rural grain demand and sunriv It is known that there were two 
different kinds of rural enterprises in the Chinese planned economy: 
state farms, which were state-owned and production teams, which were 
collective. The past theoretical studies on the rural grain demand and 
supply concentrated only on behavior of the production teams and not on 
the behavior of the state farms. Furthermore, the studies ignored the 
different behaviors of the production teams in the state market. 
Some theoretical work needs to be done in this study. Funda­
mentally speaking, how do the state farms or production teams relate to 
the rural grain demand and supply in the Chinese planned economy? More 
directly, what are the behaviors of the state farms or the production 
teams in the state market? Is there any difference in relationships to 
the state market among the state farms or production teams? The basic 
questions are how to derive and aggregate both individual demands and 
supplies for the state farms or production teams, allowing for the 
differences in their situations under the procurement and rationing 
systems, respectively. 
Using the two-stage aggregation method and following the similar 
assumption; step by step, we can work out the above problems and reach 
the correctly specified functional forms for both the rural grain demand 
and supply in the Chinese planned economy. These functions will contain 
all of the proper factors that influence the market activities and make 
the shapes of the rural demand and supply curves apparent. It is 
necessary to point out that the role of the state price will be clearly 
seen by means of the effective and Ineffective components within the 
rural grain demand and/or supply function(s). 
Behavior of the Chinese government and international grain trade 
The behavior of the Chinese government in international (grain) trade in 
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a planned economy has been described in many previous studies. It is 
generally acknowledged that the Chinese government has the monopoly power 
to manage its foreign grain trade. For the roles played by both the 
domestic and international price in the international market, the past 
discussions were mainly qualitative rather than quantitative and empiri­
cal rather than theoretical. Up to now, there has been no theoretical 
model that correctly reflects the behavior of the government in the 
international grain markets. 
The unsolved issues to be considered in this study are how to design 
a theoretical model to describe the activities of the Chinese government 
in the international grain markets and how to derive an import grain 
demand or an export grain supply function for the planned economy. In 
particular, are the grain import and the grain export independent of each 
other or are there any trade-offs between grain and other agricultural 
commodities, such as cotton, and trade-offs between different grains, 
such as wheat and rice? What roles in international grain trade are 
played by either the domestic or the international prices? The author 
will try to create a new economic model to answer these questions. 
Combining the domestic market and the international markets to­
gether, what is the equilibrium situation for the Chinese planned grain 
economy, how is this equilibrium situation different from a usual 
equilibrium condition for the free grain economy, and, finally, how do 
the government's grain policy instruments (either domestic or interna­
tional) affect the equilibrium? These questions also will be answered by 
making a proper theoretical analysis in this study. 
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The mixed grain economy 
The proper modeling framework for the mixed grain economy in China, 
more specifically, the roles of the state and the free market price 
mechanisms in the Chinese mixed economy, are still questions in need of 
answers. The readers can recognize these issues from the next discus­
sion. 
Behaviors of the urban houaeholda and the urban grain demand As 
studied in the planned grain economy, the demand in the Chinese mixed 
grain economy is regularly divided into two sections: the urban demand 
and the rural demand. The urban grain demand is still derived from the 
behaviors of urban households. 
After the shift from a planned economy to a mixed economy, the urban 
households have found themselves facing a new environment. The new model 
that reflects the change has been created by Byrd (1987) and Slcular 
(1988) without considering the difference of the households' situations 
related to the state market and the free market. 
Still, some technical problems exist in the theoretical derivation. 
Given the differences in the individual households' situations in the 
state market in the planned economy, what is the change in their be­
haviors to adjust themselves to fit the new economy? More specifically, 
changes in the functional forms for the individual and aggregate urban 
grain demand(s) that allow for the existence of different types of urban 
households in the mixed economy have to be explored and stressed. The 
roles of both the state and the free market price in both the state and 
free market have to be Illustrated separately and clearly. Last, the 
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shapes of urban demand functions In both the state and the free market 
have to be truly traced out. 
Behaviors of state farm (households^  and agricultural households and 
rural grain demand and supply Since the institutional change in the 
economic reform, the basic unit of rural consumption and production has 
become the individual or household, either the state farm household that 
belongs to the state farm, or the agricultural household which belonged 
to the production team. The previous theoretical studies on the rural 
grain demand and supply were focused mainly on the behavior of the agri­
cultural households. Moreover, most of the studies ignored the dif­
ference in the behaviors among the agricultural households in both the 
state market and free market. 
The same theoretical questions, that were presented for the planned 
rural economy need to be settled in the study for the mixed rural 
economy. They are: how the state farm (households) or agricultural 
households connect with the rural grain demand and supply in the Chinese 
mixed economy, in detail, how to derive and aggregate individual demands 
and supplies, allowing for different types of state farm (households) or 
agricultural households, respectively, and how to evaluate the price 
effects (both the state and the free market prices) on these aggregate 
rural grain demands and supplies. 
Behavior of the Chinese government and International trade The 
behavior of the Chinese government in international (grain) trade in a 
mixed economy has been discussed in several studies. Although the 
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Chinese government has decentralized the management of foreign trade, It 
Is still acknowledged that the central government has the authority to 
make the final decision on its foreign grain trade. Unfortunately, there 
has been no theoretical model that properly presents the changing 
behavior of the government in the international grain markets. 
The unsolved problems are similar to those presented in the planned 
economy and it is unnecessary to repeat them here; but special attention 
will be paid to those changes brought by the structural reform, in other 
words, change in the model designing, change in the function form of 
Import grain demand/ export grain supply, change in market roles played 
by the domestic and the international market prices, and finally, change 
in Interactions of government plan and domestic and international market. 
Modeling the Chinese Grain Economy 
After the theoretical analysis for both the planned and the mixed 
grain economy, the empirical analyses can be made on the basis of the 
theoretical models and careful comparisons for both the planned and the 
mixed grain economies. 
It may be possible to build a theoretical model to Include both the 
planned economy and the mixed economy by distinguishing different time 
periods. Until now, there has been no such econometric model to deal 
with projections for the Chinese grain economy and to evaluate policy 
alternatives for the structural changes within the economies. 
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CHAPTER III. THE CHINESE PLANNED GRAIN ECONOMY 
Central planning is considered by the Chinese government as essen­
tial to the national economy and is set up on the basis of public 
ownership of production means including state and collective ownership. 
After organizing collectives in the mid-1950s, combining a planning 
system with a marketing system, the government centralized control of the 
grain economy. To ensure rapid growth of industries and meet basic needs 
of the population, the government became involved, through direct and 
indirect plans, in almost all agricultural economic activities, such as 
resource allocation, investment distribution, production decisions, and, 
especially, marketing decisions. 
This chapter deals with a theoretical model for the Chinese planned 
grain economy. To begin with, a brief overview is presented on the 
planning and the marketing frameworks in the economy to help the readers 
understand the theoretical work. This is followed by three sections of 
theoretical discussion: the behavior of the urban households, the 
behaviors of state farms and agricultural production teams, and the 
behavior of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT), These sections develop 
an urban household model, a state farm model and an agricultural produc­
tion team model, and a MOFT model, respectively. 
General Framework of the Chinese 
Planned Grain Economy 
Because the Chinese government managed its grain economy by using 
the forces of both the plans and the market, it is necessary to introduce 
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the Chinese planned grain economy from both aspects of planning and 
marketing processes. The material used In the planning framework Is 
mainly borrowed from Tuan and Crook's (1983) excellent report, Planning 
and Statistical Systems in China's Agriculture. 
Planning framework 
In mainland China, the grain economy was planned and managed at two 
levels : central and local. The local governments included provincial, 
prefecture, and county levels. . The top apparatus of the central govern­
ment is the State Council. Managed by the Premier and several Vice 
Premiers, the State Council sets up several various commissions, min­
istries, and other agencies to perform its administrative functions. The 
responsibilities of the commissions are to help the State Council to 
coordinate its programs. Among these commissions, the State Planning 
Commission bears most of the responsibility for central plans, including 
agricultural plans. It works with the State Economic Commission, the 
State Capital Construction Commission, the State Statistical Bureau, the 
People's Bank of China, the economic ministries, and other agencies 
subordinate to the State Council to formulate national plans for dif­
ferent periods, such as five years or annually. The annual plans are 
actually carried out in practical economic activities. Plans for the 
coming year are formed in the fall before the new year so that the 
agricultural output for the current year can be known by the planners. 
There were 29 provincial, municipal, or autonomous region govern­
ments, 220 prefectural and 2300 county governments in China in 1978. 
Zhongguo nongye nianjian bianji weiyuanhui, 1981. 
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The foundation of an annual plan Is material-balance tables specified In 
physical units. 
The provincial government Is led by a governor (or head of Provin­
cial Revolution Committee during the Cultural Revolution) who is assisted 
by several vice governors. It also sets up various commissions and 
departments that correspond to the national commissions and ministries, 
respectively. These commissions and departments perform their duties 
mainly under the governor's administration and receive guidance from the 
corresponding organs at the national level. 
The prefectural government is responsible for governing several 
counties within a province and delivering documents and reports between 
counties and provinces. The county government is controlled by a county 
chairperson (or head of County Revolution Committee during the Cultural 
Revolution). Both prefectures and counties use the same models as 
provincial and national. Different commissions and bureaus in both the 
prefectural and the county government also correspond to the commissions 
and departments at provincial levels, but on a smaller scale. The 
communes were basic governmental and administrative units in the country­
side and were managed by heads of commune (or the head of the Commune 
Revolution Committee during the Cultural Revolution). 
There were two kinds of rural enterprises in the Chinese planned 
economy: state farms^  and collective farms or the commune system which 
was composed of four parts--commune, production brigades, production 
T^here were 2002 state farms in China in 1978. Zhongguo nongye 
nlanjlan bianjl weiyuanhui, 1981. 
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teams, and agricultural households.^  The planning process was different 
for state farms and collective farms. 
State farm planning State farms drew up their own preliminary 
plans according to national objectives and previous production, then the 
copies were sent to the provincial government. After summarizing and 
balancing these preliminary plans, the provincial governments sent a 
draft plan to the central government. 
The Planning Commission and its subordinate ministry received the 
draft plans for state farms and integrated those into the comprehensive 
plan for the whole economy by holding an annual planning convention. 
After this plan was approved, the relevant local plans were passed down 
from the central government to the provincial level and to the state farm 
system. This is the direct planning process. 
Collective farm planning For collective farms, the planning 
process was indirect or semidirect. At the beginning, the central 
planners estimated demand and supply for each important and centrally 
controlled good, including grain, to form a draft plan. After consider­
ing transfer between the provinces, and possible trade with other coun­
tries, the Planning Commission brought total quantity of grain supplied 
and demanded into balance for each province. The initial plans were sent 
down to province-level administrations. The corresponding Planning 
Commissions in the province broke plans down among their subordinate 
T^here were 52,781 communes in China in 1978; each had an average of 
13 brigades and 91 teams and averaged 3279 households, 15,134 persons, 
and over 1,800 hectares. Zhongguo nongye nianjian bianji weiyuanhui, 
1981. 
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prefectures and then their subordinate counties as well as their state 
farms. In turn, the county planning commissions would distribute plan 
targets for their subordinate communes. Finally, communes allotted goals 
to their brigades and then to production teams, the basic production and 
accounting units in the countryside. 
At each local level, individual units received their target input 
allocations and output quantities. Managers, farmers, and accountants 
compared the targets with their own projections, then adjusted their 
goals and sent revised figures back up through the planning chain. The 
central ministries and commissions evaluated the revised targets, 
repeated the material balance procedure, and used the results as the 
final plan, which was then officially approved by the State Council. 
Approved annual plans were formulated at the province level, then 
sent through the same process of disaggregation. They eventually became 
provincial annual plans. Finally, the provincial planner sent annual 
plans to the county, then to commune, brigade, and production team. 
Individual units would receive their output quotas and figures for their 
resource allocation and organize their production by seasons. The 
planning process was finished. 
Figure 3.1 briefly describes the agricultural planning process 
Just introduced. The arrows in the figure indicate the delivery of the 
plans either between the governments at different levels or between the 
governments and the enterprises. 
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Figure 3.1. Agricultural planning process in the Chinese planned economy 
Marketing framework 
The state market In the planned economy, the only grain market 
is managed by the government and, therefore, is referred to as the state 
grain market in this study. Figure 3.2 shows the circulation of grain in 
the Chinese planned economy. The sellers to the state market include 
most of the state farms and most of the production teams (Type I and Type 
II). The former sell almost all of their grain product except storage, 
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Figure 3.2. Circulation of grain in the Chinese planned economy 
including seed and feed for next year's production, and the latter 
usually sell part of their grain product and keep the remaining part for 
their next year's production and internal distribution. 
The buyers from the state market consist of all urban households, 
all households in the state farms, the military, some industries, and 
part of the production teams. The production teams, as the figure shows, 
Include Type II and Type III production teams. They are classified by 
their activities in the state market. The Type III production teams are 
complete buyers or zero sellers for the state market. The Type II 
production teams are partial buyers or partial sellers because they also 
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are involved in the partial selling (buying) activities. Last, the 
remaining Type I production teams are zero buyers or complete sellers in 
the state market. 
International trade and the state stock are both used by the 
government to adjust and maintain the balance of the demand and supply 
for grain in the state market. The functions of the international grain 
market will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. The 
functions of the state stock can be summarized: 1) to ensure the needs 
between harvests, 2) to protect people against natural disasters and/or 
plan mistakes, 3) to have flexibility for fluctuation in the interna­
tional market to avoid unnecessary loss, 4) to overcome time lag diffi­
culties caused by both domestic and International transportation, and 5) 
to provide for emergency needs due to some abnormal situations, such as 
war or embargo. 
For those economic and/or political reasons, by affording high 
storage costs, the Chinese government has accumulated a surprisingly 
large grain stock. It is estimated that the grain stock in China was at 
least 50% to 70% of the annual grain consumption. To simplify our 
theoretical model, we assume that the grain stock demand (or supply) 
equals zero, and will leave it to be handled in Chapter V. 
Team-own market and team market Obviously, a study of the state 
market excludes the distribution activities within the production teams. 
For convenience, let us call an assumed market in which this distribution 
happens the team-own market. 
According to the roles set by the government, the team-own market of 
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grain does not open to anybody else except for their own household 
members. In this so-called team-own market, the only seller is the team 
itself, and the buyers are its own households. The distributions are 
generally made according to the work, ages, and sexes of the members 
within the households and at the state market prices (or less). 
In addition, another assumed market in which all grain distribution 
activities in all of team-own markets are added together is called the 
team market. The sellers in this market are teams, and the buyers, of 
course, are still agricultural households. 
Finally, we have a newly assumed combined market, which combines 
both the state market and the team market. Thus, in this discussion, 
demand and supply usually mean the demand and supply in this combined 
market, unless we mark out a specific market. 
The dashed line in Figure 3.2 divides the circulation of grain in 
the Chinese planned economy into two parts. The right and upper part is 
the circulation of grain occurring in the state market and under direct 
control of the government plan. The left and lower part is the circula­
tion of grain occurring within the team market and under indirect or 
semidirect control of the plan. 
In general, the circulation of grain in the state market was a 
smaller portion of the total output in the planned economy and the 
circulation of grain in the team market occupied a larger portion. For 
instance, in 1975, the government purchased 21.4% of the total grain 
output and the production teams distributed 78.6% of the total grain 
output. In the same year, the urban population comprised 15.7% of the 
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total population whereas the rural population accounted for 84.3%.^  To a 
certain extent, these facts provide a rough proof that the agricultural 
households in the Chinese planned grain economy still possessed self-
sufficiency. 
Theory of Urban Grain Demand 
in the Planned Economy 
Because the Chinese government had applied different measures to 
distinguish and treat the basic food grain needs for urban and rural 
people, it is essential to explore and derive both urban and rural demand 
theories for the planned economy separately. To start with, this section 
of the chapter focuses on the behavior of urban households in such an 
economy. 
For convenience, the general assumptions used in demand analysis are 
followed through this study. More specifically, there exist utility 
functions for households. These utility functions have the usual proper­
ties, in other words, completeness, reflexivity, transitivity, con­
tinuity, nonsatiation, and strict convexity. Finally, the objective of 
the urban household is supposed to be to maximize its utility subject to 
given constraints. 
The discussion of urban grain demand in the planned economy is 
divided into the following three parts: policy environment, urban house­
hold model, and aggregate grain demand of urban households. The policy 
T^he data used here are from the State Statistical Bureau, P.R.C., 
1987. 
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environment existing for urban households is introduced to make further 
theoretical analysis. Immediately after that, the individual urban 
household grain demands are derived from utility maximization and 
distinguished by different types of households' situations relative to 
the rationing system. The aggregate urban grain demand is finally 
formulated on the basis of the discussion of these different situations. 
Policy environment 
Ownership of assets In the Chinese planned economy, almost all 
schools, stores, and other enterprises are owned by either the public or 
by cooperatives. 
Labor Urban labor is hired by the government, public, or coop­
erative enterprises. The government agents set the wage rates for the 
working people according to their education, working experience, and 
positions. The people usually work a fixed eight hours every day except 
Sunday and the public holidays. Labor cannot be mobile between different 
enterprises without permission and, in general, neither can they be fired 
by their employers. 
Plan control To guarantee basic living needs of the urban house­
holds, the government issues ration coupons for food grain as well as 
other necessary goods such as vegetable oil, cotton, cloth, meat, and 
whatever else the government thinks necessary. The grain coupons are 
distributed to members of urban households according to their ages and 
occupations. In this way, the government can easily make a plan to 
supply comparatively sufficient food grain based on the amount of ration 
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coupons Issued. 
Market control Urban households can buy food grain only from 
state-owned grain retail stations with both money and the ration coupons 
in the amount indicated. Without coupons, people cannot use only money 
to buy any food grain; and, in theory, coupons cannot be bought, sold, or 
exchanged legally in the market or in private. The government also sets 
fixed retail prices for food grain in the state market, although it may 
adjust retail prices for some various reasons. 
Urban household model 
To some extent, any study is considered the continuation and the 
development of all previous relevant studies. Our study, of course, 
cannot be an exception. Noting that Howard (1977) has written a very 
fine article titled "Rationing, Quantity Constraint, and Consumption 
Theory," we are going to follow his approach in this part until the 
general urban hqusehold demand functions are derived. Working in his 
model we will, under the general circumstances in the planned economy, 
expand his derivation from a single ration binding to multiple ration 
binding and, therefore, deduce more general demand functions for both the 
rationed and the unrationed goods. 
Under the environment mentioned early in this section, the urban 
household in the Chinese planned economy faces a budget line formed by 
wage income and expenditure on all goods, given state prices and some 
ration constraints for some of the specific goods including food grain. 
Suppose an urban household has a utility function 
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u (X^ ...Xg, 
where X^ ...Xg and X^ ...X^  are rationed goods but Xj^ ...X^  are not. 
Assuming that the rations for commodities X^ ...X^  are and 
the prices for commodities X^ .. .X^ , Xj^ ...X^  are , **1 ' ' ' *'n ' 
respectively, and that a given household's wage Income is M because of 
fixed working hours set by the government, we express the Lagranglan 
function as: 
n 
L - U(Xj^ . ..Xg, . -Xjç, Xj^ . . .X^ ) + Aj^ (M - Z^ P^ X^ ) 
+ S A„.(R. - X.) (3.1) 
1-1  ^  ^
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions will be: 
aXi" fxj^  ~ ^1 • "^ 21 ^  °  ^  ^ k (3.2) 
fxi" 3X^  ~ •^ l^ i ^  °  ^  ^ n (3.3) 
Agi) - 0 1-1 k (3.4) 
•  0  1 - 1  n  ( 3 . 5 )  
1-1, ..., n (3.6) 
- M - SP.X, a: 0 1 - 1, .... n (3.7) C7  ^X 3> 
A^   - A^ (M - ZP^ X^ ) & 0 1 - 1, .... n (3.8) 
A^  > 0 (3.9) 
- R, . X. & 0 1 - 1, ..., k (3.10) 
2i 
1^ 
2L. 
dx^ i^^ aXj^  1^^ 1 
1^ 
a L _  
dX^ i^^ aXj." ^ i^ i) 
1^ & 0 
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2^1 - Xi' - 0 " 
& 0 i - 1 k (3.12) 
To simplify the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, it is better to make some 
further assumptions : 
1) Suppose that the household buys each kind of good, in other 
words, instead of (3.6): 
> 0 i - 1 n (3.13) 
then (3.2) and (3.3) can be replaced by 
-  V i  - h i - "  1 - 1  "  ( 3  1 4 )  
- V i - "  1 - 1  -
After that, both (3.4) and (3.5) can be dropped out because they are 
automatically satisfied. 
2) Suppose that 
M - SPX - 0 i - 1 n (3.16) 
i 
or the urban household spends all of its income in today's market. 
Combining (3.16) with (3.9), (3.8) can be automatically ignored. 
3) Suppose that some ration constraints in (3.10), say from h^  ^to 
k*"^ , are not strictly binding for this household, 
> 0 i - h k (3.17) 
immediately according to (3.11), this means that 
- 0 i - h, .... k (3.18) 
Undoubtedly, (3.17) and (3.18) can both be used for parts of (3.10) 
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and (3.12), respectively. 
4) On the other hand, suppose that the remaining ration constraints 
are Just binding, or 
- 0 i - 1 g (3.19) 
from (3.11), this Implies that 
Agi a 0 i - 1 g (3.20) 
substituting (3.18) and (3.20) into (3.14) separately, and noting that 
(3.15) represents (3.14) if (3.18) holds, we obtain (3.21) and (3.22). 
- ^ 1?! 2^1 - 0 i - 1, ..., g (3.21) 
~ Vi ^  ° 1 - h n (3.22) 
Thus, the simplified Kuhn-Tucker conditions consist of (3.21), 
(3.22), (3.16), (3.19), (3.13), (3.9), (3.20), and (3.18). 
Assuming that the second-order conditions are satisfied, we can 
solve the first-order conditions for the above simplified constrained 
utility maximization, given a rationing system. Let R - (R^  R^ ), 
and P - (P^ , ..., P^ ), the household demand functions for (i - 1 
n) would be either 
\ " ^i (^ 1 Rg, M) 
- f^  (R, P, M) i - h n (3.23) 
2: Rj^  i - h k (3.24) 
or 
X^  - R^  i - 1 g (3.25) 
We have extended Howard's results into functional forms in which 
multiple rations are binding. From now on we are going to develop our 
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own way by using these results. 
Especially for a particular rationed good i (i - 1, ...,g), the 
demand function of a specific household may be either 
~ f£ « • • •, _ 2 * i^+l ' ' " • ' Rg > ' • • • ' I 
- f^  (R', P, M) S (3.26) 
or 
(3.27) 
where R' - (R^ , ..., R^  R^ ^^  R^ ) and P was given before. 
These results mean that the household may have either one of the 
above two types of demand functions for a particular rationing good. Its 
choice may (3.26) or may not (3.25) be directly affected by the ration. 
Conversely, a specific ration may or may not affect a household decision 
or demand function. In the former case, the household's demand would be 
the ration itself; whereas in the latter case, the household's demand 
would be a function of prices, income, and all other effective (binding) 
rations until it reaches the ration level. Please note the difference 
between the ration effect and the rationing system effect. It is true 
that a ration effect will lead to a rationing system effect, but it is 
not true that a rationing system leads to a specific ration effect. In 
fact, the rationing system has an effect on a household demand function 
if and only if there is at least one ration that is binding. 
Obviously, there are two possible types of urban households if they 
face a rationed good, say food grain Xj. For the first type of house­
hold, the demand is not affected by the food grain ration but is by some 
other rations: 
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Xj - (R", P, M) 3 Rj (3.28) 
where R" is R', but excluding R^ ; and P is the same as before. 
For the second type of household, the demand is only affected by the 
official ration on food grain; therefore, it equals the ration, 
Xj - RJ (3.29) 
The formulas (3.27) and (3.28) imply the planned food grain demand 
of an urban household in the planned economy. Because the demand for 
food, grain is not more than or equal to the official ration level for 
both the first and the second type of household, the task of a central 
planner is to make available the ration level of food grain to satisfy 
the restricted need of either the first or the second type of household. 
Thus, the planned demand for food grain is just the ration level Rj to 
any urban household in the planned grain economy. 
Comparative statics The comparative statics are made for two 
types of urban household. 
1. The first type of urban household 
The food grain demand function for the first type of household is 
Xj - f^  (R", P, M) 3 RJ 
The comparative statics can be obtained as the following: 
ax 
< 0 (i/j) for substitutes within the effective rationed goods 
aRj^  > 0 (i/j) for complements within the effective rationed goods 
ax. 
" 0 for ineffective rationed goods 
aRj 
ax, < 0 
aPj^  > 0 
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ax, 
< 0 for Ineffective rationed goods 
> 0 for normal Ineffective rationed goods 
dM < 0 for.inferior ineffective rationed goods 
A brief interpretation of the results is that, for the first type of 
household, the grain demand decreases when grain price Increases, it 
increases when household's income increases assuming grain as a normal 
good, and it does not change if the grain ration Increases. 
2. The second type of urban household 
The food grain demand function for the second type of household is 
The comparative statics are shown as the following: 
- 0 (i/j) 
ax, ax 
.Pj - aP, - » 
ax 
- 0 dM 
It Is easy to conclude that, for the second type of household, the 
grain demand is only influenced by the official ration level but not by 
other factors at all. 
Graphic analysis The graphic analyses also are made for two 
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types of urban household. 
1. The first type of urban household 
As Figure 3.3a shows, and Xg are commodities. Xg is a rationed 
good--say food grain--but Xj^  is not. R is the official ration of Xg. AB 
is a budget line for an urban household with rationing, and AC is a bud­
get line for that household without rationing. 
X. 1 
A 
C X X, 2 2 R R 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3,3. The derivation of urban grain demand of the first type of 
urban household in the planned economy 
For the first type of urban household, its indifference curve is 
tangent on the budget line AB, either at point D, which is between A and 
B, or at point B. Because the ration is not binding, the household need 
not constrain its grain consumption at all. 
By assuming the normal negative sign for the price effect on the 
grain demand function of the first type of household, its demand curve Is 
kinked as shown in Figure 3.3b. As usual, the demand curve is sloping 
downward and becomes vertical after it meets the ration line R. That is, 
under the rationing system, the food grain consumption of the first type 
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of urban household increases as the state market price goes down until 
the ration becomes effective. 
2. The second type of urban household 
Facing the same state market price and official ration R, the second 
type of urban household makes a different choice. Its indifference 
curve, as Figure 3.4a indicates, would be tangent to the budget line on 
AC but beyond B. The ration in this case is effective, so the household 
is forced to reduce its grain consumption to the ration level R. This 
means a lower indifference curve that would pass through the ration line 
at B. 
X. 1 
A 
C X R 2 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.4. The derivation of urban grain demand of the second type of 
urban household in the planned economy 
The corresponding demand curve for food grain of the second type of 
— S 
urban household is a vertical line R in (Pg, Xg) space (see Figure 3.4b). 
Under the rationing system, the food grain consumption of the second type 
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of urban household is Just the official ration level and is not affected 
by any change in the state market price for food grain. 
Aggregate grain demand of urban households 
According to economic theory, the aggregate urban food grain demand 
is the sum of all individual urban households' food grain demands: 
UP  ^
D - S X, (3.30) 
j-1 J 
UP 
where D - aggregated urban food grain demand in the planned economy and 
Xj - individual urban food grain demand. 
Considering that there are two types of urban households, the 
aggregate urban food grain demand is the sum of aggregate urban food 
grain demands for both the first type and the second type of urban 
households, or 
(3.31) 
UPI 
where D - aggregated urban food grain demand for the first type 
of urban households in the planned economy 
pUPII _ aggregated urban food grain demand for the second type 
of urban households in the planned economy. 
For the first type of urban households, whose ration coupons are not 
used up, we assume that there are n households in this group and all of 
them are identical, even facing the same ration restriction, R.. The 
UPI 
aggregate food grain demand, D , would be 
J-1 ^ 
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ITP " 
- (R", P, M) 3 n^ Rj (3.32) 
For the second type of urban households, whose ration coupons are 
just used up, we assume that there are ng Identical households in this 
group, and they face the same ration Rj. Then, their aggregate food 
grain demand would be 
j,UPII _ J2^ UP 
J-1 J 
- ngRj (3.33) 
UP Using the above results, D , the aggregate food grain demand in the 
urban area in the planned economy would be 
UP "" — — 
- n^ Xj (R", P, M) + ngRj 3 (n^  + n^ ) R (3.34) 
Suppose the total number of urban households in China is n^  so that 
Ry - + ng (3.35) 
The total number of urban households is the sum of the numbers of 
the first and the second types of urban households. In addition let 
îr - fui (3 3*) 
u 
where is the relative frequency of the first type of urban house­
holds. Substituting (3.32) and (3.33) into (3.31) gives 
UP — — 
D - n^ Xj (R", E, M) + (n^  - n^ )Rj 
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- «"• ••• M) + <1 - fui) njj S "Kj 
UP — — —" 
- D"'' (P^ J, n^ , Rj, R", P, M) :S nRj (3.37) 
Thus, the aggregate urban food grain demand in the planned economy 
is theoretically specified as a function of the relative frequency of the 
first type of urban households, the total number of urban households, the 
official ration level for grain, the ration levels for other rationed 
goods, the state market price of food grain and other commodity prices, 
and the Individual household's income. Furthermore, suppose both the 
first and the second type of household are the same in size and income. 
Then, the change in the total number of urban households is consistent 
with the change in the total population, and the change in the individual 
household's income is agreeable to the change in any representative 
household's Income, regardless of whether the ration is binding, or in 
total households' income, regardless of the method for aggregation. 
UP In analyzing formula (3.36) we notice that D consists of two 
UPI UPII 
components, D and D . This conclusion is different from past 
studies. Checking the structure of both components, we find that they 
contain some different factors as well as some similar factors. This 
fact implies that each component sometimes plays its own role to affect 
UP the total urban grain demand, D , because of the difference in the 
existing factors. On the other hand, both components sometimes play 
UP their roles together to affect the D because of the similarity in the 
existing factors. 
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Second, formula (3.37) indicates that the total urban grain demand 
is no more than the product of n^  and Rj, or the planned aggregate urban 
grain demand. In order to estimate the urban grain demand roughly, the 
central planners need to find out the total number of urban households 
and to decide the official ration level for grain. Then they can obtain 
the result by performing simple multiplication. 
Last, it is useful for the government to consider relaxing the 
ration restriction or even the ration system. By the Le Chatelier 
principle and observing formula (3.37), we know that the individual urban 
grain demand of the second type of urban household cannot be reduced by 
relaxing the ration constraint. In other words, the individual urban 
grain demand of the second type of urban household without ration 
constraint cannot be less than that with the ration constraint. Thus, 
the total urban grain demand of the second type of household cannot be 
reduced if the government decides to cancel the usage of ration coupons 
for grain. On the other hand, if the government relaxes other ration 
constraints except for grain, by the same principle and similar in­
ference, we can conclude that the total urban grain demand cannot be 
UPI 
reduced because the Xj and D cannot be reduced. Suppose the govern­
ment relaxes all rationing systems; by the same principle, the total 
UP 
urban grain demand cannot be reduced because both components in D 
cannot be reduced. If this is true, the total urban grain demand would 
be the same as the total urban grain demand in the market economy despite 
the planned state price policy. 
Comparative statics By using (3.37), the results of the 
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comparative statics can be calculated 
âj£!i ^ 
'^'ui afui 
-
- n^ (X, - Rj) s 0 
The total urban grain demand decreases or remains unchanged If the 
relative frequency of the first type of urban household Increases. 
- 'ul-'j + (I • ""ul) > » 
The total urban grain demand Increases as the urban population Increases. 
- ao""' 
3Rj aSj 
- - fui» "u > ° 
The total urban grain demand Increases If the government Increases 
the official ration level. Please note that the ration effect on the 
urban grain demand becomes operative because of only one component, 
UP • UP 
within D , rather than all D . In other words, the change In the 
offleal ration level affects only part of the urban households (the 
second type) but not all. In this sense, we name this kind of ration 
effect as the partial ration effect to emphasize the new discovery of the 
partial role of the official ration level In the planned grain economy. 
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arff _ açffi 
aPj aPj 
The total urban grain demand is partly influenced by Pj, the state 
price of food grain. If the sign of aXi/9Pj is negative, as the state 
price goes up, the total urban grain demand of the first type of urban 
households goes down; therefore, the total urban grain demand goes down. 
Thus, the slope of the urban grain demand curve is determined by 
Wj-
This situation means a partial state price effect in the planned 
urban grain economy or the change in the government price policy for food 
grain can directly influence grain consumption of only part of the urban 
households (the first type). Differing from all previous studies, this 
is a new theoretical finding for the planned economies. 
aPi ap, 
 ^< 0 (1 / j) 
• ^ul"u >0 (1 / j) 
Total urban grain demand decreases or Increases if the relative 
prices of goods increase. Note that this also is the partial price 
effect. 
an ' aM 
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dX 
" ^ul"u 3M^  ^  ° 
The total urban grain demand Increases when household Income In­
creases, provided that the food grain Is a normal good for the house­
hold. This means that the government income policy for households has 
also a partial (income) effect on the grain consumption of a part of the 
households (the first type). 
Graphic analysis The graphic analyses are made for aggregate 
urban grain demands. 
Formula (3.32) gives the aggregate urban grain demand of the first 
UPI UPI type of urban household, D . Figure 3.5a shows that the D is a 
kinked line that consists of two segments, a downward sloping line and a 
— c c 
vertical line passing through - P^ jn^ Rj on the Q axis in the (P , 
g 
Q ) space. 
pS oUPI 
<UI 
.UPII 
<UII <u 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 3.5. The aggregation of the urban grain demands in the planned 
economy 
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From formula (3.33), we obtain the total urban grain demand of the 
second type of urban household, As Figure 3.5b Indicates, the 
UPII — s 
D Is a vertical line that crosses Q^ jj - (1 - o" the Q axis 
S s in the (P , Q ) space. 
Finally, formula (3.34) indicates that the total urban grain demand, 
UP 
D , is the sum of the total urban grain demand of both the first and the 
second type of urban household. Figure 3.5c shows that the shape of the 
UP UPI 
D is similar to that of D , except that (1) the aggregate constant is 
S s s 
now - n^ Rj on the Q axis in the (P , Q ) space, and (2) the aggregate 
UP UPI downward sloping segment in D is steeper than that in D because of 
the effect of In addition, by the Le Chatelier principle, we know 
UP that the slope in D is much steeper than that in an assumed market 
economy because of the rationing system. That is why the elasticity of 
the urban grain demand in the planned economy may be very small but is 
still greater than zero. 
Theory of Rural Grain Demand and Supply 
of State Farms and Agricultural Production Teams 
in the Planned Economy 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, two kinds of basic 
rural enterprises existed in the Chinese planned economy: state farms 
and agricultural production teams. The behaviors of the state farm and 
the production team were different from each other because of different 
ownerships of their properties and different policy environments faced by 
them. Thus, this section contains two subsections: one is studying the 
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behavior of the state farm in the planned grain economy; the other one is 
studying the behavior of the agricultural production team in the planned 
economy. Each subsection is divided into three parts: the policy envi­
ronment, the state farm model or the agricultural production team model, 
and aggregate grain demand and supply of all state farms or all produc­
tion teams. To begin with, the policy environment presents basic back­
ground materials for state farms or production teams. Assuming the state 
farm's physical output maximization or the production team's utility 
maximization, we build a state farm model or an agricultural production 
team model to derive an individual farm's or team's grain demand and 
supply. After that, the aggregate grain demand and supply of the state 
farms and the agricultural production teams are formulated from derived 
individual farm's or team's demands and supplies in each subsection, 
respectively. Finally, the state market analysis is added for exploring 
and stressing the roles of the government in the rural state market. 
We now start with the first subsection: the theory of grain demand 
and supply of state farms in the planned economy. 
Policy environment of state farms 
The state farm sector consists of a small but significant portion of 
Chinese agriculture. According to statistics for 1978, state farms 
occupied about 4.5% of the total arable land in mainland China and 
produced about 2% of the grain output, which was about 10% of the total 
grain commodities purchased by the government. 
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State-owned enterprises As state-owned enterprises, state farms 
were completely run under the government's plans. State farms delivered 
their agricultural products to the government, and the government 
distributed equipment and inputs to the state farms. In case profit was 
generated, the state farms turned it over to the government, and the 
government gave the state farm financial assistance in case of a loss. 
Labor All laborers employed by state farms were paid a fixed 
wage, and they were not transferable between farms without permission. 
Consumption of food grain Laborers earned wage income and were 
free to use it to buy any commodities under the plan control. In the 
grain market, they were treated the same as the urban household by the 
government. 
State farm model 
As discussed before, under the government's plan, the state farm 
manager made decisions including the labor supply for grain production, 
and the individual households within the farm determined their own food 
grain consumption. Thus, the state farm model in the planned economy can 
be subdivided to deal with consumption and production separately. 
Food grain demand of state farm household As individual con­
sumers facing fixed wage income and ration coupons for food grain 
consumption, state farm households did not differ from urban households 
in the state market. The urban household grain demand functions (3.28) 
and (3.29) can be used for the state farm household. Thus, we have 
Xjg - Xj(R', P, M) (3.38) 
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or 
(3.39) 
For the same reasons, the formulas (3.36) and (3.37) represent the 
state farm households' different attitudes toward the ration coupons for 
food grain In the state market. The comparative statics and graphic 
analyses also are the same as before and, therefore, are omitted here. 
operation of the state farms was generally not profitable. Most of the 
state farms were established for pioneer settlement or land development 
In the border areas. There were several targets given by the state 
government to the farms. Among these targets, the gross output target 
might be the most Important one for a state farm, whereas other targets 
might be met or neglected by the farm's manager. Assume that the state 
farm's objective had been to maximize Its gross output, subject to the 
government's plan. Furthermore, assume that the production functions are 
all concave, homogeneous In a particular Input or output, and twice 
continuously dlfferentlable. The Lagranglan function Is then 
Food grain supply of state farm Before the economic reform, the 
n n n 
 ^- ,f,Qi(*i 
n 
(3.40) 
where - the 1^  ^output produced by the state farm 
- the h^  ^Input used by the state farm 
- the ration on the h^  ^Input to the state farm 
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- the h^  ^input used for the i^  ^output 
Qj^  - the i^  ^output target set by the government 
n 
X, - S X. . & 0 is an input allocation constraint imposed by the 
i-1 
government's plans. That is, the state farm can receive only X^  amount 
of the h input from the government. On the other hand, Qi - Qi & 0 
an output target set by the government That means the state farm has 
provide no less than amount of the • th i output. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions would be: 
SL—. at. . 
aXhj aq^  "2i 
f2l_ 
3^ i 
g 0 h - 1, 
i - 1, 
, k 
, n 
(3.41) 
h - 1, 
i - 1, 
, k 
. n 
(3.42) 
i - 1, . n (3.43) 
i - 1, , n (3.44) 
It;; - 9i - Si = 0 i - 1, ., n (3.45) 
i - 1, , n (3.46) 
Xhi a 0 h - 1, ... 
i - 1, ... 
, k 
, n 
(3.47) 
Qi & 0 i-1, ... , n (3.48) 
l^i 2^i - ° i - 1, ... , n (3.49) 
Suppose that Xj^ ,^ and Agi > 0 (h - 1, ..., k; i - 1. . • • »  ^ ) »  
then immediately we find out that (3.41) and (3 .45) become 
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ax^  " " ^ 2i 33^  " ° i - li .. . ! n <3.50) 
and 
- Qi - Qi - 0 i - 1 n (3.51) 
Furthermore, if 
- 0 i — 1, ..., n (3.52) 
then we have 
n 
S 
'11 " n-1 
-  Z  &  0  1 - 1  n  ( 3 . 5 3 )  
In other words, the constants (3.53) are not strictly binding or If 
A^  ^> 0 1-1 n (3.54) 
then 
ai - k 
-  X .  -  S  X .  .  -  0  1 - 1  n  ( 3 . 5 5 )  
a^ hl  ^ n-1 
In other words, the constraints (3.53) are Just binding. 
In fact, the constraints (3.43) are generally binding because the 
state farm accepted planned allocations from the government, and the 
constraints (3.45) must be fulfilled because the output targets presented 
the management level for the managers of the farms and are relevant to 
their future official positions. 
Note that If A^ ^^  - -0(1-1, . .., n) (3.41) becomes 
l-li.'.'iin (3 56) 
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That Is, there Is no freedom for the state farm to choose the Inputs 
and, therefore, outputs because every target is strictly given by the 
control plan. If this is true, solve the first-order conditions. 
Provided the second-order conditions are satisfied, we o'lltain the input 
demand ' s, which would be functions of and ; in other words, if 
both and are just binding then 
j^ i - \) h - 1 k; i - 1 n (3.57) 
On the other hand, if - 0 but > 0, the input demand X^ '^s 
would be the functions of X^  itself : 
\i " ^ i^ V h - 1 k; i - 1 n (3.58) 
Thus, the corresponding grain supply functions by the state farm 
would be either 
< «!• V \ VJ 
- Qj^ (Q, i - 1 n; h - 1 k (3.59) 
or 
- i - 1, .. ., n; h - 1, . . . , k (3.60) 
For the state farms, the grain supply functions are functions either 
of both the input allocation quotas and the output targets or of only the 
input quotas. 
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Comparative statics The comparative statics are shown only for 
the two different grain supplies by the state farms here. 
1. - Q^ (Q, Xj^ ) 
30. 
—^ >0 i - 1, ..., n; 
aq 
dQ, 
— > 0  i  -  1 ,  . . . ,  n ;  h - 1  k  
The state farm will probably increase its i grain output if the 
government either improves its plan allocation for the h^  ^input or 
raises its plan target for i^  ^grain output to the farm. 
2. Q^-Qi(V 
ao, 
_ > 0 
The state farm will probably increase its i^  ^grain output to 
respond to an increase in the h^  ^input supply from the government. 
These results imply that the grain supply by the state farm, in both 
cases, does not change in response to either input or output prices, but 
to the relevant plans. 
Graphic analysis For both supply functions, the supply curves 
are vertical lines in (P®, Q®) space (Figure 3.6a or b). Figure 3.6a 
displays a situation in which the output target is binding; Figure 3.6b 
displays another situation in which the output target is not binding. 
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Qi < Qi < 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.6. The grain supplies of state farms in the planned economy 
Aggregate grain demand of state farm households and supply of state farms 
The food grain demand and supply by state farms has been derived. 
It is time now to derive the aggregate grain demand and supply for state 
farms. We first aggregate the grain demand of all state farmers, and 
then aggregate the grain supply: 
Aggregate grain demand of state farm households Because grain 
demands of households in the state farms are the same as those for urban 
consumers, it is easy to conclude that the aggregate grain demand of 
state farm households is the same as that of urban consumers. Thus, the 
aggregate grain demand for. state farm households is; 
(3.61) 
- f^ p^ n^ pR, + (1 - fue?) n„^ , (R', P, M) 
'HF*j HFl) "HF*j 
- n^ p, Rj, R', P, M) 
where 
(3.62) 
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FI FII D , D - aggregate grain demand for the first type or the second 
type of households in state farms 
H^FI " f®l*tlve frequency of first type households in state farms 
n^ p - total number of households in scate farms 
Rj - ration of food grain for households in state farms 
R' - rations of other commodities except food grain for 
households in state farms 
P - state prices of all commodities 
M - wage income for households in state farms 
Aggregate grain supply of state farm households From the 
analysis for individual state farms, state farms have food grain supplies 
for either 
qf - Ql(5, 5%) 
or 
Q[ - Q^ (X') 
Assuming that all state farms of the same type are identical, that 
there are np state farms total, and that the relative frequency of the 
first type of state farms is the aggregate grain supply for state 
farms is 
(3.63) 
F^FI^ F^ i + (1 " ^ FFI^  ) 
- S(Pppi. np, Q, X') (3.64) 
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F 
where S - aggregate grain supply for state farms 
FI FII 
s , s - aggregate grain supply for the first or the second type 
state farms 
n_ - total number of state farms 
r 
Q - output target set by the government 
- input ration that is binding for the first type of state 
farm 
X' - input rations that are binding for the second type of state 
farm 
Comparative statics We are conducting comparative statics for 
only the aggregate grain supply of the state farms and dropping out com­
parative statics for the aggregate grain demand of the state farm house­
holds because of similarity between the individual grain demands for the 
state farm households and urban households. Therefore, the aggregate 
grain demand for the state farm households is similar to those for the 
urban households. The following are comparative statics for the aggre­
gate grain supply for state farms. 
By formulas (3.63) and (3.64) 
- sFi + sFi: 
• ^FFI"F< (Q' 
aZI. „ qF 
afpF "pOi > 0 
 ^- 'ppX > » 
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- 'fFI-V ^  < 0 as 
That is, the aggregate grain supply by the first type of state farm 
increases if the relative frequency of the first type of state farm 
within all state farms, or the total number of state farms, or the output 
target set for the state farms increases. On the other hand, the 
aggregate grain supply by the first type of state farm may increase or 
decrease if the input ration increases. 
s"' - (1 - fppi) -F Qi (X') 
dx' ^ ax' ^ 
Thus, we finally have 
âsL_ _ asfi asFii 
^^ FFI ^^ FFI ^^ FFI 
- Hp Q[(Q. \) - tip Q[(X') < 0 
65 
^"FF *"FF ^"FF 
aq aq 
That Is, the aggregate grain supply by the state farms Is increasing 
if the relative frequency of the first type of state farms decreases, or 
the total number of state farms or the output target set for the state 
farms Increases. If the government raises an input ration, the result in 
the aggregate grain supply by the state farms is still unclear. 
Note that the output target effect on the aggregate grain supply is 
partially through the aggregate grain supply by the first type of state 
farms but not the second type. This is a partial output target effect. 
In addition, the state grain market price has no effect on the aggregate 
grain supply by the state farms. 
Graphic analysis The graphic analysis is subdivided into two 
1. Aggregate grain demand by state farm households 
The shape of aggregate grain demand of the state farm households is 
the same (kinked) as that of urban households, but the intercept on the q 
parts : 
axis has been changed (Figure 3.7). 
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P 
Q 
"F*j 
Figure 3.7. The aggregate grain demand of state farm households 
in the planned economy 
2. Aggregate grain supply by state farms 
The aggregate grain supply by state farms is the sum of the aggre­
gate grain supply by both the first and the second type of state farms. 
The former is drawn in Figure 3.8a, the latter is drawn in Figure 3.8b, 
and their sum--the aggregate grain supply by state farms--is given in 
Figure 3.8c. As Figure 3.8 shows, all of the three curves are vertical 
lines in the (Q, P) space and have respective intercepts: 
F^I " ^FFl"F^ i' Qpil " ^ "^^ FFI^ "F^ i' F^ " ^FI F^II" 
We have finished discussion of the first subsection. We now move on 
to the second subsection: theory of grain demand and supply of agricul­
tural production teams in the planned economy. 
Policy environment of agricultural production teams 
Collective of agricultural households As a basic unit of 
production and distribution in rural areas, a production team made its 
own decisions to buy agricultural inputs from the state for use, to 
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<FI 
(a) 
F^II 
(b) (c) 
Figure 3.8. The aggregation of grain supplies of the state farms in the 
planned economy 
produce agricultural commodities by allocating its resources, to pay the 
agricultural taxes to the government, to sell products to the state 
market, and, finally, to distribute part of its products and income to 
its household members and to keep the necessary stock for its further 
reproduction. Thus, given the plan and the market control, the house­
holds' incomes and food grain consumption were mainly determined by their 
production teams. 
Labor The agricultural laborers were hired by the production 
team. Without approval from higher authority, the laborers could not be 
mobile even between teams. Usually, production teams set the minimum 
working days for laborers according to their ages, sex, and physical 
conditions. 
The laborers were paid annually by accounting their accumulated 
working points, which were determined on the basis of their working 
assignments and times, working attitudes and experiences, ages, and sex, 
etc. The accumulated working points were used to finance the grain 
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apportionment plus remaining cash income. 
Plan control Most of the economic activities of the production 
teams were restricted or guided by the government's plans directly or 
indirectly. On the production side, the government set some minimum 
area quotas for the main crops and rationed purchases of some inputs in 
short supply such as chemicals, fertilizer, diesel fuel. On the consump­
tion side, the government set minimum delivery quotas or sales quotas for 
the main grain commodities as well as others produced by the team, and a 
floor quota as well as a ceiling quota for food grain distribution within 
the production team. Finally, the government set stock quotas for the 
production teams. All quotas Just mentioned would be determined by local 
authorities and varied from place to place and from year to year. 
Market control The grain market for rural people was a state 
monopolized system in the planned economy. The government reserved for 
itself the exclusive right to purchase grain from the producation teams 
by using a quota system. Moreover, the government decided the procure­
ment prices of grain in the state market and imposed agricultural taxes 
that were normally fixed in grain upon the production teams. 
The government procured grain mainly from the majority of production 
teams that were totally self-sufficient; they were able to meet their 
floor consumption quotas after satisfying the procurement quotas and were 
not allowed to buy any food grain from the state market. Thus, those 
production teams are called nonbuyers or complete sellers, and they are 
classified into the first type in this study. 
There was a channel through which rural households could buy food 
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grain from the government. Two additional types, the second and third 
types of production teams, had the government's permission to do so. 
The second type of production teams are called partial buyers or 
partial sellers in the state market. They produced grain and fulfilled 
the delivery quotas set by the government, but they could not meet the 
floor consumption quotas for their household members because of either 
predictable reasons such as normally poor production conditions or 
unpredictable reasons such as some accidental disasters. Hence, they 
were given the right to buy grain back from the government until their 
floor quotas were met. 
The third type of production teams are called complete buyers or 
nonsellers in this study. According to the government's plan, they did 
not produce food grain, but produced other agricultural commodities such 
as cash crops, livestock, vegetables, fruits. The government set the 
ceiling consumption quotas for those production teams, and they bought 
all their food grain from the state market. 
Agricultural production team model 
For a production team, both production and consumption were managed 
by the team leader and guided directly or indirectly by the government's 
plans. Suppose the team's objective is to maximize its utility subject 
to its budget constraint, as well as several other constraints given by 
government's policies. Furthermore, suppose the team's utility function 
U(X^  X^ ) and production function G(q^ , ..., q^ ) have the usual 
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properties mentioned earlier In this chapter as well as In general 
mlcroeconomlc theory. To reflect the distribution activities happening 
within the production teams, we developed Sicular's model (1983) by 
adding two more constraints. In our model, the Lagranglan function for 
the production team would be 
n 
L - U(X^ X^) + S (PIAI -
i—1 
i—1 
+ //4i(*ic - i^> + - 4) (3.65) 
1—1 i—1 
where X^  ^- the i^  ^commodity consumed by the production team 
- the i^  ^commodity produced by the production team 
- sales quota for the ith commodity 
Xj^  ^- ceiling consumption quota set for the i^  ^commodity 
Xj^ g - floor quota set for the i^  ^commodity 
S (P^ q^  - P^ X^ ) & 0 is a budget constraint for the team. That is, 
i 
the team's total income from its production cannot be less than its total 
expenditure. 
X^  ^- X^  & 0 or X^  - X^ p >: 0 is a constraint that represents a ceil­
ing consumption quota or a floor consumption quota set by the government, 
in other words, the team's consumption of the i^  ^commodity cannot exceed 
the ceiling limit or cannot be below the floor limit. Last, q^  - X^  -
& 0 is a fixed sales quota imposed by the government. That is, the 
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team's 1^  ^output has to be not less than the sum of the team's consump­
tion and its sales quota. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for our model are now: 
3X^  " 8)^  • ' *31 • *41 • *51 ® " 
SL. _ A,P, -  A, as - A,, s 0 
"11 2 31 
" 1 % - "  
• '1*1) ^  " 
- «'"l " 
§5;^  - s 0 
* 3 i § ^ - °  
It;; - *1. - *1 = ° 
*41 " 
It;; - *1 - *1? = ° 
5i âX ^ - 0  5i 
i - 1, 
i - 1, 
i - 1, 
i - 1, 
i - 1 
i - 1 
i - 1 
i - 1 
i - 1 
i - 1 
i - 1 
i - 1 
, n (3.66) 
, n (3.67) 
n (3.68) 
n (3.69) 
(3.70) 
n (3.71) 
n (3.72) 
n (3.73) 
n (3.74) 
n (3.75) 
n (3.76) 
n (3.77) 
n (3.78) 
Unlike a usual agricultural household model, our production team 
model has three additional constraints: (3.73), (3.75), and (3.77). 
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Thus the results in our model, or the grain demand and supply by the pro­
duction team, would be influenced by the constraint(s) if at least one 
constraint is binding or not influenced if no constraint is binding. 
The situations for constraint binding can be easily explained. For 
instance, if (3.75) or (3.77) is binding, the food grain demand of the 
team is fixed at the ceiling level or the floor level. In addition, as 
Sicular (1986) pointed out, if (3.73) is binding, that is, - S^ , 
given the sales quota the grain demand and the grain supply by the 
team are dependent on each other, and separability of the model of the 
agricultural production team is eliminated by this binding constraint. 
Using the same procedures as in the urban demand section; making the 
necessary assumptions, such as the positiveness of all demand and 
supply q^ , equality of budget constraint; discussing the combined 
situations for these additional constraints; then solving the first order 
conditions simultaneously, we obtain the food grain demand function X^  ^
and the food grain supply q^  ^for three different cases: 
Demand Function Supply Function 
Case 1 
(3.77) is binding 
1.1. (3.73) is binding 
1.2. (3.73) is not binding 
Case 2 
V*iF (3 79) 
q^ -X^ p + (3.80) 
qi-qi(P) (3.81) 
both (3.77) and (3.73) are not binding 
2.1. (3.75) is binding (3.82) 
2.2. (3.75) is not binding Xj^ -Xj^ (P) (3.84) 
(3.83) 
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Case 3 
(3.77) is not binding but (3.73) is binding 
3.1. (3.75) is binding (3.85) (3.86) 
3.2. (3.75) is not binding Xj^ -Xj^ (P,Sj^ )(3.87) qj^ -X^ (P,S^ )+S^  
-q^ (P,S^ ) (3.88) 
These results indicate that, under certain circumstances, the grain 
demand function by the production team is either fixed X^ p^ or X^  ^or 
varied X^ (P). In other words, the grain demand Xj^  is either the floor 
quota or the ceiling quota or a function of the consumer and the producer 
prices. On the other hand, the grain supply function of the production 
team is either fixed Xj^ p + or varied q^ (P) or q^ (P,Sj^ ). In other 
words, the grain supply q^  is either the sum of the floor quota and the 
sales quota for grain or a function of the consumer and producer prices 
or of the prices and sales quotas. The corresponding relationship 
between the grain demand and the grain supply can be easily checked. 
Case 3.2 is an extremely restricted one. By the formula (3.88) 
qi(P,Si) equals Xj^ (P,Sj^ ) plus a constant S^ . Thus, both the supply and 
the demand curves must have the same positive or negative slopes with 
respect to their own price change and must keep an equal horizontal 
distance from each other in the (Q, P) space. Assuming nonpositlve-
ness of the slope of the demand curve and nonnegativeness of the slope of 
the supply curve, we drop out further discussion about the case In this 
study. 
It Is obvious that Case 3.1 and all the remaining cases (Case 1 and 
Case 2) can be included in the activities of the first type of production 
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teams, which is nonbuyer and complete seller in the state market. In 
addition to this type, two more special types of production teams exist; 
and therefore, our basic model (3.65) has to be adjusted to fit their 
cases. 
The second type of production team produced grain that was less than 
the sum of the floor consumption quota and sales quota. Thus, instead of 
(3.73) we have 
qi - J^ i - Si < 0 i - 1, ..., n (3.89) 
for this case in our model. Noting that (3.75) is not binding, solving 
the new first order conditions we obtain 
Case 4 Demand Function Supply Function 
(3.77) is binding _ 
both (3.75) and (3.89) X.-X.„ (3.90) q.-q,(P) (3.91) 
are not binding 
Another case applies to the third type of production teams, which do 
not produce grain by permission, q^  - 0 then - 0, and their grain 
consumption up to the ceiling quota is supplied by the government. In 
this case, (3.75) is dropped out of our model. Because of a drain on 
their strength and relatively lower ceiling quota as well as price level, 
the production team would not buy grain below the ceiling level. Thus, 
we have 
Demand Function Supply Function 
Case 5 
(3.75) is binding 
and S^  - 0 *i"*ic (3 9%) q^ .-O (3.93) 
(3.77) is not binding 
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In analyzing all of the above realistic demand functions of produc­
tion teams, note the roles played by the government's floor quotas and 
ceiling quotas. Indeed, all possible demand functions are not less than 
the floor quota and not more than the ceiling quota, that is, 
XjF=SXj:èXjc (3.94) 
In other words, the floor quota Xjp can be seen as the lower bound 
of grain demand by production teams and the ceiling quota Xj^  can be seen 
as the upper bound. The government can easily figure out both the 
minimum and the maximum grain demand by any production team. Thus, the 
government uses the floor quota and the ceiling quota as the policy 
instruments to plan rural grain demand for production teams. 
Turning to analyze the corresponding supply functions of production 
teams, we find out the role played by the government sales quotas. All 
supply functions are not less than the sales quota except for that of 
the second and the third type of production teams, that is 
Xjp + Sj ^  qj (3.95) 
In other words, the sum of the floor quota and the sales quota 
Xjp + Sj is the lower bound of grain supply by the first type of produc­
tion teams, which is the majority within production teams. The govern­
ment can easily figure out the minimum grain supply by a usual production 
team. Thus, the government uses the floor quota or sales quota as a 
policy Instrument to guarantee planned grain supply. 
Comparative statics The comparative statics are reported for all 
three types of production teams as follows: 
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1. The first type of production teams in the state market 
There are three cases for the first type of production teams: 
Case 1 
1.1. - X^ p + 
ax. 
- 1 
ax. iF 
ax, ax 
1 
aq, aq. 
" — 0 
Both the grain demand and supply by the production team are increas­
ing as the government raises its floor consumption quota. Only the grain 
demand, not the grain supply, is increasing as the government raises its 
sales quota. Finally, both the grain demand and supply keep unchanged 
when the government changes the grain price. 
1 . 2 .  X j ^  -  X ^ p ,  q j ^  -  q ^ f P )  
ax, ax, ax, , i are the same as that in case 1.1. 
aPi aSj_ axip 
aq. 
aq, aq 
as^  ax^  
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The grain demand Increases, but the grain supply does not change, If 
the government raises the floor consumption quota. On the other hand, 
the grain demand does not change, but the grain supply Increases, If the 
government raises Its grain price. 
Case 2 
2 .1 .  qj^  -  q^fP)  
These functions are the same as those In Case 1.2 except the celling 
quota X^  ^Is used here Instead of the floor quota X^ p. Thus, we omit 
comparative statics for Case 2.1. 
2.2. X^  - X^ (P), q^  - qj^ (P) 
ax 
ax ax 
as^  *^1 
S;-
aq. âq. 
as^  ax^  
These are the same as the standard demand and supply functions in a 
market economy except that the price here is the state market price. 
Case 3 
3.1, 
These functions are the same as those in case 1.1 except that the 
celling quota X^  ^here replaces the floor quota X^ .^ Thus, we omit 
comparative statics for Case 3.1. 
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2. The second type of production teams in the state market 
Case 4 - q^ fP) 
ax 
aXiF 
ax, ax. 
 ^3i/ ° 
aq. aq. 
ax^ p as^  
The grain demand Is fixed at the floor consumption quota and is 
increasing as the floor quota increases. The grain supply is increasing 
as the grain price Increases. 
3. The third type of production team in the state market 
Case 5 X^  ^- X^ ,^ q^  - 0 
ax. 
^^ ic 
ax. ax. 
ai,--
- 0 
aq. aq. aq 
ail " aXiP " ° 
The grain demand is increasing if the ceiling consumption quota 
increases. The grain supply is always zero. 
Graphic analysis The graphic analysis is made in the combined 
market with the state price for all three types of production teams. 
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1. The first type of production teams 
Case 1 
For Case 1.1, both the grain demand and supply curves are vertical 
lines in (P, Q) space (Figure 3.9a). While the grain demand is passing 
through on Q axis, the grain supply is passing through on 
the Q axis. Thus, the horizontal distance between the two curves is 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.9. The demand and the supply curves in Case 1 
For Case 1.2, the demand curve is still vertical but the supply 
curve is upward sloping, and the horizontal distance between the demand 
and the supply is greater than because is not binding (Figure 
3.9b). 
Case 2 
For Case 2.1, the demand curve is a vertical line and the supply 
curve is upward sloping, and the horizontal distance between these two 
curves is always greater than (Figure 3.10a). 
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- - - . 
"ic ' i^F *ic 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.10. The demand and the supply curves in Case 2 
For Case 2.2, the demand slopes downward and the supply slopes 
upward (Figure 3.10b), and the horizontal distance between the demand and 
the supply curve is greater than because X^  has to be more than X^ p, 
the floor consumption quota, and less than X^ ,^ the ceiling consumption 
quota. The demand curve becomes vertical at X^  ^ - X^ p^ and X^  ^- X^ ^^ . 
Case 3 
The graph for Case 3,1 is the same as that for case 1.1 (Figure 
3.9a) except that the intercept X^ p^ is replaced by X^ .^ 
2. The second type of production teams 
Case 4 
As Figure 3.11a shows, the grain demand X^  is a vertical line 
passing through Xj^ p on axis, and the grain supply q^  ^is upward sloping 
and on the left of a vertical line that passes through X^ p^ + on 
axis. The supply curve q^  ^ crosses the demand curve X^ .^ Given price P, 
if q^  is on the right of X^ , the team is a net seller in the combined 
market. On the other hand, if q^  ^is on the left of Xj^ , the team becomes 
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a net buyer In the combined market. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.11. The demand and supply curves In Case 4 and Case 5 
3. The third type of production teams 
As Figure 3.11b shows, the demand curve for Case 5 Is a vertical 
line that passes through X^ ^^  on the axis. 
Aggregate grain demand and supply of production teams 
Aggregate grain demand of production teams There are three types 
of production teams, according to their activities in the state market, 
or, alternatively, their situations relative to the ceiling quota or the 
floor quota and the sales quota. Situations are complex for the first 
type of production teams. Within the first type of teams, there are 
three subtypes that may contain even two different cases. Start with the 
first subtype of production teams. Assuming that the total number of all 
production teams is n^ , the relative frequency of the first type and the 
first subtype (within the first type) of production teams are and 
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are and P<j<2i< respectively. Furthermore, assuming that all teams of 
Til the first subtype are identical, we can obtain D , the aggregate grain 
demand by the first subtype of production teams, as follows: 
D - T^Il "T *iF 
Til — 
- D (PTI' PTII' "T' V (3 96) 
TI2 TI3 By using the same method, we can derive D and D , the aggre­
gate grain demand of the second and the third subtype of production 
TI2 teams. The only difference for D is that it contains two components 
rather than one to reflect Cases 2.1 and 2.2 within the subtype. Thus, 
DTI2 _ dTI21 ^  pTI22 
" ^TI ^ TI2 ^ TI21 "T ^ ic T^I ^ T12 ' ^TI21^  "T *i^ ^^  
" ^TI ^ TI2 [^ TI21 "T *ic + T^I21^  "T 
TI2 — 
• ^ (^ TI' ^ TI2' ^ TI21' "T- *ic' (3 97) 
and 
TI3 — 
D - Pçj,j (1 - - Pjj-2) "T *ic 
TI3 — 
- D (Pjj, Pjjj^ , ^ 1^2' "T' ^ ic^  (3.98) 
TI 
Adding (3.96), (3.97) and (3.98) together, we obtain D , aggregate 
grain demand by the first type of production teams. 
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- "t *iF T^I ^ TI2 [^ TI21 "t ^ ic 
+ (1 - "T + ^ Ti " T^Il " T^I2^  "t *ic 
- P^ j (^ TIl "t *iF T^I2 [^ TI21 "T *ic 
+ (1 - ^^ 121^  "T + (1 - T^Il " T^I2^  "T *ic^  
- D (^ xi' ^ TIl' ^ TI2' ^ TI21' "t' *iF' *ic' (3.99) 
That is, the aggregate grain demand by the first type of production 
teams is a function of the relative frequencies P^ j, T^I2' 
T^I21' total number of production teams, the floor consumption 
quotas, the ceiling consumption quotas, and commodity prices. 
TII Till Obviously, we can derive D and D , aggregate grain demand by 
the second and the third type of production teams in the same way: 
TII — 
D - P^ jj «Y *iF 
TII — 
- i> ly,, x^ p) (3.100) 
and 
Till — D - (1 - PJJ - PÇPJJ) OP 
Till — 
• ° (^ TI' ^ TII' "T- Xic) (3.101) 
Thus, the aggregate grain demand by the second and the third type of 
production teams are a function of the relative frequency P^ ^^ , the total 
number of production teams, and the floor quotas, and a function of the 
relative frequencies P^  ^and P^ jj. the total number of teams, and the 
ceiling quotas. 
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T Finally, D , the aggregate grain demand of all production teams can 
be formulated by summing (3.99), (3.100) and (3.101). 
(3.102) 
- P I^ N^ ^IF 'TI2 ^^ TI21 "T *ic 
+ (1 - ^ xi21^  "T *i ' ^TIl " T^I2^  "T *ic' 
T^II "t *iF • ^ TI " T^II^  "t *ic 
- (^ TI' ^ TII' ^ TIl' ^ TI2' ^ TI21' "T' ^ iF' *ic' (3.103) 
where 
T D - aggregate grain demand by production teams 
_TI _TII -Till - aggregate grain demand by the first, second, u f D ,  D 
and third type of production teams 
T^I' ^ TII " relative frequency of the first and the second type 
of production teams 
Ptii, P,j,j2 " the relative frequency of the first or the second 
subtype within the first type of production teams 
T^I21 " relative frequency of case 2.1 of the first subtype of 
production teams 
n^  - the total number of production teams 
X^ j, - the floor quota for production teams 
- the ceiling quota for production teams 
P - prices of commodities 
Formula (3.115) indicates that aggregate grain demand of production 
teams is a function of the relative frequencies P^ ,^ P^ ^^ , P^ ^^ , P^ ^^ , 
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and JPJJ21' tot*! number of production teams n^ ,, the floor quota and the 
celling quota, and commodity prices. 
In addition, observing (3.100) and (3.101) we note that 
TT T 
T^I "T *1F < D - ^ TI "T *1c (3.104) 
— Till — 
(1 - - D < (1 - f^ Yl • ^ TI2^  "T ^ Ic (3.105) 
That is, the aggregate grain demand by the second type of production 
teams is staying on the upper bound n^  under the government 
policy, whereas the aggregate grain demand by the third type of produc­
tion teams is staying on the lower bound (1 - P^ j - P^ jj) n,p re­
stricted by the government. Furthermore, looking at (3.96), (3.97) and 
(3.98) carefully, we find that 
T^I ^ TIl "T ^ IF " ^  ^ T^Il "T *1c (3.106) 
— TI2 — 
Pti Pji2 "T *iF  ^ T^I ^ TI2 "T *1c (3.107) 
— TT 3 — 
T^I(1'^ TI1"PTI2^ "T*1F ^  ^ • ^TI^ '^^ TI1'^ TI2^ "T^ 1c (3.108) 
The second inequality (3.107) is obtained by adding the following 
two inequalities: 
— TI21 **• 
Pti Prj,j2 T^I21 "T ^ IF  ^ " ^TI ^ TI2 ^ TI21 "T ^ Ic (3.109) 
— TI22 — 
T^I^ TI2^ "^^ TI21^ "T*iF ^  T^I^ TI2^ "^^ TI21^ "T^ 1c (3.110) 
Now, we add (3.106), (3.107) and (3.108) into a new inequality: 
T^I ^ T ^ IF ^  ^  ^^xi ^ T ^ Ic (3.111) 
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TI That is, D , aggregate grain demand by the first type of production 
teams is more than n^  and less than n^  Thus, the former 
is its lower bound and the latter is its upper bound. Finally, summing 
(3.104), (3.105) and (3.111), we immediately have 
That means aggregate grain demand by production teams in the planned 
economy is between the product of total number of production teams and 
the floor quota and the product of total number of production teams and 
the ceiling point. In other words, n^  X^ p^ and n^  are the lower bound 
and the upper bound for the aggregate grain demand by production teams, 
respectively. In this case, the government can easily plan and manage 
the grain demand for production teams. 
Aggregate grain supply of production teams By using the same 
aggregation method as in the analysis of aggregate grain demand by 
production teams, and making appropriate assumptions such as the total 
number of production teams, the relative frequencies, and identicalness 
of production teams within a certain type or subtype, we can derive 
(3.112) 
S ,TI (3.113) 
where 
gTIl _ gllll ^  gTI12 
" ^TI ^ TIl ^ TIll "T + ^ i) + ^ TI ^ TIl ^^ "^ TIll^  "T 9i(P) 
S (P^ j, P,j,jj^ , T^Ill' "t* *iF' ^ i' F) (3.114) 
and 
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S - T^I21 "T 9i(P) 
- (P^ j, Pjj21' "T' (3.115) 
S - P^ J (1 - P^ ii - T^I21^  (*ic 
TTl — — 
- s ('TI' ^ ni' 'nz' *ic' (: IIS) 
Substituting (3.114), (3.115), and (3.116) into (3.113) we obtain 
TTl "" — 
s - P^ J T^Il [^ TIll "T (^ iF •*• i^^  ^  ^^ '^ TIll^  "T 
+ P^ j P^ j2 "T 9i(P) + ^ TI • ^ TIl " ^ TI2^  (^ ic i^^  
- Pjj (f^ ii [^ TIll "T (*iF ®i^  "*• (I'^ TIll) "T 
+ P^ j2 "r 9i(P) + " ^ TIl ' ^TI2^  (*lc S^ )) 
TT — — 
- s (P^ J, P^ J^ , P^ J2' ^ TIll' "t' *iF' *ic' ^ i' (3.117) 
TII Till By using the same procedures, S and S can be derived. 
TII 
S - P^ II "t Si/P) 
- (P^ JJ, n^ , P) (3.118) 
and 
.Till 
- 0 (3.119) 
Formulas (3.117), (3.118) and (3.119) specify aggregate grain supply 
functions by the first, the second, and the third type of production 
teams, respectively. Adding (3.117), (3.118) and (3.119) together, we 
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finally get 
(3.120) 
• ^TI ^ T^Il f^ TIll "T (*1F "*" i^^  (I'^ TIll) "T 
+ P^ j2 "T 9i(P) + (1 - Pjii - ^TI2^^*ic + Sj)) + Ppi q^CP) 
" ^ (^ TI' ^ TII' ^ TIl' ^ TI2' ^ TIll' "t' *iF' *ic' ^ i' (3.121) 
where 
,T S - aggregate grain supply of production teams 
TI TII Till S , S , S - aggregate grain supply of the first, second and 
third type of production teams, respectively 
Til TI2 TI3 S , S , S - aggregate grain supply of the first, second, and 
third subtype within the first type of production 
teams 
Sj^  - the sales quota for production teams 
T^Ill " relative frequency of case 1.1 of the first subtype of 
production teams 
Other factors such as , P^ jj, P^ ^^ , n^ , X^ p, and P are 
defined as the same as those used in the aggregate grain demand function. 
Formula (3.121) indicates that aggregate grain supply by production 
teams is a function of the relative frequencies P^ j, P^ ^^ , P^ ^^ , P^ g^' 
and the total number of production teams, the floor quota, the 
ceiling quota, and sales quota, and, finally, commodity prices. Making 
the bounds analysis for aggregate grain supply by the third type of 
production teams, we can figure out the following inequalities by 
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observing (3.114), (3.115) and (3.116). 
PTI F' ,TI1 Til "t + Sj^ ) < S - T^Il [^ TIll "t (*iF 
+ (1 - P^ iii) "r qi(P)] (3.122) 
— — tt2 
Pti Pjii (X^ p + S^ ) < - P^ I Pjj2 "T qi(P) (3.123) 
Pti (1 - %i - 'tij) <*if + < s"' -
Pti (1 - t^I1'^ TI2^  *^1c (3.124) 
Thus, summing up (3.122), (3.123) and (3.124) immediately we obtain 
Pti nT (X^ p + S^ ) < s" (3.125) 
That means aggregate grain supply by the third type of production 
teams, or the majority of production teams, is more than Pti nT (X^ p + 
S^ ). In other words, the product of the relative frequency of the first 
type of production teams, the total number of teams, and the sum of the 
floor quota and the sales quota is the lower bound for aggregate grain 
supply by the third type of production team. If this is true, the 
government can easily guarantee the minimum grain supply plan for most 
production teams. 
Comparative statics The comparative statics are made for both 
aggregate grain demand and supply of production teams: 
1. Aggregate grain demand of production teams 
From (3.102) and other relevant formulas we know that 
dT _ pTI ^  pTII ^  jjTIII 
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a. D" - + D"' 
ai£. icHi ^ âEÎH ^ âiiîf! > 0 
a^ Ti dPjj  âPj j  ap^ j 
âlZi _ gpTIl ^  gpTIS ^  Q 
^^ TIl ®^ TI1 ^^ TIl 
_ âi£! + âBÎi! < 0 
dPji2 ^Pjx2 ^^ tI2 
TI21 TI21 
a£î. âi£fl ^ âi£H, asE! ^  „ 
ôn^  an^  an^  fliXj, 
a^.aaJH^o 
aXiF aXiF 
_ açIH + > 0 
ax^ c aXic aXic 
The aggregate grain demand by the first type of production teams 
decreases as the relative frequency or or its own price in­
creases, and it increases as the relative frequency or the 
total number of productions teams, the floor quota, or the ceiling quota 
increases. 
b. - P^ ij "r ^ iF 
- 'in *iF > » 
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aoTII 
ax^ p • ^TII "T ^  ° 
The more the relative frequency of the second type of production 
teams, or the total number of production teams, or the floor quota is, 
the more the aggregate grain demand by the second type of production 
teams is. 
c. d"" . (1 - P„) - Pjjj 
aoTlil 
3n^  - (1 - x^i " ^ TII) *ic ^  ° 
.nTII 
- •PTI - X^II^  "x > 0 
ic 
The aggregate grain demand by the third type of production teams is 
increasing if the relative frequency or decreases, the total 
number of production teams, or the ceiling quota increases. Thus, 
âcL _ acIL 91?"" < 0 
SPt i  afTI 
aiL- _ âûHI + > g 
3Ptii ap^ jj ap^ jj < 
è-Cr-
it-iS" 
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TI21 TI21 
âuL _ âfiîL + acIH. + ss^ IR > o 
aiy, âiVj, 8iy, 
aDL_aD!L + mIL> o  
aXiF aXiF aXiF 
âcL. âiiZL + > 0 
aXio *Xic aXic 
The aggregate grain demand of production teams Is Increasing If the 
relative frequency , the total number of production teams, the floor 
quota, or the celling quota Increases. On the other hand, the aggregate 
grain demand is decreasing if the relative frequency , or , 
or its own price Increases. 
Note that every factor (including P^ ) except n^  has only a partial 
effect on the aggregate grain demand through only a certain component or 
only a certain group of components within the aggregate demand function. 
By the previously detailed statics, the government can know exactly how a 
policy Instrument is going to affect the aggregate grain demand and how a 
certain type of production team is affected by such a policy Instrument. 
The government also can pay attention to a change in relative frequency 
of a certain type or subtype of production teams to estimate its effect 
on the aggregate grain demand. 
2, Aggregate grain supply by production teams 
From (3.132) and other relevant formulas we have 
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- s" + S?:: 
a. s" -
asH _ 
aPii 
as": 
a'Ti 
Cr 45^  + afrii as?" ap^ ii 
C" âsEi, ^^ TI2 as": **TI2 
^^ TIll ^^ TIll 
anr anr 
as": 
anr 
^ > 0  
âs!!. 
^^ ic 
0 
âfilf _ isIH: + as"' 
aSi ai, asi 
anIE . 
î° 
-„TI3 
+ f > 0 
a?^ aPj^  d?^ 
> 0 
> 0 
The more the relative frequency is, the less the aggregate grain 
supply of the first type of production team is. On the other hand, the 
more the total number of production teams, the floor quota, the ceiling 
quota, the sales quota, or its own price is, the more the aggregate grain 
supply of the first type of production team is. 
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b. S?:: - q^ (P) 
ggTII 
If- - "I > » 
a-Tll 
- 'in "i'" > » 
flP - P,„ n, > 0 
The aggregate grain supply by the second type of production teams 
increases if the relative frequency of the second type of teams, the 
total number of production teams, or its own price Increases. Thus, 
it-e-
Ci-C;-" 
CrC;'* 
T TI 
âsL. âsiL> 0 
^^ TI2 ^^ TI2 
Till ^^ TIll 
âsL _ âsZi + isEii ^ 
3X1^ an^  + 8n^  ^
aXiF aXiF 
aXic axic 
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If; - fff ^ Hp > ° 
The aggregate grain supply by production teams Increases If the 
relative frequency or , the total number of production teams, the 
floor quota, the celling quota, the sales quota, or its own price 
Increases. The aggregate grain supply is uncertain if the relative 
frequency x^i3 Increases. 
Finally, we also need to point out that the effect of any factor 
(Including own price) within the aggregate grain supply function is a 
partial one because it affects the grain supply through only a certain 
component or a certain group of components rather than all components 
within the aggregate supply function. This knowledge is useful for the 
government to use as a policy instrument to affect part of the aggregate 
supply and to predict the different responses from the different types of 
production teams. 
Graphic analysis The graphic analyses of aggregate grain demands 
and supplies of three types of production teams are presented below: 
1. The first type of production teams 
a. The first subtype of production teams 
For the first subtype of the first type of production teams, aggre­
gate demand curve is a vertical line whose intercept on the axis is 
T^lla " ^TI ^ TIl "t ^ IF (^ S^"re 3.12a). On the other hand, the 
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aggregate supply curve of the first subtype of teams is formed by the sum 
of a vertical line that passes through (X^ p + and 
an upward-sloping line (Figure 3.12a). Note that the horizontal dis-
TIl Til Til tance between D and S is always not less than S - P^ jj^  n^  
b. The second subtype of production teams 
For the second subtype of production teams, the aggregate grain 
TI2 demand curve D is the sum of a vertical line whose intercept on the 
axis is Qjj2a " ^TI ^ TI2 ^ TI21 "t *ic ® downward-sloping line between 
T^I2b " ^TI ^ TI2 ^ TI21 "T i^F T^l2b 3.12b). On the other 
TI2 hand, aggregate supply curve S is an upward-sloping line on the right 
of Djj2» and their horizontal distance is more than " ^xi ^ TI2 "t ^ i 
(Figure 3.12b). 
.Til 
- -S Til 
Til ^ i 
<TIla 
(a) 
T^llb 9i 
.TI2 
-S TI2 
,TI2 ^ i 
1. 
T^I2b T^I2a i^ 
(b) 
.TI3 ,TI3 
— S TI3 
<TI3a T^I3b ^ i 
(c) 
Figure 3.12. Aggregate grain demands and supplies of the first, the 
second, and the third subtype within the first type of 
production teams 
c. The third subtype of production teams 
TI3 Figure 3.12c shows that D , aggregate grain demand by the third 
subtype of the first type of production teams, is a vertical line whose 
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T^Il " T^I2^  "T ^ ic' intercept on the axis is - P^ i (1 
TI3 
aggregate grain supply S also is a vertical line whose intercept on 
the axis is Qpisy " ^TI ' ^TIl " T^I2^  "t ^ *iF + Si)' 
TI3 TI3 TI3 
horizontal distance between D and S is S - (1 - " ^ 1^2^  
— — — Til TI2 TI3 TI 
"T (%iF + - X^ g). Adding D , D , and D together we obtain D , 
the aggregate grain demand by the first type of production teams, which 
contains two segments: one is a vertical line whose intercept is " 
T^lla T^I2a T^I3a' **°ther one is a downward-sloping line (Figure 
TI 3.12a). Similarly, we draw S , aggregate grain supply by the first type 
of production teams in Figure 3.12c, which also contains two segments: 
TI2 
one is a vertical line whose intercept is + Qirj2a  ^ + 
Qlisb' another one is an upward-sloping line (Figure 3.13a). 
,TI 
T^la T^lb 
(a) 
.TII 
/ 
z 
/ ,TII / 
T^IIb^ TIIa 
(b) 
.Till 
<TIIIa 
(c) 
Figure 3.13. Aggregate grain demands and supplies of the first, the 
second, and the third type of production teams 
2. The second type of production teams 
As Figure 3.13b shows, aggregate grain demand by the second type of 
production teams is a vertical line passing through Aj, 
on the axis, and the aggregate grain supply by the second type of 
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production team Is an upward slope In the (P^ , Q^ ) space. 
3. The third type of production teams 
For the third type of production team, aggregate grain demand Is a 
vertical line that passes "T *1c 1^ (Figure 
3.13c). 
Now we can complete graphic analysis for the aggregate grain demand 
and supply of all types of production teams. By summing , Dçpjj. and 
In Figure 3.12 we obtain D^ , the aggregate grain demand by produc­
tion teams, which consists of two segments. One Is a vertical piece 
whose Intercept Is + Qxnia' another one Is a 
downward-sioping line (Figure 3.14). Similarly, the aggregate grain 
supply curve Is obtained, and It Is an upward sloping line In the same 
figure. In general, Is on the right of because the team surplus Is 
provided for urban households as well as other uses. 
T^a b^ 1^ 
Figure 3.14. Aggregate grain demand and supply of all production teams 
The state market analysts 
In the view of central planners, the main Interest In food grain is 
the balance between the demand and the supply occurring In the state 
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considering that the role played by a state farm is a nonbuyer or 
complete seller in the state market, and the state farm household behaves 
in the same way as the urban household does in the state market, there is 
no need to repeat the state market analysis for the state farms, but 
there is a need to split both the grain demand and the grain supply of 
production teams in the combined market into a state market analysis and 
a team market analysis. 
Derivation of team's grain demand and supply in the state market 
At the beginning of the second subsection, we already classified the 
production teams into three types according to their activities in the 
state market. In order to make the state market analysis, we are 
formulating the grain demand and the grain supply functions correspond­
ing to the roles played by these three types of production teams in the 
state market. 
1. Nonbuyer 
As a nonbuyer (complete seller), the production team provides 
sufficient grain to the state market as well as its own households by the 
government standard. It is not permitted to buy any grain from the state 
market; therefore, its grain demand in the state market is 
XJ3I - 0 (3.126) 
Its grain supply in the state market, q.^ T, is the difference 
between its supply and its demand in the combined market, or 
qjsi - Qj - Xj (3.127) 
Substitute Xj and qj into (3.127) according to (3.79) through (3.84) 
individually, and we have the results for three subtypes of nonbuyer: 
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a. the first subtype of nonbuyer 
Sjslll - (3.128) 
9jsI12 • 9j(P) - *jF 
" ^jSI12 (^ jF* (3.129) 
b. the second subtype of nonbuyer 
4jsI21 - 4j(P) • *jc 
- qj (P, Xjg) (3.130) 
9jsl22 • 9j(P) " Xj(P) 
- qjsI22 C) (3.131) 
c. the third subtype of nonbuyer 
j^sI3 " 4j(P) • *Jc 
• qjSI3 (Xjc' (3.132) 
That is, the grain supply by the first type of production team is 
the sales quota, or a function of the floor quota and commodity prices, 
or a function of the ceiling quota and commodity prices, or a function of 
commodity prices, or, finally, a function of the ceiling quota and 
commodity prices. 
2. Partial buyer 
A partial buyer (partial seller) sells its grain to both the state 
market and its households and has the right to buy some grain back up to 
the floor quota. Obviously, its grain supply in the state market is 
qjgll - Sj (3.133) 
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Its grain demand in the state market the difference between 
its floor quota and the remainder left after subtracting its state market 
supply, from qj, its total grain supply in the combined market, or 
Xjall - Xj - (Sj - qjsll) (3 134) 
Substituting (3.90), (3.91) and (3.132) into (3.133) we obtain 
*jsll " ^JF " 
" *JF • 9j(P) 
- XjsII (XjF' (3.135) 
Thus, the grain demand by the second type of production team is a 
function of the floor quota, the sales quota, and both consumer and pro­
ducer price of grain; and its grain supply is just the sales quota. 
3. Complete buyer 
For a complete buyer (nonseller) in the state market, the grain 
demand function and the supply function are the same as 
(3.92) and (3.93), 
XjsIII - Xjc (3.136) 
and 
"jslll - " <3 137) 
Comparative statics of teams' grain demand and supply Compara­
tive statics are calculated for all three types of production teams in 
the state market; 
1. Nonbuyer 
For the nonbuyer or complete seller in the state market, the grain 
102 
demand X. ? - 0, but there are three subtypes of nonbuyer in analyzing jSi 
its grain supply: 
a. The first subtype of the nonbuyer 
» qjsiii -
1 
as, 
The grain supply in the state market is increasing if the sales 
quota increases. 
9jsI12 " ^js (*jF' 
sr'-sf >• 
. .1 
The grain supply in the state market increases as the grain price 
increases or the floor quota decreases. 
b. the second subtype of nonbuyer 
9jsI21 " Xjc) 
£545121 _ f3i . 0 
aPj 3Pj > ° 
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fljsm. .1 
aXj. 
The grain supply in the state market increases if the grain price 
Increases; it decreases if the ceiling quota increases. 
9jsI22 " 9jsI22 (F) 
aq13122 aqufP) *%,(?) 
aPj -6Pj -aPj 
The grain supply in the state market increases if the grain price 
increases. 
c. the third subtype of nonbuyer 
9jsI3 • 9jsI3 (*jc' 
The grain supply is increasing if the grain price increases or the 
ceiling quota decreases. 
2. Partial buyer 
*jsll • XjsII (*jF' Sjsii - Sj 
! ^ _ 1  
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Sr-S;-
fljaii _ 1 
''j 
jail _ 0 
For the partial buyer in the state market, the grain demand is 
increasing if the ceiling quota or sales quota increases, or grain price 
decreases, and its grain supply is increasing if the sales quota in­
creases. Thus, the state price has an effect on its grain demand but not 
its grain supply in the state market. 
3. Complete buyer 
XjsIII - Xjc' ^jslll • 0 
aXic 
For the complete buyer in the state market, the higher the ceiling 
quota is, the higher the grain demand is. The state price of grain has 
no effect on either the grain demand or the grain supply. 
Looking back at all of the above comparative statics, we can con­
clude that all the factors included in both the demand and the supply 
function only have an effect on only a partial group of production teams. 
For instance, the change in grain price has an effect only on the demand 
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of the partial buyer and the demand and the supply of a part of the 
nonbuyers. This finding is important for policy makers to recognize the 
roles played by such policy parameters. 
Graphic analysis of team's demand and supply Graphic analyses 
also are made for all these three types of production teams in the state 
markets : 
1. Nonbuyer 
For nonbuyer or complete seller, the grain supply in the state 
market is either a vertical line (Figure 3.15a) or an upward-sloping 
line (Figure 3.15b). The former reflects the first case of the first 
subtype of nonbuyer, whereas the latter describes the remaining situa­
tions. 
jslll 
/ / 
/ SjsIlZ (21,22,3) 
/ 
J 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.15. The grain supplies of the first type of production team 
in the state market 
2. Partial buyer 
Figure 3.16a shows that the grain demand in the state market for 
partial buyers is a downward sloping line and becomes vertical at both 
*jsll " *jF XjsII X b e c a u s e  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n  o f  b o t h  t h e  f l o o r  jc 
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quota and the celling quota. The grain supply for this partial buyer is 
a vertical line that passes through Sj. 
Ijsll 
"jc 
(a) 
JF 
*j32 jsIII 
"jc 
(b) 
Figure 3.16. The grain demand and supply of the second and the third 
type of production team in the state market 
3. Complete buyer 
For the complete buyer, the grain demand in the state market is a 
vertical line passing through on the Q axis (Figure 3.16b). 
Aggregate grain demand of production teams in the state market 
TS 
In the state market, D , aggregate grain demand by all production teams, 
Is the sum of aggregate grain demands of all three types of production 
teams, that is, 
pTS _ „TSI ^  „TSII ^  ^TSIII (3.138) 
Making the similar assumptions and following the similar procedures 
in aggregation of grain demand in the combined market using formula 
(3.126), (3.135) and (3.136), we can derive aggregate grain demand by the 
TSI TSII first, the second, and the third type of production teams, D , D , 
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TSUI 
and D , separately. 
1. Nonbuyers 
- ^TI "t *jsl 
- 0 (3.139) 
2. Partial buyers 
- ^ TII "T *j=2 
• ^TII "T [XjF + - Si/P)] 
- (Pxii. "T' XjF' ^ j' (3.140) 
In the state market, aggregate grain demand by the second type of 
production teams is a function of the relative frequency , the total 
number of production teams, the floor quota X^p, the sales quota Sj, and 
commodity prices P. 
3. Complete buyers 
- (1 - ^TI - ^TIl) "T Xjs3 
(1 - - P^jj) Uj, Xjg 
TCTT — 
- D (P^j, P^jj, n^, Xjg) (3.141) 
Aggregate grain demand of the third type of production teams in the 
state market is a function of the relative frequencies P^j and P^^^, the 
total number of production teams n,p, and the ceiling quotas Xj^. 
Substituting (3.139), (3.140), and (3.141) into (3.138), we obtain 
D - Pçpjj nj, [XjF + Sj - qj^(P)] + (1 - Pçpj - f^Il) "T *jc 
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- (P^ j, Op, Xjp, Xj^ , Sj, P) (3.142) 
In the state market, aggregate grain demand by production teams is a 
function of the relative frequency P^^. and P^^^, the total number of 
production teams nj,, the floor quotas Xjp, the ceiling quotas Xj^, the 
sales quotas Sj, and commodity prices P. In addition, observing (3.140) 
carefully we can figure out the following inequality: 
TSTT — — 
0 < < Pp; (Xjp + Sj) (3.143) 
That is, the aggregate grain demand by partial buyers in the state 
TS11 7SIX — 
market is more than - zero and less than - P^j (Xj^ + Sj). 
TSII Thus, zero is the lower bound, and is the upper bound for the 
aggregate grain demand in the state market, or the government needs to 
TSII provide at most of grain to those partial buyers. 
TSITT 
Since formula (3.141) indicates that D - (1 - P.^^ - Prpjj 
TSUI the government needs to set a plan to sell exactly D amount of grain 
to those complete buyers. Adding (3.139), (3.141) and (3.143) together 
we obtain 
— TS — — — 
(l-i'Ti-^TII^"T*jc ^ ^ ^TIl"T^^jF'^^j^'^^^"^Tl"^TII^"T^jc (3.144) 
Formula (3.144) indicates that aggregate grain demand of production 
jc 
TS — teams in the state market is between - (1 - P,^^ - P^^^.) X. and 
TS — — — 
VX " ^ TII "T (XjF + - ^TI " ^TIL) "T Xjc' ^he 
lower bound and the latter is the upper bound for the total grain demand 
in the state market. To satisfy the basic need of food grain to team 
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TS TS households, the government has to provide at least but at most 
of grain. 
Aggregate grain SUDPIV of production teams In the state market 
TS S , aggregate grain supply of production teams In the state market, is 
TSI TSII TSUI the sum of S , S , and S , aggregate grain supply of the first, 
the second, and the third types of production teams in the state market. 
Algebraically, 
_ gTsi + s?::: + (3.145) 
Using the similar assumptions and methods in the analysis of the 
aggregate grain supply of production teams in the combined market and 
applying formulas (3.127), (3.128), (3.129), (3.130), (3.131), (3.132), 
(3.133) and (3.137), we can induce and individually. 
1. Nonbuyers 
TSI 
There are three subtypes of nonbuyers; therefore, S is the 
aggregate grain demand of the first, the second, and the third subtypes 
of nonbuyers in the state markets. 
3TSI . jISIl ^  5TSI2 ^  5TSI3 (3.146) 
where 
gTSIl _ gTSIll ^  gTSI12 
• ^TI ^ TIl ^ TIll "T Sjsill ^TI ^ TIl (I'^TIll) "T 4jSI12 
- f-rii ^Tiii "T + ^ Ti ^Tii ^^"^Tiii^ "T [qj(P)-%jF] 
• ^TI ^ TIl (^TIll "T Sj + (1 ^TIll^ "T t9j(P) - Xjp]) 
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- s (P^J, ^xill' "T' *jF' (3.147) 
gTSI2 _ gTSI21 ^  gTSI22 
• ^TI ^ TI2 ^ TI21 "T 9jSI21 ^TI ^ TI2 " ^ TI21^ "T 9jsi22 
• *'TI^'TI2^TI2l"T[9j(P)'*jc]+fTr^Tl2(l"^TI2l)"T[9j(F)"%j(F)] 
S (^TI' ^ TI2' ^ TI21' *jc' "T' (3.148) 
TOT? 
S - P^J (1 - Ppii - ^TI2^ 4jS13 
- P^j (1 - P^jj^ - P^j2^ (4j(P) - Xjcl 
TST^ — 
- S (^TIl' ^TI2' Xjc' (3 149) 
Substitute (3.147), (3.148) and (3.149) into (3.146): 
TOT — — 
S - P^J ^TII (^TIll "x Sj + (1 - P^m) "t [qj(P) - Xjp]) 
•*• ^TI ^ TI2 ^ TI21 "T [9j(P) - Xjc] 
+ P.JJ ^ipj2 " ^TI21 ) ^  [9j(P) " Xj(P)] 
+ Pjj (1 - P^;! - Pxi2) [9j(P) - Xjc] 
TST ^ "* ^ 
- s (P^J, Pjjj^, ^112> ^TIll ' "t' XjF' *jc' ®j' (3.150) 
That is, in the state market, the aggregate grain supply by the 
nonbuyers is a function of relative frequencies P^j, P^j^f ^xi2' ^ TIll' 
and ^xj21' total number of production teams, the floor quotas, the 
Ill 
ceiling quotas, the sales quotas, and commodity prices. 
2. Partial buyers 
For partial buyers, their aggregate grain supply in the state market 
TSII S is given as the following: 
" ^TII "T 
_ S^SII n^, ij) (3.151) 
In the state market, the aggregate grain supply by partial buyers is 
a function of relative frequency of , the total number of production 
teams, and the sales quotas. 
3. Complete buyers 
For complete buyers, their aggregate grain supply in the state 
TSUI 
market S is zero, or 
S - (1 - f^ll " ^ TII^ "T 4jS3 
- 0 (3.152) 
Finally, adding (3.150), (3.151) and (3.152) together we obtain 
(P, 
TI Til ^^Tiii "t Sj + (1 - Pçpjj^j^) ly, 
^Tl ^TI2 ^ TI21 "T 
"*• ^TI ^TI2 " ^TI21^ "T 
+ p^ j (1 - p^ jj^  - [qj(P) - + Pjii "r 
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S (•PTl'^TII'^TIl'^TI2'^TIll'^TI21'"T'^JF'*jc'®J'^^ (3.153) 
Thus, In the state market, the aggregate grain supply by production 
teams is a function of the relative frequencies P^^i, Pji2' 
^TIll' ^TI21' total number of production teams, the floor quotas, 
the ceiling quotas, the sales quotas, and commodity prices. 
Additionally, observing (3.147), (3.148), and (3.149), we note 
that 
— TQT1 
^TI ^ TIl "T Sj < S (3.154) 
— TCTO 
^TI ^ 112 "T Sj < S (3.155) 
^TI - ^TIl • ^TI2^ "T Sj < S^SI3 (3.156) 
Summing (3.154), (3.155) and (3.156) we get 
P^j n,j, S J < S^SI (3.157) 
That is, in the state market, the aggregate grain supply by non-
buyers or most of the production teams is always guaranteed to be more 
TSI 
than S^^^ - P^j n^ Sj, which is the lower bound for the aggregate grain 
supply by nonbuyers. 
TSTT — 
Formula (3.151) indicates that S is a constant P^^^ n^ Sj, or 
the government can keep a fixed procurement of grain from partial buyers. 
Combining (3.157) with (3.151) we obtain a new inequality; 
TS 
(Pti + "T Sj < S (3.158) 
TS ^ Thus, the government has a guarantee to procure )n^Sj 
amount of grain from production teams. In other words, S^^^ is the 
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minimum planned grain supply by production teams. 
Lastly, comparing aggregate grain demand with aggregate grain supply 
for nonbuyers, partial buyers, and complete buyers in the state market, 
respectively. We can figure out the balances between the demand and 
supply by these different buyers. Subtracting (3.139) from (3,150) and 
noting (3.154) we can get 
Pti ^TIl "r Sj < (3.159) 
Similarly, 
gTSII _ jjTSII _ [q^(P) - Xj^] > 0 (3.160) 
gTSIII _ jjTSIII _ .pTSIII _ .(1 . rvp Xjp < 0 (3.161) 
TSII TSII 
In general, S - D might be negative, that is, the government 
TSII TSII provides a net amount of grain to partial buyers. Assuming S - D 
< 0 and adding (3.159), (3.160) and (3.161) together we get 
^TI ^TIl "T " ^ TII "T [XjF ' 
- (1 - - P^jj) n^ Xj^ < S^® - (3.162) 
TS TS 
Let (S - D )' equal the left of the inequality (3.162). In the 
TSII TSTT TS TS 
case of S -D >0,(S -D )' becomes even bigger, but is still 
TS TS less than S - D Thus, regardless of positiveness or negativeness of 
TS TS TS TS 
s - D , the government can have more than (S - D )' amount of grain 
for use, excluding that resold to production teams or used by the rural 
people themselves. This surplus provides a base for the government to 
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make further plans to consider other uses, which Include urban people's 
consumption and Industrial uses as well as the needs of international 
grain trade. 
Comparative statics of agyreiyate prain demand and supply bv teams 
Comparative statics is divided into two parts. 
1. Aggregate grain demand of production teams in the state market 
From (3.138) and other relevant formulas 
• + D^SII + dTSIII 
a. Nonbuyers 
- 0 
b. Partial buyers 
TSTI — 
D - "T [*jF 
15-;;- - "T [XjF + :j - SifP)] > 0 
aoTSii 
an.j. " ^TII [*jF ° 
n„ > 0 
aXjF aij "I T 
aPj Tii X 3Pj 
In the state market, the aggregate grain demand by partial buyers is 
increasing if the relative frequency the total number of production 
teams, or the floor quotas increase, or its own price decreases. 
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c. Complete buyers 
TCTTT — 
D - (1 - ^TI - ^TII> "T Xjc 
aiZîîii _ gpTsiii - ^ g 
TI ""TII 
.TSUI 
aP^T • aP-TTT • " "T jc 
8n^ • • ^TI • ^TII^ *jc ^  ° 
TSUI 
„n - (1 - Pj i  -  ^Tii) "T ^  ° 
**jc 
The aggregate grain demand of complete buyers in the state market 
increases as the total number of production teams or the ceiling quotas 
increases, or as the relative frequency decreases. Then 
â£L. > „ 
aPTii 3^X11 ^^TII 
 ^_ 5£!!££, âcZfH 
5n^ 8n^ + dn^ > " 
aZ!_ 0 
aXjF aXjF 
â£!_ 0 
axjc axjc 
0 
asj asj 
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i Ç . Ï = < .  
Thus, in the same market, the aggregate grain demand by production 
teams increases when the total number of production teams, floor quotas, 
ceiling quotas, or sales quotas increase. On the other hand, it de­
creases when the relative frequency or its own price increases. In 
addition, each of these factors affects the aggregate grain demand in a 
partial way through a component or a group of components in the aggregate 
demand function; therefore, these factor effects are called partial 
effects in this study. 
2. Aggregate grain supply of production teams in the state market 
From (3.146) and other relevant formulas 
gTS _ gTSI + gTSII + gTSIII 
a. Nonbuyers 
gTSI _ gTSII ^  gTSI2 + gTSl3 
where 
gTSII _ p p (p 
TI Ptii (fg,211 Aj Sj + (1 - [qj(P) - Xjp]) 
TCTO — 
S - ^TI21 "t " *jc^ 
^TI ^ TI2 " ^TI21^ "T [9j(P) -
- 'in - ISj'" - i:j.l 
Thus, 
117 
is2i ..TSIl ,.TSI2 ,,TSI3 
ai>Ti SPj, af,: *'11 
.^ISI _ ,,TSn ,TS13 
^'tii ^'TII "TII * 
isZE. âsîflî ^  ssEîL >.„ 
^^112 ^^TI2 *^712 ^ 
aaî!L.asHH^>o 
""tih ""nil * 
â£!L . âsï!!H > 0 
^^1121 "TI21 * 
asî!i. âslîii  ^ âsI!H  ^â£!i! , „ 
aof aoj ^ aiij * dn^ 
â£!! . âsZ!ii ^  0 
«V 
4. ' 
.„TSI ..TSIl 
^ ^  >  0  
asj aSj 
âsîfi . asEH, â£!fi ^  0 
3P. 3P, ap, 
J J J 
In the state market, the aggregate grain supply by nonbuyers is 
increasing if the relative frequency , the sales quotas Sj, or its own 
price Pj increases. The aggregate grain supply is uncertain if the 
relative frequencies ^TI2' ^TIll* ^TI21 ^^e ceiling quotas 
increases. Lastly, the aggregate grain supply is decreasing if the floor 
quotas increase. 
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b. Partial buyers 
- P,„ n, Sj 
agTSii 
^ - S, > 0 
afTTT - *T Sj 
a& 
TII 
,TSII 
an? ^TII Sj > ° 
agTSI 
- 'ill "T > ° 
asj 
For partial buyers, the aggregate grain supply in the state market 
is increasing if the relative frequency , the total number of 
production teams, or the sales quotas increases. 
c. Complete buyers 
gTS::! _ 0 
Thus, we finally have the results: 
iè-îfr-
âsZ!_ _ asZH > 0 
aPiii ^^Tii 
isIL - âsEi > 0 
3PTI2 ^^tI2 
âs!!_ 
**TI11 
asl!_ 
**TI21 
SgTSI > 
^^TIll < 
> 
*^TI21 < 
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asIL _ 5S!!L . 
an^ dn^ + an, ^ " 
aa^_ a^< 0 
**JF **jF 
âs!!.âs!!i>o 
4=  ^
âsîî _ isîîi + > 0 
as as as 
For production teams, the aggregate grain supply in the state market 
increases as the relative frequency or , the total number of 
production teams, or the sales quotas increases. The aggregate grain 
supply is uncertain as the relative frequency ^TI2' ^ TIll' ^TI21 
or celling quotas increases, and it decreases as the floor quotas, or its 
own price, increases. 
Graphic analysis of aggregate grain demand and supply in the state 
market Based on these mathematical analyses, the graphs of the 
aggregate grain demand and supply by production teams can be drawn in 
three subparts. 
1. Nonbuyers 
a. The first subtype of nonbuyers 
The aggregate grain supply by the first subtype of nonbuyers is the 
sum of a vertical line passing through n^ Sj on 
the Qj axis and an upward sloping line (Figure 3.17a). 
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TSIlb 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 3.17. Aggregation of the grain supplies of the first and the 
second subtype within the first type of productions teams 
in the state market 
b. The second and the third subtypes of nonbuyers 
For both the second and the third subtypes of nonbuyers, their 
aggregate grain supplies in the state market have the same shape (Figure 
3.17b and c), although they may have a slight change in their slopes. 
Thus, we can figure out the shape of the aggregate grain supply of 
nonbuyers in the state market. That is an upward sloping line shown in 
Figure 3.18a. 
2. Partial buyers 
For partial buyers in the state market, the aggregate grain demand 
is a downward sloping line on the left of Xj^, and its 
aggregate grain supply is a vertical line that passes through -
PTII "X (Figure 3.18a). 
3. Complete buyers 
For complete buyers in the state market, the aggregate grain demand 
is a vertical line that passes through - (1 - ^jc 
and its aggregate grain supply is zero (Figure 3.18c). Thus, adding 
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,TSI 
<TSIlb 
(a) 
.TSII \. ,TSII 
^TSIIb^TSIIa 
(b) 
D 
TSUI 
TSIIIa 
(c) 
Figure 3.18. Aggregate grain demands and supplies of the first, the 
second and the third type of production teams in the state 
market 
Figure 3.18a, 3.18b and 3.18c together, we obtain the aggregate grain 
demand and aggregate grain supply of production teams in the state 
market. The former has two segments: one is a downward-sloping line and 
the other one is a vertical line passing through - Q-pgjja + ^ silla 
on the Qj axis. The latter also has two segments: one is an upward-
sloping line and the other one is a vertical line passing through 
^TSb ~ ^TSIb ^TSIIb Qj (Figure 3.19). The minimum horizon-
TS TS 
tal distance between D and S is Q^g - - Q-jga' *hich is the 
minimum net grain supply of production teams in the state market. 
^TSa ^TSb 
Figure 3.19. Aggregate grain demand and supply of all production teams 
in the state market 
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Theory of International Grain Trade 
in the Planned Economy 
During the period of the Chinese planned economy, the government 
built up a state trading system to manage international trade. Thus, the 
government had significant power to use trade to achieve not only 
economic but also political objectives. For simplicity, this study 
focuses on the economic issues rather than the political issues. 
The discussion of international grain trade in the Chinese planned 
economy contains four major parts: policy environment, the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade (MOFT) model, aggregate grain import demand or export 
supply, and interactions of plans and markets. Under policy environment, 
the existing background for the decision-making process in the MOFT is 
introduced so that theoretical work can be pursued. Next, the individual 
grain import demands or export supplies are derived from the MOFT model 
under the assumption that the MOFT maximizes its utility, subject to its 
budget constraint and other constraints due to the planning control. 
After that, total import grain demand or export grain supply is aggre­
gated from all individual import demands or export supplies. In the last 
part, plan impacts on both the domestic grain market and the interna­
tional grain market are examined and analyzed. The roles of plans and 
markets in the planned economy are illustrated and described. 
Policy environment 
State monopoly of foreign trade After collectivization of the 
agricultural sector and the nationalization of the industrial sector in 
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China In the mid-1950s, the state government had the sole responsibility 
for the management of foreign trade. Including the foreign grain trade. 
This situation was unchanged until 1978. 
In practice, under the guidance of the State Planning Commission 
(SPC), the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) made annual, as well as 
medium-term, foreign trade plans. The plans were carried out by opera­
tions of several different Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs) through 
their subordinated local Foreign Trade Bureaus (FTBs), and then exchange 
activities in the International markets. Among the FTCs, the China 
National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation 
(CNCOFIEC), and its branches in different provinces and cities are 
specialized in the trade of grain, as well as in other foodstuffs. 
Objective of foreign trade The Chinese government usually thinks 
of foreign trade as the engine of socialist development. The main task 
of foreign trade is to import relatively advanced plants and equipment 
that cannot be produced or cannot be produced in sufficient quantities 
inside China. In this way, the new technology would be absorbed and the 
modernization of industry would be facilitated and accelerated. The 
problem lies in that China's import capacity mainly depends on its export 
capacity. To fulfill the main task, the government has to make a great 
effort to export goods (such as raw material, agricultural commodities, 
and products of light industry) to earn as much hard currency as pos­
sible. On the other hand, the government wants, to the maximum feasible 
extent, to rely on China's own production for those basic needs of its 
people, such as food and cloth. 
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In the international markets, the MOFT may behave as a special 
consumer with a utility function within imported commodity space and may 
face a budget constraint, as well as other constraints due to the 
planning control. The assumed objective for the MOFT is to maximize its 
utility from purchasing commodities in the international markets. 
Plan control The MOFT makes Its foreign trade plan, which states 
its revenues and expenditures. Imposed import and export quotas, and 
expected targets in quantities of goods to be imported and exported. 
For the MOFT, one main concern is the external balance, which is the 
budget in foreign exchange. To pay for its imports, the Chinese govern­
ment has to collect foreign currency from its export earnings and/or its 
foreign exchange reserves and foreign loans because the Chinese currency 
is not an internationally convertible currency. In other words, the MOFT 
must extend its exports to guarantee its ability to purchase the desired 
foreign goods. Comparatively speaking, the Internal balance is not so 
important for the MOFT in the planned economy because its profits have to 
be turned over to the State Treasurer, and its losses can be covered by 
the State Treasurer. 
Another concern for the MOFT is the balance of domestic demand and 
supply for some Important goods. According to needs in the Chinese 
economy, the government Identifies all Important goods that are needed 
to keep the balance. For those types of equipment necessary for in-, 
dustrial development, the MOFT must fulfill plan requirements. For those 
types of goods necessary for the people's livelihood, such as grain, the 
MOFT must strictly maintain the planned balance (rather than the real 
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balance) in the domestic state market (rather than the combined market). 
Market operation Because the main interest in this section is 
focused on the foreign grain trade managed by the MOFT, for simplicity, 
we assume that the MOFT is a price taker in all international markets 
except the international grain market. The behavior of the MOFT in the 
foreign grain markets changes as its position changes. When the MOFT is 
a buyer in the foreign grain market, it behaves as either perfectly 
competitive or imperfectly competitive. In the former case, it is a 
price taker; and in the latter case, it is a price follower because of 
its limited export capacity. 
Bilateral trade agreement Political factors as well as economic 
factors affect the negotiation of package deals for other traded commodi­
ties, and the MOFT makes several bilateral agreements with different 
foreign governments. In these agreements, the Chinese government usually 
guarantees to buy a minimum amount of a specific commodity such as wheat 
from the other country in the following several years. Therefore, during 
the period, the MOFT's total purchases are at least the sum of the 
amounts stated in all agreements with these countries. 
Model of the Ministrv of Foreign Trade 
In the Chinese planned economy, the MOFT is assumed to maximize its 
utility in the import commodity space subject to given constraints. 
Suppose that the MOFT has a utility function U(Xj^j, ..., Xjj, 
Xni) where (i - 1 n) is the i*"^ imported good. Furthermore, to 
guarantee utility maximization, suppose that U(Xj^j) has all proper 
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properties such as completeness, reflexivity, transivity, continuity, 
nonsatiation, and strict convexity. The Lagrangian function is formu­
lated as the following: 
L ~ U (X^i' *••» ^kl' •••' ^ nl^ 
n I _ n J 
+ ( Z P, X,_ + K FR + q FL - Z P, X,?) 
1 i iE i_i 
+ - Xii) - - C'l 
i-1 
n 
— pc po 
+ s A3, [(XiB - X,j) - (Si - D, )] 
i-k 
n 
+ S A^i (Xj^j - X,j) 
i-1 
where 
(3.163) 
"il the i^^ imported commodity (i - 1. 
th 
Xj^g - the export quota for the i commodity (i-1, 
X,, -il 
i 
FR — 
FL — 
in case there is no potential to export, X^^g - 0 
the import quota for the i^^ commodity (i-1, 
in case there is no desire to import, X,^ - 0 
international price for the i^^ commodity (i-1, 
the foreign currency reserves 
the foreign loans 
planned domestic grain supply in the state market 
planned domestic grain demand in the state market 
, n) 
, n) 
, n) 
, n) 
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PS th 
- planned domestic supply of the 1 commodity in the state 
market (i - k, ..., n) 
planned domestic demand of the i^^ commodity in the state 
market (i - k n) 
K, T) - fixed proportional coefficient 0 3 % 3 1, Osfysl 
The constraints in the Lagrangian function can be classified into 
three categories: 
1) external balance. 
n I _ n 
S P. X,_ + K FR + % FL - S P. X,T is an external balance con-
i-1 ^ i-1 ^  II 
straint. It says that ZP^X^^, total expenditure for importing goods, 
T— 
must be covered by ZP^X^g total earnings from possibly exporting goods 
plus part of reserves FR and loans FL in foreign currency. 
2) balance of the planned domestic demand and supply. 
(X^g - X^j.) is a net export for good i if X^g > X^^ or a net import 
for good i if X^^g < X^^, and - 5^ ) is a planned surplus for good i 
PS PS PS PS if or a planned shortage for good i if . The 
— pg pg 
constraint (X^g - X^^) - (S^^ - ) & 0 means that, for an important 
good i, the net export or net import has to be covered by the planned 
domestic surplus or has to cover the planned domestic shortage. Grain, 
as a composite good, is considered in the balance table by the central 
planners, and, therefore, is an exception. An individual variety of 
grain is not considered to be a single good, but more importantly, is 
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considered to be part of a composite good. Suppose that the first 
J _ 
(i - 1 j) commodities belong to the grain category, then S (X^g -
i-1 
PS PS 
Xij) - (Sq - Dg ) is a constraint that guarantees the planned balance of 
domestic grain demand and grain supply in only the state market by using 
international grain markets. 
3) Import quota imposed for some commodities. 
Due to the central plan, the government may impose import quotas for 
some specific commodities. X^^ - X^^ is the import quota constraint, 
that is, import of commodity i must be no more than the import quota set 
by the government. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
aXj^j • 8X^2 "'^l^i • ^ 2 " '^4i ^ ° ^ ' J (3.164) 
- Ag 3 0 for X^j-0, i - l,...,j (3.165) 
-Ag^ -A^i :S 0 for X^^/O, i - k,...,n (3.166) 
il ""il 
ax ax Vi - ^31 a O for X^^-O, i - k n (3.167) 
Xii - 0 i-1 n (3.168) 
QT ^ T "" ^ T 
- Z pf X,_ + K FR + q FL - 3 pf X,_ & 0 (3.169) 
''^ l i-1 ^  i-1 ^  
"^1 3A^ " ° i - 1, .... n (3.170) 
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^ • V • ® » (3 I 'l '  
(3.172) 
^ - (XiE - *ii> • (Si^ - dJ ®) & 0 i - k, .... n (3.173) 
ai__ 
Si ^31 ax " ° i - k, .... n (3.174) 
" *il ^  ° for X^j / 0 i - 1 n (3.175) 
\i 3A^ " ° for / 0 i-k n (3.176) 
^1' Ag, & 0 i - 1 n (3.177) 
X3I > 0 i-k n (3.178) 
Suppose that the MOFT strictly keeps its budget in foreign currency 
at the balance level, 
lb - XlE + * P* + s PL - *11 - » 
1 i-1 i-1 
then both (3.169) and (3.170) can be omitted. Similarly, suppose that 
the MOFT keeps grain and other commodities at the planned balance levels, 
then 
% - - *11' • <=" - "f) - " <3.180) 
and 
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^ - (*IE • =^11' • - "R* - » (3 181) 
After that, (3.171), (3.172), (3.173), and (3.174) can be dropped 
from the model. 
Furthermore, suppose that the second-order conditions are satisfied; 
solving the first-order conditions, we find three possible situations for 
Xii'. 
1. - 0 (3.182) 
2. - X^j (pl, FR, PL, Xg, Xj, - Dg! - DJ^) (3.183) 
and 
3. Xj^j - X^j (3.184) 
The first formula (3.182) implies a corner solution. That is, the 
MOFT does not import any amount of good i. Pormula (3.183) says that 
import demand for good i is a function of international commodity prices, 
foreign reserves in the country, foreign loans borrowed by the govern­
ment, the export quotas, the planned balance of domestic grain supply and 
demand in the state market, and the planned balances of domestic supplies 
and demands of other commodities in the state market. The last formula 
(3.184) gives imported good i as just its quota. 
If X^^ is determined, the corresponding quantities of either net 
export supply X^^g or net import demand X^^^ are Immediately determined. 
We now discuss the three situations of X^^: 
1. Xi, _ 0 
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There are two possible solutions for if - 0. 
a. Xj^g - 0 
XiNI - XiNE - 0 (3.185) 
The HOFT is not buying and selling good i in international markets. 
This case will be dropped out of this study because it is meaningless. 
b.  
*11IE - *1E (3 IBS) 
The MOFT exports good i at the quota level only and, therefore, is 
called a command exporter for good i. 
2. X^; - Xj^j (pl, FR. FL, Xg, Xj, 
a. Xj^g - 0, then 
XIJJI - XJ^J (PL, FR, FL, XG, XJ. SQ® - DG? (3.187) 
Net import demand for good i is a function of international prices 
of goods, the foreign reserves, the foreign loans, the export quotas, the 
import quotas, the planned balance of domestic grain supply and demand in 
the state market, and the planned balances of domestic supply and demand 
for other goods in the state market. Therefore, the MOFT is a flexible 
importer for good i. 
b. Xj^g > 0, then we have 
1) ifx,g>x^j 
XiNE - hE • Xii (P:. FR, FL, sf - - D^^) 
- X^JJG (PL, FR, FL, XG, XJ, SQ® - DG? - D^^) (3.188) 
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2) if < Xi, 
*iNI " *il " ^ iE 
- (Pl, PR, FL, Xg, Xj, - D^ ! - ofS ) - Xg 
- X^ i (Pl, FR, FL, Xg, Xj, - D^ S) (3.189) 
These are either net export supply or net import demand of good i, 
which is a function of international prices of goods, the foreign 
reserves, the foreign loans, the export quotas, the import quotas, the 
planned balance of domestic grain supply and demand in the state market, 
the planned balances of domestic supply and demand for other goods in the. 
state market. Because export quota is effective, the MOFT is called 
either a restricted flexible exporter or importer for good i in case (2) 
a and b. 
3) 
*iNI " *iNE " ° (3,190) 
either net export supply or net import demand for good i is zero. The 
MOFT is a nonexporter and nonimporter. This case is not discussed 
further. 
3. Xi, . X^ , 
*iE • ° 
thus 
*iNI " *il (3.191) 
The MOFT imports good i at the quota level only and is called a 
command importer for good i. 
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b. XiB > 0 
1) if > X^ g 
*iNI " *il ' *iE (3.192) 
2) if X,j < XiB 
X INI X IE X II (3.193) 
3) if Xii - XiE 
X 
INI 
X iNE 0 (3.194) 
Because (3.194) does not make sense, it is dropped from the discus­
sion. Thus, if X^ g > 0, either net import demand or net export supply 
for good i is fixed at the difference of the import quota and the export 
quota by the MOFT. The MOFT is both a dual command importer and exporter 
in these cases because it is restricted by both the import and the export 
quota at the same time. 
All of the above results indicate that the MOFT tries to decide all 
net imports and net exports for all goods together, although it may pay 
prior attention to export quotas in order to collect the foreign currency 
needed to purchase goods in the international market. 
Comparative statics From the above discussion, we can classify 
the MOFT's behavior by its importing and exporting behaviors. 
1. Importer 
a. Dual command importer 
134 
*iNIl " *il • *iE 
_ 1 
3^ il 
fïim. .1 
For dual command Importer, the net import demand increases or de­
creases as the import or the export quota increases. 
b. Command importer 
*iNI2 " *il 
fiW _ 1 
Net import demand for the i good is not affected by any factor 
except for the import quota. 
c. Flexible importer 
*i»I3 - f'- *!• - "G' - 0^ ') 
fïim . fïu - 0 
S?l 6FI 
fïim _ fîu> 0 
aFR 3FR 
fîim _ fïu 0 
aFL aFL  ^" 
. fii < 0 
aXiE 
fïim _ fil > 0 
aXii ax^ j 
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3(sp- Df ) " 8<sf - Df ) ^ " 
Net Import demand for the 1^  ^good Is increasing if the foreign 
reserves, the foreign loans, or the import quotas increase. On the other 
hand, net import demand for the i^  ^good is decreasing if its own price, 
the export quota, or its planned balance of domestic supply and demand in 
the state market increases. 
Especially, for net import demand of a kind of grain (i - 1, 
..., J) and net import demand of total grain , where 
G^NI - (3 195) 
n-1 
then 
but 
a(3 - ' ° 
That is, when the balance of domestic grain supply and demand in the 
state market decreases, net import demand of total grain increases, but 
net import of a specific kind of grain X^ ^^  may increase or decrease 
depending on the situations. The reason this happens is explained as 
follows. As the balance of domestic grain supply and demand in the state 
market decreases, the government must increase the net grain import to 
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satisfy the planned domestic needs because grain Is so Important to 
people's lives as well as political stability in the country. But the 
increase in net grain import is constrained by the budget balance in 
foreign currency. To increase net grain import and keep other imports 
and exports unchanged, the government must have additional money to keep 
its budget balanced. If the HOFT cannot get more foreign currency from 
the State Treasury, it must adjust its net import and/or net export to 
compensate its additional expenses from increasing net grain import. 
There are two ways for the MOFT to deal with this matter. First, it can 
reduce imports and expand exports, and, therefore, reduce net imports or 
expand net exports for other goods rather than grain. Alternatively, it 
can make adjustments only within the grain trade to avoid financial 
difficulty. For example, it can expand net exports for a specific kind 
of grain, say rice, whose price is relatively higher in the International 
market, and expand net imports for another specific kind of grain, say 
wheat, whose price is relatively lower in the international market. 
Working in this way, making a trade-off between rice exporting and wheat 
importing by utilizing their price difference, the MOFT can easily have 
its net grain import expanded without any further financial request 
in foreign currency from the State Treasury. In addition, without 
changing the aggregate grain demand and supply in the domestic state 
market, the government can easily use its play to change or restrict the 
proportion of different varieties of grain demanded or supplied in the 
state market to guarantee the trade-off in the international market. 
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d. Restricted flexible Importer 
XlNI4 - ^ 11 (P'' FL, Xg, Xj. - DfS) - X^ g 
Because X^  ^Is fixed, the partial derivatives for restricted flex­
ible Importer are exactly the same as those for the flexible Importer. 
2. Exporter 
a. Dual command exporter 
*1NE1 " *1E " *11 
For the dual command exporter, comparative statics Is the same as 
that for the dual command Importer but with opposite signs. 
b. Command exporter 
*1NE2 " *1E 
AXIE 
Net export supply for the 1^  ^good Is not affected by any factor 
except for the export quota. 
c. Restricted flexible exporter 
XlNE3 - XiE - *11 FR. FL. X^ ' h' " "'G' 
Obviously, any partial derivative for X^ g^g Is the same as that for 
a negative X^ j^ or a negative X^ ^^ g (see flexible Importer). Thus, It Is 
not necessary to continue the discussion of comparative statics here. 
. Graphic analysis The graphic analysis also is divided into two 
parts by importing and exporting behaviors of the MOFT. 
1. Importer 
a. Dual command Importer 
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For a dual command Importer, its net import demand for a grain 
commodity i, is a vertical line that passes through -
— T 
*il " *iE *ii axis in the (X^ ,^ space (Figure 3.20a). 
*iNIl(*iNI2) 
*iNIl^ *iNI2^  *il^ *i2^  
(a) 
\ x .  iNI3^ i^NI4^  
Xl,(Xw) 
(b) 
Figure 3.20. Net import demands of the MOFT 
b. Command importer 
For a command importer, its net import demand for a grain commodity 
i, X^ Q22' is a vertical line that passes through X^ ^^ g " o" the X^ g 
axis in the (X^ g, P^ g) space, and therefore, can be represented by 
Figure 3.20a. 
c. Flexible importer 
As Figure 3.20b shows, for a flexible importer, its net import 
demand is a downward-sloping line in the (X^ g, P^ g) space. 
d. Restricted flexible importer. 
For a restricted flexible importer, its net Import demand also is 
downward-sloping, and, therefore, is represented by Figure 3.20b. 
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2. Exporter 
a. Dual command exporter 
For a dual command exporter, Its net export supply is a 
— — J 
vertical line that passes - Xjg - Xjj on the (Xj^ , Pj^ ) space 
Figure 3.21a). 
XjNEl(*jNE2) •J3 
Vl<V2' 
(a) 
X 
/ JNE3 
/ 
X j3 
(b) 
Figure 3.21. Net export supplies of the MOFT 
b. Command exporter 
j^NE2' export supply of a grain commodity j for a command 
exporter, is the same as that for a dual command exporter, except for 
that its intercept on the X^ g axis is Xj^ g^ " rather than Xj^ ^^  
(Figure 3.21a). 
c. Restricted flexible exporter 
As Figure 3.21b shows, when the MOFT behaves as a restricted 
flexible exporter, Xj^ gg, its net export supply for a grain commodity j, 
is an upward-sloping line in the (X _, P^ _) space. jj jj 
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Aggregate Import grain demand and export grain supply 
Within the first grain commodities, suppose that the first e^  ^
are net importing grain commodities and the remaining are net exporting 
grain commodities. In the planned economy, the aggregate import grain 
demand D is then 
MP 
 ^ *iNIl i^NI2 *iNi3  ^*iNi4 (3.196) 
1-e 1-e 1-e 1-e 
" ^  (*111 ' *iEl^   ^*iI2 
1-e 1-e 
+ S (Pl, FR, PL, Xg, Xj, 
1-e 
+ s (X„4 (pl, FR, FL, Xg, Xj, sf - D^ ? - X^ ^^ l 
1-e 
- (pl, FR, FL, Xg, Xj, (3.197) 
That is, as long as the HOFT behaves as a flexible or a restricted 
flexible importer for at least one grain commodity, D , the aggregate 
import grain demand, is a function of international prices of commodi­
ties, the foreign reserves, the foreign loans, the export quotas, the 
import quotas, the planned balance of domestic grain supply and demand in 
the state market, and the planned balances of domestic supplies and 
XP demands of other goods in the state market. On the other hand, S , the 
aggregate export grain supply in the planned economy is as follows; 
XP 
 ^ - f^ /iNEl + ,^ /iNE2 + ,^ /iNE3 <3,198) 
" g^ y^ iEl " *ill^  
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— T — — pc pc pc pc 
+ S [X^ g3 - X^ J3(P\ FR, FL, Xg, Xj, - D" S - D )] 
f-J 
- (pl, FR, FL, Xg, Xj, Sq® - (3.199) 
As long as the MOFT behaves as a restricted flexible exporter for at 
least one grain commodity, the aggregate export grain supply Is similar 
to the aggregate Import grain demand as a function of International 
prices of commodities, foreign reserves, foreign loans, export quotas. 
Import quotas, the planned balance of domestic grain supply and demand in 
the state market, and the planned balances of domestic demands of other 
goods in the state market. 
Two important things should be pointed out. First, both the 
aggregate import grain demand and the aggregate export grain supply by 
the MOFT do contain International price vectors, especially the interna­
tional grain price, but do not contain domestic price vectors, especially 
the domestic grain price. This fact Indicates that the MOFT's behavior 
in the International grain market is affected by international prices 
but not by domestic prices. Second, whether China becomes a net import­
ing grain country or a net exporting grain country depends on the 
difference between the aggregate Import grain demand, D , and the 
XP MP XP 
aggregate export grain supply, S . If D > S , the MOFT is a net 
grain Importer; otherwise, it is a net grain exporter. Looking back at 
the history of Chinese grain trade after the 1950s, we found out that 
China was a net importing grain country most of the time, especially In 
the planned economy. That means, in general, the aggregate import grain 
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MP XP demand D is greater than the aggregate supply of grain S in China. 
If this is true, the net grain import demand, is as follows; 
pNMP _ jjMP _ gXP (3.200) 
Undoubtedly, is a function that contains all the factors 
XP 
and/or S have/has. 
Comparative statics The comparative statics are calculated for 
both aggregate import grain demand and export grain supply. 
1. Aggregate import grain demand 
_ S fïilill + S fim + S **iNI4 > 0 
**iNIl *^iNIl **iNIl **iNIl 
âcîîL-. S s fïim+ s **iNi4 > 0 
**iNEl **iNEl **iNEl **ÏNE1 
S fîim + s fim + s fïiïïià > 0 
aXii2 '"3X^ 12 aXii2 < ax^j2 
As the import quota or the export quota faced by the dual command 
importer or the command importer increases, the total effect on the 
aggregate grain demand is unclear because the effects on the last two 
terms, aggregate import grain demand by the flexible Importers and 
restricted flexible importers are unclear. 
Based on similar reasoning, we have 
_ S + S fïmiâ > 0 
3Xii3 3*113 3*113 
143 
âçî!!_ _ s **inI4 + s fïim > 0 
aXii^  ® ax^ j^  
The remaining comparative statics are focused on the behaviors of 
flexible and restricted Importers. 
_ S **iI3 ^  S **iI4 >0 (i - 1, .... j) 
apj apj 3pJ 
apMP S'fîm. s **iI4 n 
.Pj ap' 1- ap: 
afiîîL- _ s fill + s fîilà > 0 
aPR 1-e aFR 1-e aPR 
iDÎî!_ _ s £ïm + s fiiA > 0 
aPL 1-e âPL 1-e aPL  ^" 
ms. s mn s fikià 
9(3%^  - DG®) ' a(sf - of) a(sf - of) 
The aggregate import grain demand increases when the foreign 
reserves or the foreign loans increase. It decreases when its 
international price, pj, average grain price, or the balance of domestic 
grain supply and demand In the state market increases. Finally, it 
becomes uncertain when the international price of one grain commodity 
Increases. 
2. Aggregate export grain supply 
Under the changes of the import quotas or the export quotas, the 
final results of comparative statics for aggregate export grain supply 
are the same as those for the aggregate import grain demand. Otherwise, 
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the results are given as follows: 
âsï!_ _ S îhn > 0 
api f-j api < 
dpl apj 
u 1 
âsïL_ _ s fîm < 0 
aPR f-j 3FR 
isïL_. s fîm<0 
8FL f-j aPL 
âSÎÎ! _ 2 fïiE2 >0 
a(SGS . D^S) F-J acs^S - D^®) 
These results indicate that, given the above change(s) in the fac-
tor(s), aggregate export grain supply is changing in the opposite direc 
tion of changes in the aggregate grain demand. 
Graphic analysis Graphic analysis also is presented for both 
aggregate grain demand and export grain supply. 
1. Aggregate import grain demand 
Given the average international grain price, we can aggregate the 
import grain demand by graph. As Figure 3.22a shows, the sum of 
aggregate import grain demands by dual commanders and commanders, is a 
vertical line that intercepts on the Q ^ axis is Q^ j - Z 
— II 
+ S X^ 22 the (Qq, P^ ) space. 
1-e 
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In Figure 3.22b, aggregate import grain demand by flexible 
and restricted flexible importers, is given as a downward-sloping line in 
the (Q^ , Pg) space. Finally, after summing and we obtain 
MP 
aggregate Import grain demand by the MOFT. As Figure 3.22c shows, D 
MPI is still a downward-sloping line, but it is much steeper than D in the 
(Qg, Pg) space because of the effect of . 
.MPI I 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 3.22. Aggregation of Import grain demands in the planned economy 
2. Aggregate export grain supply 
Similarly, we can figure out aggregate export grain supply in the 
I I XPI (QQI PQ) space. In Figure 3.23a, S , the sum of the aggregate export 
grain supplies by dual command exporters and command exporters is a 
vertical line that passes through - S (*iEl " *iil^  + 2 o" 
I I f-j 
axis in the (Q^ , P^ ) space. 
XP 
Lastly, S , the aggregate export grain supply by the MOFT is 
XPI XPII 
obtained from the sum of S and S , which is the aggregate grain 
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supply by restricted flexible exporters (Figure 3.23b). It is still an 
XPII 
upward-sloping line, but it is steeper than S because of the effect 
ypT 
of (Figure 3.23c). 
,XPII 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 3.23. Aggregation of export grain supplies in the planned economy 
Interactions of plans and markets 
In the Chinese grain economy, the markets, especially the domestic 
state markets, are different from markets in the usual sense. Deter­
mined by the government authority and not by the interaction of market 
forces, the state market price lacks the mechanism to adjust the market­
ing process automatically and instantaneously. Moreover, through the 
planning process, the government almost controls grain consumption and 
production. In the state market, the government limits the maximum grain 
demand by using ration coupons in urban areas and floor quotas in rural 
areas and guarantees the minimum grain supply by applying the output 
targets to state farms and the sales quotas and the ceiling quotas to 
production teams. That the government has monopoly power in the state 
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market Is not only because it has the authority to decide the prices but 
also because it has authority, to a great extent, to decide the quanti­
ties exchanged. Hence, the state market becomes a buyer market when the 
government procures grain from state farms and production teams and 
becomes a seller market when the government retails grain to the urban 
households and sells or resells grain to those production teams per­
mitted. Under such circumstances, in a certain sense, the state grain 
market can be seen as an extension of government policies. 
In the international grain markets, the Chinese government has no 
power to decide prices, but still has full monopoly power to decide the 
variety and quantity of grain imported and exported. Thus, the interna­
tional grain markets can be partly seen as extensions of government 
policies. The next is the analysis of the policy impacts on the equilib­
rium situations of the domestic as well as the international market. 
Market equilibrium situations Generally, one particularly 
noticeable feature of the state grain market is its disequilibrium. 
Indeed, disequilibrium is an internal part of the Chinese grain economy. 
Without perfect information and knowledge, exogenous prices cannot be the 
equilibrium prices in the state market. In addition, it is believed by 
both the Chinese officials and professional authorities that the grain 
price in the state market is well below its equilibrium price. One 
reason is that the government wants to set lower prices for agricultural 
products but higher prices for industrial products to create a difference 
between prices of agricultural and industrial products and to collect 
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funds from the agricultural sector. After economic reform, this hypothe­
sis was partly proved by the much higher free-market prices, whose 
average might be considered as the equilibrium price. Obviously, this 
too-low price would create an excess grain demand in the state market. 
Moreover, usage of the ration coupons imply an existing shortage problem 
in quantities of grain in the planned economy. Even under such a 
rationing system, restricted excess grain demand still existed throughout 
the state market because the Chinese government had adjusted its grain 
price within only a narrow range, and China had been a net grain import­
ing country from 1961. Hence, the equilibrium quantities of grain were 
reached by means of international trade in the planned economy. 
In the international grain markets, there exist equilibrium prices 
and quantities. Although the equilibrium prices are mainly determined by 
excess grain suppliers of the rest of the world, the equilibrium quan­
tities are mainly determined by the planned excess grain demand, rather 
than the real excess grain demand of the MOFT. 
Domestic policy instruments In the domestic grain market, as 
already analyzed, the policy instruments include ration coupons, sales 
quotas, ceiling quotas, floor quotas, and the state market prices. Among 
these policy instruments, the ration coupons, the sales quotas and the 
state market prices are more important for the central planners because 
these three mainly determine a disequilibrium in the state grain market. 
The first two of the three policy instruments, needless to say, are 
quantity parameters to adjust either the grain demand or the grain supply 
in the state market. The last one is regarded as a policy instrument 
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because the state market price is centrally decided and generally is 
uniform throughout the country (although there are some local differen­
tials). It is weakly (partly) related to the grain demand and supply in 
the state market. Next are comparative studies for these three policy 
instruments : 
1. Ration coupons 
Ration coupons are issued to the urban households plus the house­
holds of state farms. With the rationing system the government can plan 
the maximum grain demand in the state market. Suppose the government 
raised the amount of ration coupons to the urban people in order to 
improve their standard of living. The market impacts of this policy are 
illustrated in Figure 3.24. 
S 
P 
I 
P 
ES(R) 
(a)  (b) 
Figure 3.24. The effects of a change in ration level in the planned 
economy 
P P On the left, D and S separately represent the aggregate grain 
demand and supply in the domestic state market in the planned economy. 
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S D 
At the given state market price P^ , the grain demand is and the 
S FD PS grain supply is Q^ . The planned grain demand and supply are and Qg , 
S PD D 
which are not affected by the state market price Pj^ . Obviously, 
PS S 
and because the government wants to make sure that the plans 
would fully coordinate the balance of real demand and supply in the state 
grain market. On the right, the international grain market is partly 
separated from the state market because the state market price is 
irrelevant to the planned excess demand, but it is partly related to the 
state market because the balance of the planned demand and supply is 
relevant to the planned excess demand. Suppose that China is an import­
ing grain country. We find out that the planned excess demand is ED, 
which is downward-sloping, and the excess supply of the rest of the world 
is ES(R), which is a horizontal line because China is assumed to be 
either a price taker or a price follower in the international market in 
spite of the fact that it is a larger country. The import grain demand 
is determined by a cross point under a presumed international grain 
price P^ . All of these descriptions about the beginning situations of 
the markets are fitted to discussion of any other policy instruments, 
and, therefore, are not repeated in this part. 
Because the government increases the amount of ration coupons 
distributed, the domestic grain demand in the state market is expanding 
from to Q^ . At the same time, the planned grain demand also is 
1 2 
PD PD 
expanding from Q to Q Neither the domestic grain supply nor the 
1 2 
planned grain supply is changing. Thus, the balance of total grain 
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demand and supply as well as the balance of total planned grain demand 
and supply in the state market is increasing. The change in the latter 
balance rather than the former balance would cause a rightward shift of 
the planned excess demand curve ED in the international market. The 
M 
Import grain demand then increases to Qg. 
2. Sales quotas 
Sales quotas are set to production teams. Using sales quotas, the 
government can plan the minimum grain supply in the state market. Figure 
3.25 shows the impacts on both the domestic and the international market 
when the government increases sales quotas. 
The beginning situations have already been discussed. As the gov­
ernment decides to increase the sales quota S^  to S^  in the state market, 
S 
P 
,PS rtPS„SrtS «D „PD S 
I 
P 
ES(R) 
ED 
ED' 
(a)  <b)  
Figure 3.25. The effects of a change in the sales quota in the planned 
economy 
p 
the total grain supply line S is shifted to the right, and results in 
S s 
an Increase of both total grain supply from to and planned grain 
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PS PS 
supply from to Qg . Thus, both the balance of total grain demand and 
supply and the balance of total planned grain demand and supply decrease. 
Because of a decrease in the balance of total planned grain demand and 
supply, the planned excess grain demand line ED is shifted back to ED'. 
Immediately, the import grain demand decreases from to Qg. 
3. The state market price 
The state grain markets are set for both domestic consumers and 
producers. By adjusting the state market prices, the government can 
partly influence the behaviors of urban households and rural production 
teams. Figure 3.26 indicates the effects of a change in the state market 
price on both the state and the international markets. 
The beginning situations are the same as before. When the govern-
S s 
ment decides to raise the state market price--say from P^  to Pg'-to 
ES(R) 
.M 
(a)  (b)  
Figure 3.26. The effects of a change in the state market price 
in the planned economy 
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Improve the rationality of the price, immediately in the state market, 
the total grain demand decreases and the total grain supply increases, 
but both total planned grain demand and supply are unchanged. Hence, the 
balance of total grain demand and supply decreases but the balance of 
total planned grain demand and supply does not change. There is no 
impact on the international market because all factors specified in ED 
stay the same as before. Here, we can draw a conclusion that a change in 
the state grain market price has an impact only on the domestic market 
but not on the international market. 
International policy Instruments In the international grain 
markets, the main policy instruments used by the Chinese government in 
the planned economy are import quotas and export quotas. Comparative 
studies of these two policy instruments follow. 
1. Import quota 
The import quotas are used to restrict import grain demand. 
Theoretically, the impacts on an individual import grain demand due to a 
change in grain import quotas are not certain. Suppose the import quotas 
for all grains increase simultaneously, or suppose the import quota for 
total import grain demand increases. 
As Figure 3.27 shows, when the import grain quota increases, the 
planned excess demand in the international market shifts to the right, 
the import grain demand increased from to Qg. There is no change 
in the domestic market. 
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(a)  (b)  
Figure 3.27. The effects of a change in the import grain qyota 
in the planned economy 
2. Export quota 
Export quotas are used to limit the export grain supply. The 
impacts on an individual import grain demand due to an increase in the 
grain export quota also are not certain. Suppose the export quotas for 
all grains increase together, or suppose the export quota for total 
export grain supply increases, then the result is in the opposite 
direction to the result of an increase in the import grain quota (Figure 
3.27b). 
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CHAPTER IV. THE CHINESE MIXED GRAIN ECONOMY 
A major aspect of the Chinese mixed economy is the integration of 
central planning with the markets' mechanism in spite of the fact that 
central planning is still considered as fundamental by the government. 
Even though the state market still plays the dominant role, and the free 
market is merely an auxiliary means of regulating the economy, current 
economic reform has eventually provided a new approach for combining the 
state market with the free market to distribute and circulate goods, 
especially important goods such as grain. In this sense, the Chinese 
grain economy has been transformed in the last decade from being planned 
to being mixed. After the collective disappeared earlier in the 
economic reforms and the free market reemerged later, the powerful 
influence of the government in the grain economy declined significantly. 
This chapter deals with a theoretical model for the Chinese mixed 
grain economy. The expositional process is similar to that in Chapter 
III. At the beginning, a brief overview of the planning and the market­
ing framework in the mixed economy is presented. Following this are 
three sections of theoretical discussions; the behavior of urban 
households, the behavior of state farm households and agricultural 
g 
households, and the behavior of the MOFT in the mixed grain economy. 
These sections generate an urban household model, a state farm (house­
hold) model and an agricultural household model, and, finally, a MOFT 
g 
For convenience, we call the households that belonged to the state 
farms state farm households, and the households that belonged to the 
production teams agricultural households. 
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model. 
General Framework of the Chinese 
Mixed Grain Economy 
Because we have introduced the general framework of the Chinese 
planned grain economy, this section is mainly focused on the distinc­
tions, rather than the similarities, between the frameworks of the mixed 
and the planned grain economy. 
Planning framework 
Since the economic reform, the macro aspects of the grain economy 
have still been planned and managed by the central and local governments, 
but institutional changes have occurred on the micro aspects of the 
economy. Among these institutional changes, the most significant and 
important for the planning framework is that the rural households, 
including both state farm households and agricultural households, have 
replaced state farms and production teams, respectively, and become the 
fundamental units of management and production in the agricultural sector 
with state or collective ownership of land and major fixed assets. The 
Production Responsibility System (PRS) consists of contracts that define 
the rights and responsibilities of owners (including state, collective, 
and private) and managers of assets. The most widely accepted contrac­
tual form is the Bao Gao Dao Hu (BGDH). Under the BGDH, the households 
have the right to manage collectively owned land according to their size 
or labor force. The households are obligated to pay agricultural taxes, 
make contributions to social welfare funds, and provide their share in 
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satisfying state procurement requirements. After that, all remaining 
output may be kept and disposed of by the households. 
In addition to the replacement of state farms and production teams, 
the other institutions in the countryside have been restructured. The 
communes have been transformed into the townships, and the brigades have 
been renamed as the villages. All these institutional changes have 
brought about change in the planning framework. At the central govern­
ment level, there is no big change at all. At the local government 
level, however, the channel from county to basic units--agricultural 
households through the townships then the villages--has been established 
to replace the old channel. There are now two kinds of new rural 
enterprises in the Chinese mixed economy: the state farm households and 
the agricultural households. The planning processes for state farm 
households and agricultural households are almost the same as that for 
state farms and production teams before the economic reform, except that 
the plan targets and sales quotas that were set for the state farm and 
the production team have to be split into the corresponding small shares 
to fit the households' sizes and production situations. 
Figure 4.1 briefly describes the planning process in the mixed grain 
economy. The arrows in the graph indicate the transition of the plans 
between the central government and the local governments and between the 
local governments and the state farm households and the agricultural 
households. 
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Figure 4.1. Agricultural planing process in the Chinese mixed economy 
Marketing framework 
In the mixed economy, there are dual grain markets. The state 
market is continuously controlled by the government, while the free 
market is managed by the government but is opened for private exchange. 
Figure 4.2 shows the circulation of grain in the Chinese mixed economy. 
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Figure 4.2. Circulation of grain in the Chinese mixed economy 
The arrows in the graph indicate the flow directions of grain within the 
economy. We will discuss the situations in these markets separately. 
The state market Sellers in the state grain market include state 
farm households and a majority of the agricultural households (Type I and 
Type II). The former sell almost all their product to the state market, 
and the latter sell part of their product to the state market. Among the 
latter, Type I agricultural households are complete sellers or nonbuyers 
and Type II are partial sellers in the state markets. On the other hand, 
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buyers in the state grain market include urban households, the military, 
industry, state farm households, and a minority of agricultural house­
holds (Type II and Type III). Obviously, the first four buyers purchase 
most of their grain from the state market by either ration coupons or the 
government's permission. For the last buyers. Type III agricultural 
households are complete buyers and Type II are partial buyers in the 
state market. 
Under the guidance of the government's plans, both the international 
market and the state stock still are used to adjust and maintain the 
balance of the demand and supply for grain in the state market. Indeed, 
the government now may even purchase or sell some grain in the free 
market to change the level of the state stock. For simplicity, we 
continue to assume that the stock grain demand/supply equals zero and to. 
leave it to be dealt with in Chapter V. The relationship between the 
international market and the state market in the mixed grain economy is 
discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
The free market Everybody in the mixed economy can buy goods in 
the free market. As the figure shows, buyers in the free market consist 
of urban households, industry, state farm households, and a minority of 
agricultural households (Type II and Type III). The first three buyers 
have the right to buy grain from the state market at the lower prices, so 
they may purchase additional amounts of grain from the free market at 
generally higher prices to satisfy themselves. The seller in the free 
market Is usually a Type I agricultural household, that Is called a 
complete seller in the free market. 
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Household-own market and household market The previous analyses 
for the state market and the free market clearly eliminate the part of 
agricultural households' own grain consumption (Type I and Type II). 
Among these households, Type I is a complete self-supplier whereas Type 
II is only a partial self-supplier. 
For convenience, we call an assumed market in which such a house­
hold's own consumption occurs as the household-own market. Clearly, in 
this household-own market, the only seller and buyer is the household 
itself, and the trading price can be seen as the free market price. In 
addition, we call another assumed market in which, for all involved agri­
cultural households, all the own grain consumptions without circulation 
within either the state market or the free market are combined together 
the household market. Sellers and buyers in this market are the house­
holds themselves. 
Finally, we assume an additional united market that combines both 
the free market and the household market in the mixed grain economy. In 
these discussions, we mention grain demand and supply with a specifica­
tion for the market. 
The dashed line in Figure 4.2 divides the circulation of grain in 
the Chinese mixed economy into four parts. The central part is the 
circulation of grain occurring in the state market and under direct 
control of the government plans. The other three parts, except a rec­
tangle on the left corner, compose the circulation of grain occurring in 
the free market and under weakened Indirect plan control. The rectangle 
represents the circulation of grain within the so-called household market 
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and is almost out of government control. 
Generally, the circulation of grain in both the state market and the 
free market hold only a smaller share, whereas the own grain consumption 
by most of the agricultural households still holds a larger share of 
total grain consumption in the Chinese mixed economy. It is estimated 
that the government retailed about 34% of the total grain consumed in 
China and the agricultural households sold about 5% of the total grain 
9 
consumed to the free market in 1985. Thus, in the household market, the 
own grain consumption by the agricultural households was roughly figured 
out to be about 61% of total grain consumed in the same year. These 
figures illustrate that the Chinese mixed grain economy, to a certain 
degree, is still self-sufficient but not commercialized. 
Theory of Urban Grain Demand 
in the Mixed Economy 
Even though the free market is now open to everyone without any 
restriction from the government, the urban and the rural people still 
receive different treatment in the state grain market. Thus, it is still 
necessary to explore and develop urban and rural grain demand theories 
separately for the mixed economy. Again, behavior of the urban house­
holds in the mixed grain economy will be discussed first. 
To insure the correct derivation of the urban grain demand func­
tion, the general assumptions mentioned in Chapter III are consciously 
maintained here. Like the corresponding section in Chapter III, the 
9 
The data used here are from State Statistical Bureau, 1987. 
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study for urban grain demand in the mixed economy contains three similar 
parts: policy environment, urban household model, and aggregate grain 
demand of urban households. Unlike the corresponding section in Chapter 
III, this section has two additional parts: the state market analysis 
and the free market analysis. Under the policy environment, the policy 
changes due to the economic reform are especially stressed. The indi­
vidual urban households still are classified into different types, and 
they maximize their utilities subject to new constraints based on the 
policy changes. Then, the aggregate urban grain demand is derived from 
the aggregation of grain demands by all different types of individual 
urban households. Finally, the exchange activities in both the state 
market and the free market are analyzed separately. 
Policy environment 
Ownership of assets In the Chinese mixed economy, most schools, 
stores, and other enterprises still are owned by either the public or the 
cooperatives, but some stores and enterprises have emerged under private 
or foreign ownership. 
Labor Urban laborers who are hired by either public or private 
businesses are paid by wages plus bonuses. Those working for the public 
cannot change Jobs without their employer's permission, but they may work 
in other places in their spare time. Those working for private busi­
nesses are free to take offers from the job market. 
Plan control The government still issues ration coupons for food 
grain for all urban households. The issuing and distributing method is 
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exactly the same as before. 
Market control There is a dual market system. Urban households 
still need coupons to buy grain from the state market. Prices in the 
state grain market are determined by the government and are usually fixed 
for comparatively long time periods. In spite of existence of the state 
market, the free market is encouraged by the government and outlets are 
scattered in urban areas. The urban households can freely buy grain from 
the free market. The prices in the free grain market are determined by 
market forces and change from time to time. In general, for food grains, 
the free market prices are much higher than the state market prices. 
Urban household model 
Concentrating on the commodity demand, we simply assume that each 
urban household earns a fixed wage income, M, plus a fixed bonus, B, even 
though members may work in their spare time. Thus, the urban household 
in the mixed economy now faces a new budget, dual markets and dual 
prices. Suppose the urban household is buying a good, say food grain 
, and let 
Xi - *18 + XiF (4.1) 
That is, total food grain bought is the sum of X^ g grain purchased 
from the state market and X^  ^grain purchased from the free market. 
Obviously, X^ ,^ X^ g, and X^ p^, > 0. 
Furthermore, suppose the price for the state market grain X^ g^ is 
P^ g, and the price for the free market grain X^ p^ is P^ .^ Comparing the 
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state market grain price with the free market grain price, we find all 
three possible situations: (1) > P^ p, (2) Pj^ g - P^ p, and (3) P^ g^ < 
i^p-
Sicular (1988) carefully examined these three situations in her 
paper. Apparently, the first situation may occur if a surplus of grain 
in the free market exists. In the case of P^ g^ > P^ p, the urban house­
holds would buy all of their food grain from the free market at a lower 
price; therefore, an increasing demand for food grain would push the free 
market price up quickly. On the other hand, the rural households would 
try to sell as much food grain as possible to the state market at a 
higher price. Some of them might even attempt to buy food grain from the 
free market and then resell it to the state market to make a profit. 
Thus, both the higher demand and the lower supply in the free market 
would cause a quick increase of the free market price, then a reduction 
in the price difference between the markets until an end of this situa­
tion. 
The second situation may happen only by coincidence. Obviously, if 
P^ g - P^ p, there is no price difference between the state market and the 
free market, and the ration coupons are no longer meaningful for the 
urban households because they could buy as much as desired in either 
market at the same price. With this case, there is no real reason for 
keeping such a dual market system, or the dual markets for those goods 
without coupon limits can be treated as a single market. As a result, 
the problem has returned to the usual utility maximization problem for 
the urban household. 
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The third situation occurs when a shortage of food grain In the free 
market exists. Looking at the long-run process, the case of Is 
the most likely because the problem of food grain shortage In China has 
not yet been solved and might become more serious In the future. In this 
case. If we assume all food grain products are homogeneous, the urban 
households would buy food grain In the state market first until their 
coupons are used up and then consider further purchasing In the free 
market. 
In theory, the third situation exists continuously, because China 
usually faces constant grain shortages In both the state market and the 
free market. In practice, according to statistics during the period 1979 
to 1986, the state market prices had been much lower than the correspond­
ing free market prices. Similar analyses can be used for the other 
goods. Thus, this study Is mainly concentrating on the third situation 
with an effective rationing coupon system. 
Focusing on the third situation, Byrd (1987) created a model to deal 
with the (urban) demand from Industry in the mixed economy. After that, 
Slcular (1988) developed her model to handle the urban demand for agri­
cultural goods in the mixed economy. First of all, perhaps for simplic­
ity, she assumed that the urban producer also is a consumer of agricul­
tural commodities. This is true for those urban industries that use 
agricultural goods as their Inputs or for those urban households which 
open private enterprises; but it is not true for the majority of urban 
households which earn fixed wages in the public or cooperative enter­
prises and consume agricultural goods in their own home. Thus, her model 
167 
may not fit the mixed grain economy very well. Second, perhaps by 
accident, she ignored the dependence between the total urban grain demand 
(total urban demand for agricultural goodsand the total urban grain 
demand in only the state market. In detail, she made the mistake of 
choosing both (X^ g) and X^ g (i^ g) the decision variables in the 
Lagrangian function for the urban household, but X^ g^ is either just X^  ^
itself if Xj^ g :fi (X^ g - 7j^ 2 ^  ^12^  included in Xj^  if Xj^ g -
(?12 ~ ^ 12^  and X^ p^ > 0 (X^ g & ^12^ • Fortunately, by assuming the equi­
librium conditions and such an aggregate demand function, she had grain 
consumption in the state market equal the ration level and avoided the 
technical trouble caused by variable choices in her model, but she 
totally omitted the possibility of X^  ^- X^ g (X^ g^ - -^ 2^ ^  1'l2^ " finally, 
based on such derivation, Sicular drew her main conclusion that the state 
market price has no direct effect on grain demand (the demand for agri­
cultural goods) but only the free market price does. 
In fact, this result may not well represent the situation in today's 
China. It is known that most of the urban households in China cannot use 
up their food grain coupons; they accumulate the coupons at home instead. 
Some of them trade illegally with the rural people for agricultural goods 
such as eggs, chickens or even for money. In this case, urban households 
purchase food grain from the free market not because the total quantity 
of grain in the state market is limited but because the qualities .and 
%^nless otherwise noted, from now on the parentheses in this 
paragraph indicate the similar item or symbol used by Sicular (1988) in 
her model. 
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varieties of grain available in the state market are limited. For 
instance, in Northern China, sometimes the state market limits the 
purchase of some grains such as rice or wheat flour within the ration 
level for total grains provided. 
Noting Sicular's mistake, considering a multiple-good case instead 
of her three-good case, and assuming the situation in which the state 
market prices are less than the free market prices, we extend our urban 
household model in the planned economy to fit the changes in the mixed 
grain economy. Regardless of the rationing system, our decision vari­
ables would be (i - 1, ..., n) and all relevant Lagrangian multi­
pliers. The Lagrangian function for an urban household in the mixed 
economy is as follows: 
L ~ U[XJ^ , . . . , (X^ G + X^ P) , . • • , XJÇ, X^ , • • • » X^ ] 
k n 
+ AJIM + B . Z (PiAs + PipXiF» - fl*ll 
i-1 i-1 
+ s Aji (Rj - (4.2) 
1—1 
U[Xj^  I • • • > (X^ g + X^ p) , . . . , X^ , Xj^ , . . . , X^ ] 
+ + B (^ is + ^ ip) " j^ ^^ i^^ i " ' ^iS^  *18^  
+ Z Agi (Ri - Xig) (4.3) 
i—1 
where the first k goods are rationed and the remaining n-k goods are 
unrationed. M + B - S (Pj^ gX^ g +  ^ is a new budget con­
straint faced by the urban household in the mixed economy. It implies 
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that the total Income of the household, M + B, has to cover the total 
expenditure, Including the expenses on the rationed goods in both the 
state market and the free market and the unrationed goods. Another 
constraint, - X^ g, means the ration for purchasing goods in the state 
market. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
 ^" ««IS + *1F> ^  ° '• 
* 1 °  1 -
- « H. B . «'isXls + 'iXi 
- * 
h  - h s ^ "  1-
*21 15^ - ° i -
i^S' ^ iF ^  ®  ^• 
& 0 i -
Ai, A2i a 0 i -
Let us make some assumptions to simplify the Kuhn-Tucker conditions: 
(1) Suppose 
M + B - S (PigXis + - S P^ X^  - 0 (4.14) 
i-1 i-1 
that is, the urban household spends all its money in the market(s). Then 
1, . .. , k (4.4) 
1. . • • f 11 (4.5) 
1, . • • f XI (4.6) 
> 0 (4.7) 
(4.8) 
1, . . . , k (4.9) 
1, . . . , k (4.10) 
1, . .., k (4.11) 
1, . • • f R (4.12) 
1, . , . , k (4.13) 
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(4.7) and (4.8) can be dropped out. 
(2) Suppose 
> 0 i - 1, ..., n (4.15) 
the household buys every good in the market(s). Hence, (4.5) equals zero 
and becomes (4.5)', and (4.6) can be eliminated. 
Looking at the new Kuhn-Tucker conditions carefully, we have trouble 
with (4.4), which is expressed as an implicit condition. To obtain an 
explicit expression, we need a technique to develop a mathematical 
AT 
transformation for (i - 1, ..., k): 
flL_ . âL_ 
aXi a(Xis + Xip) 
+ x,?) 
dL 
5^  + 5: 
dL dL 
_L 
— + -rf 3L— âL— 
dXis ax^ F 
5L_ 
2L— . âL_ (i - 1 k) (4.16) 
aXis axip 
Because X^  > 0 (i - 1, ..., k) by (4,15), immediately we have 
(4 17) 
Substituting (4.17) into (4.16) we have 
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aL_ aL_ 
**is *XiF - 0 (4.18) 
2L_ . âL_ 
aXis aXiF 
Consequently, it is necessary to have either 
- 0 but 41^ - f 0 (4.19) 
is iF 
or 
f^-0 but 4L-_ f  0 (4.20) 
° iF is 
Moreover, in order to avoid the situation of multiple solutions for 
X., we need to reduce the ranges for % / 0 in (4.19) and - / 0 in 
iF is 
(4.20). Clearly only two cases in which a unique solution for is 
insured can exist and are discussed below: 
Case 1. - 0 and ^ — < 0 (4.21) 
This is because ^ — < 0 guarantees a corner solution X.„ - 0; 
therefore, the situation of multiple solutions for X^  ^ under concave 
constraint sets can be avoided. 
The above conditions imply that, to maximize the utility, the urban 
household is buying food grain only in the state market; hence, 
and 
Xis - X^ g ( ) a (4.22) 
X^ p - 0 (4.23) 
Substituting (4.22) and (4.23) into (4.1), we obtain 
Xi - Xis ( ) :S (4.24) 
where X^ g^ ( ) is an implicit function for X^ g^ at this time. 
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These results indicate that the ration constraint is not binding. 
The urban household seems to satisfy its initial needs in the state grain 
market at a lower price and does not need the free market for further 
purchases at a higher price. Indeed, if the household's preference has 
been unchanged, this case fits well the first type of urban household in 
the planned economy. Thus, we conclude that for the first type of urban 
households, their preference and, therefore, grain demand function are 
not affected by the existence pf the free market in the mixed economy. 
Case 2. —^ > 0 and ^ — - 0 (4.25) 
ôXis 
ar — 
This is because — > 0 guarantees a corner solution X^ g^ - R^ ; 
therefore, it guarantees continuity and a unique solution of X^  under 
nonlinear budget constraints. 
These conditions imply that, to maximize utility, the urban house­
hold decides to use both the state market and the free market to purchase 
its food grain. Thus, 
Xj^ g - (4.26) 
and 
XiF - XiF ( ) (4 27) 
Substituting (4.26) and (4.27) into (4.1), we get 
Xi - Ri + XiF ( ) > (4.28) 
where X^ p^ ( ) is an implicit function for X^ ^^  at this time. 
The results indicate that the ration constraint in the state market 
is Just binding. The urban household seems not to satisfy its initial 
purchase in the state grain market and is willing to pay a higher price 
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for an additional purchase in the free market. Assuming the household's 
preference has been unchanged, this household in the mixed economy 
exactly belonged to the second type of urban households in the planned 
economy because their attitudes toward the grain coupons in the state 
market are exactly the same. The ônly difference is that the household 
in the mixed economy needs the free market to purchase additional grain 
to make itself better off, whereas the household in the planned economy 
had the same need for further purchase but had no way to go (to the free 
market). 
Now we continue to discuss the Kuhn-Tucker conditions by using the 
above results. Within the first k rationed goods, supposing the first g 
goods belong to Case 1 and the remaining k-g goods belong to Case 2; we 
could obtain a set of explicit conditions for replacing undeveloped 
(4.4): 
2L_ _ 5L_ 
aXi 
_ âlL . p , 
dx^ ax^g " is " ^2i 
" 33^  ' ^l^ iS 2^i ^  ^ i - 1, ..., g (4.29) 
*1 lx[ - XiS Ix;; - 0 1 - 1. •••. g (4:30) 
âL_ . âL. 
ax^  a(x^ s + Xip) 
_ aL 
+ Xip) 
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âL_ 
AXIF 
. m_ . P 
aXi ax^ p 
âîL_ ax " ^l^iF ^ i - h, . ... k (4.31) 
*i axT " "*• *1?) âX.p " ° i - h k (4.32) 
1 IF 
In addition, according to conditions that appeared in Case 1 and 
Case 2, we have 
It;; - *1 - Xis - 0 1 -t. k (4.33) 
a n d  ^ -  X ^ ^ g  > 0 ( 1 - 1  k )  c a n  b e  o m i t t e d  f r o m  o u r  m o d e l .  
We already assumed all X^  > 0 (1 - 1, ..., n), so that (4.29) and 
(4.31) become the equalities (4.29)' and (4.31)', and (4.30) and (4.32) 
can be dropped out. Thus, a complete new set of Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
consists of (4.29)', (4.31)', (4.5)', (4.14), (4.33), and a set of 
positive constraints (4.11), (4.12) and (4.13). 
Solving these first-order conditions simultaneously, provided that 
the second-order conditions are satisfied, additionally, let 
i^s " ^IS *•'' ' 
I^F " ^IF " h, ..., k), 
- Pi (1 - 1, .... n), 
Rj - (1 - h k), 
and M' - M + B. 
The implicit demand functions for the urban household in the mixed 
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economy would be 
- ^ iS 
" *iS (PiS' PiF' Rj. M') a Ri i - 1 g (4.34) 
Xi - x^ s + Xip 
- Ri + X^ p (Pjg, P^ p, P^ . R^ , M') > i - h, ..., k (4.35) 
Xi - X^  (P^ g, Pjg, P^ , Rj, M') i - 1 n (4.36) 
The following discussion for urban household grain demand in the 
mixed economy is similar to that in the planned economy, and, therefore, 
will be given briefly. Facing rationed grain in the state market in the 
mixed economy, an urban household can have two different choices, hence 
two possibly different grain demand functions. All the urban households 
in the mixed economy still can be classified into two types by their 
choices. Suppose that the preferences of these two types of urban house­
holds have not changed and that their real income and the real price of 
grain also have not changed. Immediately, we obtain individual grain 
demand functions for those two types of urban households and note that 
those two types to which the urban households belong have not changed at 
all since the period of the planned economy. 
The first type of urban households, whose grain demand was not 
affected by the grain ration in the planned economy, are continuously 
satisfying their initial purchase in the state grain market. Its demand 
function for food grain in the mixed economy is 
*JI • *jSI 
- Xjgj (P^ g, P^ p, P^ , R^ , M') S Rj (4.37) 
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Note that P^ g, Includes Pjg but and exclude and Rj, 
respectively. Thus, formula (4.37) implies that the grain demand of the 
first type of household in the mixed economy is a function of the state 
market price vector P^ g, including grain price Pjg: the free market 
price vector P^ p, excluding grain price P^ p, the price vector of 
unrationed goods, the ration vector R^ , excluding grain ration Rj; and, 
finally, its wage M plus bonus B. 
On the other hand, the second type of urban household, whose grain 
demand was the ration itself in the planned economy, is getting better 
off by an additional purchase in the free market. Its demand function 
for food grain in the mixed economy becomes: 
*jll • *jSII XjFII 
- Rj + Xjpii (P^ g, Pfp, R^ , M") > Rj (4.38) 
- XjFII (PiS' PiF' Pi- ^ i' «"> (4.39) 
Note that PJg excludes Pjg, but PJ|p and R" include Pjp and Rj, 
respectively. Moreover, M" is the difference between M' and expenditure 
on Xjg, or 
M" - M' - PjgRj (4.40) 
Hence, formula (4.39) implies that the grain demand by the second 
type of urban household in the mixed economy is a function of the state 
market price vector Pjg, excluding grain price Pjg: the free market price 
Pg,, including grain price Pjp: the price vector of unrationed goods, the 
ration vector R^ , including grain ration Rj: and its wage and bonus 
income. 
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Comparative statics The comparative statics are given for the 
above two types of urban households. To save space and time, we con­
centrate on only own price effects, own ration effect, and the Income 
effect as well as the bonus effect. 
1. The first type of urban household 
From formula (4.37), the food grain demand of the first type of 
urban household In the mixed economy Is 
*jl " *jSI (^ IS' ^ IF' ^ 1' ^ 1' M') 3 Rj 
The comparative statics can be calculated as the following: 
Sï-Sf-
0 
aRj 3Rj 
> 0 for normal goods 
aXji aXjgr 
- gg-" > 0 for normal goods 
The results Indicate that, for the first type of urban household In 
the mixed economy. Its food grain demand Is driven by the own state mar­
ket price In the opposite direction and by Its wage and bonus Income In 
the same direction, but Is not driven by the own free market price and 
the official food grain ration level. Noting that both P^ g and 
vectors appeared In the function form, and checking our results, we can 
conclude that the food grain demand by the first type of urban household 
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In the mixed economy is affected by the dual price system but not by the 
dual prices of grain. 
2. The second type of urban household 
By formula (4.38), the food grain demand of the second type of urban 
household in the mixed economy is 
Xjll - Rj + XjFIl(PiS' PiF' Pi' ^ i' 
The comparative statics can be calculated as the following: 
fïiii . ÎÏJEU aui- < 0 if film > o 
gPjg ÔM" aPjg aM" 
fill! . fîjui < 0 
+ i f^^>.1 
aR, dR. aR, 
J j j 
ax ax 
gQI - gQi > 0 for normal goods 
^^ 111 
ggJ - ggJ > 0 for normal goods 
These results imply that, for the second type of urban household in 
the mixed economy, its food grain demand is driven by the own free market 
price directly through the price effect, by the own state market price 
indirectly through the income effect in the opposite direction, and by 
its wage and bonus income in the same direction. The ration effect 
consists of two components: one directly impacts on and the other 
one indirectly impacts on Xjpjj through the income effect. As the 
official grain ration level increases, Xj^  ^might increase. Similarly, 
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both P|g and Pj!p vectors are contained in the function form of Xjjj. 
Combining this with the previous results, we can draw a conclusion that 
the food grain demand by the second type of urban household in the mixed 
economy is directly influenced by the dual price system but not by grain 
own dual prices. 
Graphic analysis In order to make a graphic analysis of the 
mixed grain economy, it is necessary to introduce a dual market graph in 
this part. As Figure 4.3 shows, the usual (Q, F) space can be divided 
F into two subspaces by a vertical line of the free market price P . On 
F S S S the left of P is the (Q , P ) subspace, where Q is the quantity 
g 
demanded or supplied in the state market and P is the state market 
price. All activities occurring in the state market are represented in 
S S F F F F (Q , p ) subspace. On the right of P is the (Q , P ) subspace, where Q 
F is quantity demanded or supplied in the free market and P is the free 
market price. All activities happening in the free market are reflected 
in (Q^ , P^ ) subspace. To learn the quantity demanded or supplied in both 
the state and the free market in the mixed economy, one should first read 
S S S s Q in (Q , P ) subspace according to the given state market price P , 
then read in (Q^ , P^ ) subspace according to the given free market 
price P^ , and, finally, add and together to get total quantity 
demanded or supplied in the combined market. 
This graph is especially useful for a rationed good such as food 
grain in the mixed economy. Under rationing, there is a vertical limit 
S S s " for the rationed good in (Q , P ) subspace. For example, Qj - Rj is an 
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free market 
state market 
N 
w-
Flgure 4.3. A dual market graph 
individual urban grain demand, and Q - is an aggregate urban grain 
F demand by a certain type of urban household. Thus, we can move the F 
axis to this vertical limit, such as .Rj or ZRj, to combine both the state 
market and the free market together (Figure 4.3). 
S F 
Moreover, under the assumption that P < P , or the state market 
price is less than the free market price, given the ration level Rj or 
—S 
whatever it is, and the state market price P , as Figure 4.3 shows, the 
exchange activity occurring in the state market would be located in the 
S S 
south of (Q , P ) subspace, with the right boundary Rj and the upper 
—S boundary P . On the other hand, the exchange activity happening in the 
free market would be located in the north of (Q^ , P^ ) subspace, with the 
left boundary Rj and the lower boundary P^ . Indeed, Rj and P^  limit the 
S S FF 
state market (Q , P ) subspace, as well as the free market (Q , P ) 
subspace. In other words, the government directly controls the state 
market by means of two policy instruments: ration coupons and the state 
market price. Any change in the ration coupons or the state market price 
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means a change in the state market space, and, therefore, a change in the 
free market space. Because of shortages, an expansion or a reduction of 
the state market space would cause a reduction or an expansion of the 
free market space. In this sense, the free market space can be seen as a 
residual space and is indirectly controlled by these government policy 
instruments. The following are graphic analyses for two types of urban 
households in the mixed economy. 
1. The first type of urban household 
In Figure 4.4a, both and Xg are goods. Xg is a rationed good-
say food grain--but X^  is not. R is the official ration level for Xg. 
ABC is a kinked budget line for the first type of urban household in the 
mixed economy. Assume the income of the household is fixed, and AB is 
part of the budget line that reflects the state market price Pg and the 
ration R, whereas BC, another part of the budget line, reflects the free 
market price Pp. Under the assumption that Pg < Pp, BC is steeper than 
AB. 
X. 1 
rF A 
R C *2 
state market free market O 2 state market free market 
(a) (b) 
Figure 4.4. The derivation of grain demand of the first type of urban 
household in the mixed economy 
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For the first type of urban household in the mixed economy, its 
indifference curve would be tangent to the budget line AB because the 
official ration is not binding. The shape of the food grain demand is 
the same as that in the planned economy. Figure 4.4b gives a kinked 
S s demand in (Q , P ) space for the first type of urban household. The 
ration R plus the dotted line separate (Q, P) space into the state market 
space (Q^ , P^ ) and the free market space (Q^ , P^ ). Of course, the 
exchange activity participated in by the first type of household is 
limited in the state market space only. 
2. The second type of urban household 
Figure 4.5a shows that another situation exists for the second type 
of urban household. Its indifference curve would be tangent on the 
budget line BG. Suppose the real prices of goods and Xg in the state 
market and the real income of the household have been unchanged since the 
period of the planned economy. Consequently, the household's utility in 
the mixed economy (at point D) obviously would be higher than that in the 
planned economy (at point B) because of opening the free market. 
In Figure 4.5b, two pieces of demand line for the second type of 
urban household are given. The first piece is a vertical line X^ g - R, 
S s —g 
which is located in (Q , P ) subspace. Given the state market price P , 
a corresponding point on X^ g^ - R should be read as quantity demanded in 
the state market. There is no change in this demand at all if the state 
market price changes. The second piece is a downward-sloping curve that 
FF "" is located in (Q , P ) subspace. Because the official ration R is given 
by the government and Pg < P^ , is provided by the assumption, this piece 
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Xo(Q ) R G Xg 
State market free market 
(a) 
state market free market 
(b) 
Figure 4.5. The derivation of grain demand of the second type of urban 
household in the mixed economy 
— —O 
would be on the right of R and on the north of P . Given the free market 
price, a corresponding point on X^  should be read as quantity demanded in 
the free market only. Thus, in general, for dual markets, there are dual 
demand lines. Given dual prices in the dual markets, there are always 
corresponding dual points on the dual demand lines, respectively. 
Finally, because the urban household is always buying its initial food 
grain in the state market, the demand in the free market can be called 
the residual demand, to correspond to the total grain demand by the urban 
household. 
Aggregate grain demand of urban households 
The aggregate urban food grain demand is the sum of all individual 
urban household's food grain demands. In the mixed economy we have 
D™. SX 
:i j (4.41) j-1 
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where - aggregated urban food grain demand in the mixed economy 
Xj - Individual urban household food grain demand in the mixed 
economy 
Clearly, the aggregate urban food grain demand can be the sum of 
aggregate urban households' food grain demands of both the first and the 
second types of households. That is, 
_ 0%%: + D"M:: (4.42) 
where - aggregate urban food grain demand of the first type of 
households in the mixed economy 
pUMII _ aggregate urban food grain demand of the second type of 
households in the mixed economy 
For the first type of urban households, who purchase food grain from 
only the state market, we assume that the total number of households in 
this group is n^  ^and all of them are identical and face the same offi­
cial ration Rj. Then their aggregate food grain demand would be 
D ™. 
j-1 
"ui 
• jf, XjSI (PiS' PlF' P;' *i' 
" "ui ^JSI^^iS' ^ iP' ^i' ^ i' ^ "ui 43) 
For the second type of urban households, who purchase food grain 
from both the state market and the free market, we assume that there are 
n^ ^^  identical households in this group and that they are facing the same 
ration Rj. Hence, their aggregate food grain demand would be 
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- À"-... 
"un _ 
• + XjFii ('ÎS" PiF' H' "Pl 
" "uil^ j * "uiI^ jFII^ i^S' ^ IF'  ^"uil^ j 
Substituting (4.43) and (4.44) into (4.42), we obtain 
® • "UI ^jsi^^îs' ^ iF' ^i' ^ i' 
"uil^j "uiI^jFII (^iS' ^ Ïf' ^ i' ^ i' "P (^-^5) 
Let the total number of urban households in China be n^ , so that 
"U - "UI + "UII (4 46) 
In addition, let 
^ - ''ui <"•"> 
where P^ j is the relative frequency of the first type of urban house­
holds. Substituting (4.46) and (4.47) into (4.45) gives 
 ^ " "UI XjSI^ i^S' ^ iF* Pp ^ P ^ P 
("u " "ui^ * ("u "UI^ *jFII (^iS' ^ iF' ^ P ^ P ^ P 
" ^UI "u ^ jSI^ i^S' ^ iF' Pp ^P ^P 
+ (l-Pyj)n^ j + (l-^ ui^ 'V'jFII^ i^S' ^ ÏF' Pp P^ ^ P 
UM -
- D (Pur "U' PiS' PiF' Pp ^P "P (4.48) 
Hence, the aggregate urban food grain demand in the mixed economy is 
theoretically specified as a function of the relative frequency of the 
first type of urban households, the total number of urban households, the 
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state market prices including the state grain price; the free market 
prices including the grain price; the prices of unrationed goods; the 
ration levels including the grain ration; and the individual household's 
wage plus bonus Income. 
Analyzing formula (4.48), we find out that contains two com­
ponents: and This conclusion is different from the previous 
studies. Looking at both and we note that they have some 
different factors and some similar factors. This fact implies that each 
component sometimes plays its own role to affect the total urban grain 
demand 0^  because of the difference in the existing factors, and 
sometimes both components play their roles together to affect because 
of the similarity in the existing factors. 
Second, comparing (4.48), aggregate urban grain demand in the mixed 
economy, with (3.34), aggregate urban grain demand in the planned econ­
omy, we cannot draw any conclusion here because of too many uncertain 
factors. However, by assuming and Rj are fixed for both the mixed 
economy and the planned economy, and neglecting the differences between 
j^SI^ i^S' ^ iF' ^ 1' ^ 1' the mixed economy and Xjg(P, R^ , M') in the 
planned economy, the sum of the first two terms in is consistent with 
UP 
D ; consequently, we can have 
D™ - D"® + (1 - i>m)n„XjFii (fJs' "iF' 'r "ï> > •>" (t **) 
That is, given the assumed conditions above, the aggregate urban 
grain demand in the mixed economy would be higher than that in the 
planned economy. If this is true, we can conclude that the urban 
households are benefited in food grain consumption by the economic 
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reform. 
Comparative statics As we did in the study for individual types 
of households, the comparative statics in this part are still focused on 
the effects of own prices, own ration, the income, and the bonus. Using 
(4.48), the comparative statics of the aggregate urban grain demand in 
the mixed economy can be calculated: 
"u *jSI + "u + "u XjFII ^  ° 
The total urban grain demand decreases if the relative frequency of 
the first type of urban household increases. 
" ^UI *jSI XjFII ^  ° 
The total urban grain demand increases as the total number of urban 
households increases. 
'"js " "'js 
"^ ui"ui? r +  jS jS 
ai2! iclEi 
''jP " "if 
- " • ''ui' -H; ^  < 0 
J' 
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An Increase in either the state grain market price or the free grain 
market price can drive the total urban grain demand down. Note that both 
the state market price and the free market price have only a partially 
direct price effect on the total urban grain demand through corresponding 
components in for Pjg and in for Pjp) individually. 
This conclusion is different from the previous one (Sicular, 1988) that 
the aggregate demand of agricultural goods in the mixed economy is only 
directly affected by the free market price but not by the state market 
price. 
When the official ration level is increased, the total urban grain 
demand also increases, but only the second type of urban households want 
more food grain. This also is a partial ration effect in the mixed 
economy. 
Ô M  "  a M  a n  
as • as as 
" ^ui"u aB + "u as ^ ® 
When the government increases the wage or gives an additional bonus 
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to the urban households, the total urban grain demand increases, provided 
that grain is a normal good. 
Graphic analysis The graphic analysis is made for two types of 
urban households separately. 
1. Aggregate grain demand by thé first type of urban households 
From (4.48) and (4.43) we know that 
 ^ " ^UI "u ^ JSI^ i^S' ^ iF' ^ i' ^ i'  ^^UI "u (^ -50) 
Figure 4.6a indicates that the aggregate food grain demand by the 
first type of urban households in the mixed economy would be a kinked 
line in (Q®, P^ ) subspace, and nothing in the'(Q^ , P^ ) subspace. The 
main piece of is downward sloping with n^  Rj as its right 
boundary and Pg as its upper boundary. 
2. Aggregate grain demand by the second type or urban households 
By formulas (4.48) and (4.44) we can get 
UMII - -
D - (1 - Pyj) n^  Rj + (1 - Pyj) n^  (P^ g, P^ p, . Wp 
2: (1 - Py;) Rj (4.51) 
In Figure 4.6b, the shape of is the same as that of the graph 
for individual urban households within the second type (Figure 4.5b), 
S S 
except that the right bound line for (Q , P ) space has become Q^ jjj -
"u *j' 
Based on furmula (4.48), referring to Figure 4.6a and 4.6b, we can 
draw a graph of the aggregate urban grain demand in the mixed economy 
(Figure 4.6c). The shape of is similar to that of except 
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(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4.6. The aggregation of the urban grain demands in the mixed 
economy 
S S 
that (1) the right boundary line for (Q , P ) space is now - n^  Rj, 
and (2) the downward-sloping piece of is much steeper than that of 
DUMII 
To close this section we present the market analysis, which includes 
the state market analysis and the free market analysis. These two parts 
can help us to recognize fully the roles of both the state market and the 
free market for urban households in the mixed economy. 
The state market analysis 
Although dual markets exist in the mixed economy, the government 
still is paying more attention to the state market. Thus, it is neces­
sary to conduct the state market analysis to explore whether or not there 
is a change in the government plans regarding urban grain demand in the 
state market. 
Grain demand bv urban household in the state market As we know, 
there are two types of urban households in the state market, and their 
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behavior in the mixed economy is similar to that in the planned economy. 
1. The first type of urban household 
XjSI - XjSI (Pis' Pi?' n- ^ 1' «•' = (4 52) 
For the first type of urban household, its grain demand in the state 
market is a function of the state market price vector P^ g, the free mar­
ket price vector Pf , the prices of other goods, the state ration levels, 
and the money income. 
2. The second type of urban household 
*jSII " (^ -53) 
For the second type of urban household, its grain demand in the 
state market is just the amount of the ration coupons received. 
Comparative statics for the individual ?rain demands Compara­
tive statics are made for individual grain demands of the two types of 
urban household in the state market. 
*jSI " *jSI (^ iS' ^ iF' ^ i' ^ i' j^SII " 
aRj aRj 
aXjcT ax 
> 0 for normal goods - 0 
These results indicate that, for urban housholds in the state 
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market, (1) grain demand by the first type decreases, but demand by the 
second type does not change when the state grain market price increases; 
(2) grain demands by both the first and the second type do not change 
when the free grain market price increases; (3) grain demand by the first 
type does not change, but demand by the second type increases when the 
government increases the official ration level; and (4) grain demand by 
the first type increases, but demand by the second type does not change 
when the government raises the income of urban households. 
Aggregate grain demand by urban households in the state market 
Now we formulate the aggregate urban grain demand in the state 
market of the mixed economy, as follows: 
D™S - (4.54) 
where and are aggregate urban grain demands by the first and 
the second type of urban households in the state market of the mixed 
economy. From formulas (4.43), (4.44) and (4.48), we know that 
IIMRT — — 
 ^ " ^UI "u *jSI (^ iS' ^ iF' ^ i' ^ i'  ^^UI "u (^ -55) 
UMSII . , , _ _ T 
jSII D - (1 - Pyj) Hy X 
- (1 - Pyj) ny Rj (4.56) 
and 
D 
UMS 
UI 
.UMS 
"u *jSI (^iS' ^iF' ^ i ' ^ i' ' ^UI "u 
- D (Pyj, n^ , P^ g, P^ p, P^ , R(, M') 3 n^  Rj (4.57) 
That is, total grain demand by urban households in the state market 
is a function of the relative frequency P^ j» the total number of urban 
households, the state market price vector, the free market price vector, 
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the prices of other goods, the state ration levels, and the money income. 
In addition, formula (4.57) implies that the total urban grain 
demand in the state market of the mixed economy is not more than the 
product of the total number of urban households and the official ration 
UHF level, or D , the planned urban grain demand in the mixed economy. In 
other words, the government still is using the same method to plan the 
aggregate grain demand in the urban area, even though it permits reopen­
ing of the free market. Without any further assumptions, we cannot 
compare with the planned urban grain demand in the planned 
— UHF 
economy. If we suppose R. is fixed, however, D is certainly greater 
UPP 
than D because n^ , the total number of urban households, has certainly 
increased in the urban area in mainland China. 
Comparative statics for aggregate grain demand The comparative 
statics are shown for aggregate grain demands by two types of urban 
households in the state market separately. 
1. The first type of urban households 
 ^ " ^UI "u *jSI (*iS' ^ iF' ^ i' 
Because is exactly the same as , it is not necessary to 
recalculate the comparative statics for here. 
2. The second type of urban households 
D^ SII _ (1 . fy,) 
-pUMSII 
dP^j. " ' < 0 
„dUMSII 
 ^ - (1 - ?,„) R, > 0 
an^  ' UI' "j 
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.-UMSII ..UMSII 
.pUMSII 
 ^ (1 • ^ UI> "U > 0 
SRj 
These results Illustrate that, for the second type of urban house­
holds, the aggregate grain demand in the state market (1) decreases when 
the relative frequency increases, (2) does not change when the state 
market price or the free market price increases, and (3) increases when 
the total number of urban households or the official grain ration in­
creases. 
Now we perform comparative statics for aggregate grain demand by all 
urban households.in the state market. 
„DHS _ pOMSI ^  pDMSII 
^ 
âiff. , 0 
îÇ-
8M' " aM'  ^" 
For urban households in the mixed economy, the aggregate grain 
demand in the state market (1) is uncertain if the relative frequency 
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Increases, (2) decreases If the state grain market price increases, (3) 
does not change if the free grain market price increases, and (4) 
increases if the state grain ration level or the money income increases. 
Based on these results, we can conclude that both the state grain 
market price and the state ration level have partial (not total) direct 
(not indirect) effects on the aggregate grain demand in the state market 
through and respectively. Besides, the free grain market 
price has no effect on and , and hence on at all. 
Graphic analysis The graphic analyses for either individual or 
aggregate grain demands by either individual type or aggregate urban 
households in the state market have been completed; readers interested 
S s 
can refer to the (Q , P ) subspace in Figures 4.4b, 4.5b, and 4.6. 
The free market analysis 
The existence of the free grain market provides a channel through 
which urban households can purchase additional grain to satisfy them­
selves. In particular, the free market is not a unique market within the 
mixed economy but coexists with the state market so that it is somewhat 
different from the free market in a free economy in the common sense. 
Thus, it is necessary to make the free market analysis to explore its 
operational mechanism in such an environment. 
Grain demand bv urban households in the free market There are 
two types of urban household in the free market. 
1. The first type of urban household 
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Xjpj - 0 (4.58) 
For the first type of urban household, the grain demand in the free 
market is zero. 
2. The second type of urban household 
XjFII - Xjril (Pis' PÏP' n- (4 59) 
For the second type of urban household, its grain demand in the free 
market is a function of the state market price vector P^ g, the free 
market price vector P^ p, the prices of other goods, the state ration 
levels, and the household's income minus its expenditure in the state 
grain market. 
Comparative statics for the individual grain demand Comparative 
statics are made for individual grain demand by two types of urban 
household in the free market. 
1. The first type of urban household 
XjFi - 0 
For the first type of urban household, the grain demand in the free 
market is always zero and is unaffected by any factor. 
2. The second type of urban household 
XjFII " XjFII (^ iS' ^ iF' ^ i' ^ i' 
film _ fjii ân::. 0  ^ > o 
ap,„ 3M" ap,_ 1= aM" 
JO JO St-
**jFII _ ML. > n • 
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gQ, > 0 for normal goods 
Thus, for the second type of urban household, the grain demand in 
the free market (1) decreases if the state grain market price or the free 
grain market price increases, (2) is uncertain but possibly Increases if 
the state ration level increases, and (3) increases if its income 
increases. 
Aggregate grain demand of urban households in the free market 
Now we derive the aggregate urban grain demand in the free market 
of the mixed economy as follows; 
pUMF _ jjUMFI + pUMFII (4.60) 
where and are the aggregate grain demands by the first and 
the second type of urban households in the free market of the mixed 
economy. From formulas (4.43), (4.44) and (4.48), we can have 
pUMFI _ Q (4.61) 
- (1 - "U XjFII 
- (1 - Pyj) nu XjFii PiF' ' M") 
ITMPTT — 
- (Pui> "u- Pig. PiF' ^ i' ^ i' M") (4.62) 
Thus, substituting (4.61) and (4.62) into (4.60), we obtain 
pUMF _ pUMFII 
- - "Ul) "U XjFII (PÎS' PiF' i^' 
- (P^ j, n^ , P%g, PJ-p, P^ , R^ , M") (4.63) 
Consistent with the aggregate grain demand of the second type of 
urban households in the free market, is a function of the relative 
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frequency , the total number of urban households, the state market 
price vector P^ g, the free market price vector the prices of other 
goods, the state ration levels, and the household's income minus the 
expenditure on Xjjjg 
Comparative statics for aggregate grain demand The comparative 
statics are made for the aggregate grain demand(s) of two types of urban 
households as well as of all urban households in the free market. 
1. The first type of urban households 
_ 0 
There is nothing that can change the aggregate grain demand of the 
first type of households in the free market. 
2. The second type of urban households 
D - (1 - Pyj) ny Xjpjj (P^ g, Pjlp, P^ , M") 
onUMFII 
aPyj " • VjFII ° 
„nUMFII 
any - (1 - XjFii > 0 _ 
J® 
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ÔX.p J 
aM' " (1 " ^Ul) "U AM' ^ ° 
For the second type of urban households, the aggregate grain demand 
in the free market (1) decreases if the relative frequency , the state 
grain market price, or the free grain market price increases, (2) is 
uncertain but possibly increases if the grain ration level increases, and 
(3) increases if the income of urban households increases. 
UMP UMPTT 
We have D - D from formula (4.63), so that the comparative 
UMF UMFII 
statics for both D and D are exactly the same. Thus, we can 
conclude that for the second type, as well as all types of urban house­
holds, both the state grain market price and the state ration level have 
indirect effects, but the free market price has a direct effect on the 
aggregate grain demand in the free market through the income effect. 
Graphic analysis Similarly, the graphic analyses for either 
individual or aggregate grain demands of either the individual type or 
the aggregate of urban households in the free market have been completed 
F F in the (Q , P ) subspace in Figure 4.4b, 4.5b and 4.6 and are not 
reprinted here. 
Theory of Rural Grain Demand and Supply 
of State Farm (Households) and Agricultural Households 
in the Mixed Economy 
After the institutional changes in the rural area in the recent 
economic reforms, there have been two kinds of basic rural enterprises in 
the Chinese mixed economy: state farm households and agricultural 
households. The state farm households became the basic production units 
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much later than agricultural households did. There are differences be­
tween the behaviors of state farm households and agricultural households 
becausee they face different environments, especially the policy about 
land ownership utilized by them. Consequently, the first two subsec­
tions in this section are formed separately. One subsection studies the 
behavior of the state farm (households) and the other one studies the 
behavior of the agricultural households. Each subsection consists of 
three parts: the policy environment, the state farm (household) model or 
agricultural household model, and the aggregate grain demand and supply 
of all state farm (households) or all agricultural households. The pol­
icy environment introduces the basic background materials during the eco­
nomic reform for the state farm (households) or the agricultural house­
holds. The state farm model is developed based on an assumption of its 
profit maximization whereas the agricultural household model is built 
based on an assumption of its utility maximization. After that, the 
aggregate grain demand and supply of the state farm (households) and the 
agricultural households are given from the derived state farm (house­
hold's) or agricultural household's grain demand and supply in each 
subsection. 
To close this section, an additional subsection deals with the 
market analysis. This subsection contains two parts; the state market 
analysis and the free market analysis. Within these two parts, the 
market situations are described, the policy impacts are discussed, and, 
finally, the interactions among the state market, the free market, and 
the household market in the mixed grain economy are explored and studied. 
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The topic of the first subsection is the theory of rural grain 
demand and supply of state farm (households) in the mixed economy. From 
the early 1980s, managers in the state farms had changed their behavior 
to catch up with the policy changes. Their goal of management had 
shifted away from the previous output maximization. The adjustment 
brought changes to the state farms. The initiative of state farm 
households had been partly stimulated by the bonuses attached to their 
wage income. In the mid-1980s, state farms applied the production 
responsibility system and turned their households' members into basic 
production units. After that, there seems to be no big difference 
between the state farm households and the agricultural households except 
for their production equipment and explanation of land ownership. 
Policy environment of state farm (households) 
This part deals with the earlier stage of state farms in the mixed 
economy, before the production responsibility system. 
State ownership Before the mid-1980s, the state farm was still 
run under the government's plans. All properties, including land, 
livestock, houses, and equipment, belonged to the state. In the mixed 
economy, the state farm delivered all its agricultural products to the 
government. The government distributed equipment and material inputs to 
the state farm. Although the state compensated the losses of the state 
farm, the government permitted the state farm to keep profits for its own 
reinvestment and partial benefits of its own households. Thus, under the 
state plans, to a great degree, the managers of the state farms made an 
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effort to make as much profit as possible. 
Labor All laborers of the state farm household still were not 
transferable. Just like the past, they were paid by a fixed wage. In 
order to encourage their working initiative, additional bonuses were 
provided by the farm manager. 
Consumption of food grain The wage income earned by the state 
farm households could be spent in the market(s). These households were 
given ration coupons and permitted to purchase grain from the state 
market. They were treated as the urban households. 
Market control Almost all economic activities of the state farms 
were limited to the state market. To motivate the state farm to develop 
agricultural production, the government set the minimum sales quotas for 
each state farm. On the other hand, the government increased the pro­
curement prices for agricultural products including grain. It also set 
an above-quota price that was used for the grain delivered above the 
quota and was clearly higher than the procurement price. In addition, 
the state farm could buy some material inputs from the free market. 
State farm h^ousehold) model 
For a state farm, its grain economy possesses dual features. Its 
grain production decision was made by the farm manager, but its food 
grain consumption decisions were made by its households. Hence, the 
state farm model in the mixed economy can be. subdivided to handle grain 
consumption and production. 
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Food grain demand of state farm household As an individual 
consumption unit, earning fixed wages plus bonuses, receiving grain 
coupons from the government, and facing dual grain markets in the mixed 
economy, the state farm household does not differ from the urban house­
hold. Thus, the urban household grain demand functions can be used for 
the state farm household: 
XjsH - "js (%' PiF' 5;. M') S Rj (4-64) 
or 
XjsH - ^3 * Xjp'fis' Pif' 'r H- (4 «5) 
Formulas (4.64) and (4.65) represent different attitudes toward the 
ration coupons for grain and the dual markets, especially the free 
market. The comparative statics and the graphic analysis are also the 
same as before and, therefore, are deleted here. 
Grain supply of the state farm Since the economic reform, the 
state farm had shifted its interest from concentrating on output to 
seeking profits for its own needs. Although the output target set by the 
government remained the same, the profit goal had become more important 
for the managers of the state farms. Assuming that the objective of the 
state farm is transformed into maximizing profit, subject to the govern­
ment plans, and that the production functions for the state farm have all 
the usual properties, as mentioned in Chapter III, the Lagrangian 
function would be 
 ^" i^ (^Fis9iS+ *ÏSAQiSA)+i^ P^iQi"j^ (^7jS*jS+ ^ jF^ jF^ 'j^ T^j^ j 
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+ {G [Q^  ( • • • > (Q^ g » • • • Q]j ' ' • • • > Q^ ] ) 
+ .V21"" - ^^ is' + Asi«^ s - 'is> 
i-1 j-1 
where 
Qj^ g - the output sold at the quota price (1-1, .. ., k) 
Q^g^ - the 1^^ output sold at the above quota price (1-1, ..., k) 
- the 1^  ^output without quota (1-1 n) 
Q^ g - the sales quota for the 1^  ^output of the state farm 
(1-1, ..., k) 
X._ - the Input bought at the state market price (J-1 k) 
J® • 
Xjp - the Input bought at the free market price (j - 1 k) 
Xj - the Input without ration (j - 1, ..., m) 
X._ - the purchase ration for the j input of the state farm 
J® 
( j - 1 ,  . k )  
Pj^ g - the quota price for the 1*"^  output (1-1 k) 
P^ g^  - the above quota price for the 1^  ^output (1-1, ..,, k) 
P^  - the price for the 1^  ^output (1-1, ..., n) 
7.„ - the state market price for the input (j-1, ..., k) 
7jp - the free market price for the j^  ^input (j - 1 k) 
Tj - the price for the j^  ^input (j-1 m) 
Because the sales quota Q^ g set by the government must be fulfilled. 
we have 
"is - "is <"•"> 
Substitute (4.67) into (4.66), and the Lagrangian function becomes 
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+ 2: AgiCXig - X^ g) (4.68) 
 ^" ^/iSA^ i + 2 FiQi- Z (PigA - Pig) Qis ' S TypfXjS Xjp) 
1—1 1—1 1-1 j-1 
"Â * i /'j" • "js' 
+ {G [Qj^ , .. . , (Q^ g + ^iSA^  ' * ' ' ^ k' ^ 1 ' ' ' ' '  ^
k 
S
j-1 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
^  ^0  j - 1  k  ( 4 . 6 9 )  
2 P, 7=1 - ?. + A, 3 ^^ 0 j-1 m (4.70) 
j 1-1 j J 1-1 j 
X j  _  0  j - 1  m  ( 4 . 7 1 )  
SA^  " ® [^ 1 (QlS "*• QlSA?' • • • Qfc' 1^ n^^  ~ ° (4 72) 
Al It; - ° (4 73) 
It;; - â^ s - Xj, a 0 J-1 k (4 74) 
121 It;; - ° J-1 k (4 75) 
Xj, A^  > 0 j - 1, ..., k (4.76) 
Agi a 0 1 - 1, .... k (4.77) 
Assume that Xj > 0, or that the state farm Is purchasing each 
product In the market(s). Obviously, this assumption Implies that (4.69) 
and (4.70) equal zero and (4.71) is dropped out. By the same reasons 
given in the last section, we let 7jg < 7jp for j-1 m, the 
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state market price for the input is less than the free market price, 
and Ignore the situations of 7jg & 7jp. Thus, the state farm always 
makes its initial purchase of X._ in the state market until X._ is ful-ja ja 
filled. Under the condition of 7jg < 7jp, we now consider the transfor­
mation of (4.69). By the mathematical transformation of (4.16), we 
understand that - 0 is equivalent to these two cases: 
Case 1. - 0, < 0. 
Thus, 
âL_ . s p  fSi Xjp) _  +  ^  2  !Si A  
aXjg  ^^iSA aXj aXjg j^s + aXjg 2^i 
aq, gn 3Q. 
• ^^iSA ax " TjS+ h ^  aq ax " 2^i" ° j-l....,k (4.78) 
ja 1 jS 
Case 2. > 0, ^ — - 0. 
Thus, 
â L . s p  a(Xjg + Xjy) _ â2.fSi 
aXjp iSA a(Xjg + Xjp) aXjp + ^ i ^  aq^  ax^ p 
aq, ac aq 
" ^iSA aXjp • '"jF + ^ 1 2 aq^  ^aXjp" °  ^  ^  ^(^ -79) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions now consist of (4.78), (4.79), (4.72), 
(4.73), and (4.74). Furthermore, suppose that > 0, and that the first 
h^  ^inputs belong to case 1 and the i^  ^to the k^  ^inputs belong to case 
2. Solving the equations simultaneously, provided the second-order 
conditions are satisfied, let 
*iSA " ^iSa^  ^" 
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- 1. ..., n) 
7js ~ ?jg(j "It .•., h) 
Tjp " TjpCj " » k) 
7j - 7j(j - 1. '••. œ) 
Xjg •" Xjg( j ~ 1, .. . , k) 
We obtain the Implicit input demand functions of the state farm in 
the mixed economy as follows; 
Xj - Xjs (PisA' 'r ?js' *is> J - 1 " 
Xj - ÏJ3 + Xj, 
- *JS + Xjp/PisA' ^ i' TjS- 7jP' Tj' *is> J - ' " <*•'» 
Xj - Xj PJ, 7'p, 7-, X'g) j - 1 m (4,82) 
Substituting (4.80), (4.81) and (4.82) into the grain supply 
function of the state farm, we get 
Qjj^  "" • • • I X^ , . . . , X^ , Xj^ , . . . , X^ ) 
" ^i^ '^ iSA' ^ i' 7jS' 7jF' "^ J'  ^^iS (4.83) 
That is, the grain supply of the state farm is a function of the 
above quota prices, the prices of other outputs, input prices in the 
state market and the free market, prices of other inputs, and, finally, 
input rations in the state market. It needs to be pointed out that the 
state market grain quota price is excluded from the grain supply func­
tion, or it does not affect the grain supply. Thus, we can conclude that 
when two prices exist in the same.state market, the grain supply of the 
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state farm is guided by only the higher price, the above-quota price, and 
not by the lower price, the quota price. In our case, after the state 
farm fulfills the government's quota requirement, the additional grain 
supply depends on only the above-quota price. The case can easily be 
extended to where more than two prices exist. 
Comparative statics The comparative statics for the grain demand 
by state farm households are the same as those by urban households, and 
are, hence, not necessary to recalculate here. The comparative statics 
for the grain supply by the state farm are focused on the grain own 
prices. 
Using formula (4.83), we have 
The above results imply that the grain supply is increasing if the 
above quota price increases, but it remains unchanged if the quota price 
increases. 
also is made for only grain supply by the state farms. Because the grain 
supply function does not contain the quota price but the above-quota 
price, the supply curve is kinked in Figure 4.7. The lower piece is a 
is upward-sloping and is connected with at the quota price P^ g. 
Graphic analysis Like comparative statics, the graphic analysis 
S 
vertical line whose intercept on the axis is Q^ g, and the upper piece 
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Figure 4.7. Grain supply of state farm in the mixed economy 
Aggregate grain demand of state farm households and supply of state farms 
The individual grain demand and supply of the state farm (household) 
have been derived. In this part, aggregate grain demand of state farm 
households and aggregate grain supply of state farms are derived separ­
ately. 
Aggregate grain demand of state farm households Individual grain 
demand of the state farm household is similar to that of urban house­
holds, so the aggregate grain demand of the state farm households is no 
exception. 
Using formulas (4.42) and (4.48), we have 
D™ . (4.84) 
" ^FI "F ^ jS (^ iS' ^ IF' ^ i' ^ i* 
+ (1 - fpi) "F + *jF (fiS' PÏP' Rj' M')] 
- D™ (Ppj, np, PJg, Pj-p, P^ , Rj-, M') (4.85) 
where 
FM 
D - the aggregate grain demand of state farm households 
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- aggregate grain demand of the first type and the 
second type of state farm households 
np - the total number of state farm households 
Ppj - the relative frequency of the first type of state farm 
households 
Other symbols used here are the same as those in (4.48). 
Formula (4.85) indicates that the aggregate grain demand is a 
function of the relative frequency Ppj, the total number of state farm 
households, the state market prices, the free market prices, the prices 
of other unrationed goods, and the household's disposable income. 
Aggregate grain supply of state farms Suppose that all the state 
farms are identical and there are n^  state farms total. From formula 
F (4.83) we can derive S , aggregate grain supply of state farms. 
S - "p Qi (PiSA' ' 7js' 7jF' ^ j' 
- S (np, P^ , 7jg, 7jp. 7j. X^ g) & Hp Q^ g (4.86) 
Comparative statics This subpart is subdivided into two parts. 
1. Aggregate grain demand of state farms 
Aggregate grain demand of state farm households is the same as that 
of urban households, so the comparative statics are the same for both 
state farm households and urban households. 
2. Aggregate grain supply of state farms 
Comparative statics for aggregate grain supply of state farms 
concentrate mainly on the grain quota price and the above-quota price. 
FM — 
s - "F Qi (^iSA' 7jS' 7jF' j ' ^ iS^ 
211 
SS. FM 3Q, 
aPis " a'ls " ° 
3P.„. "F ap. > 0 
ISA ISA 
The higher the above quota price is, the higher the aggregate grain 
supply by the state farms is. 
Graphic analysis The graphic analysis for aggregate grain demand 
is presented in Figure 4.6. The graphic analysis here is limited to only 
the aggregate grain supply of the state farms. The shape of the aggre­
gate grain supply of the state farms is the same as that of an individual 
S " 
state farm, but the intercept on the Q axis has been changed to n^ Q^ g 
(Figure 4.8). 
•Vis 
Figure 4.8. Aggregate grain supply of state farms in the mixed economy 
We have finished our study of the first subsection, and we are 
starting our work with the second subsection, the topic of which is the 
theory of rural grain demand and supply of agricultural households in the 
mixed economy. 
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Policy environment of agricultural households 
Private agricultural household As a basic unit of production and 
consumption in rural areas in the mixed economy, the agricultural 
household makes its own decisions in its economic activities. It owns 
almost all of the means of production except for the land used. Accord­
ing to contract, it is assigned a specific plot of land to plant within a 
specified period. 
Labor Agricultural laborers are transferable in the mixed 
economy. The agricultural household can hire labor to help its operation 
or can have its labor hired by someone else. In either case, the hired 
laborer is paid wages. 
Plan control The government has loosened its plan control in the 
rural areas. First, it reduced the grain quota and agricultural tax in 
grain, and tried to use price as a signal to guide the grain delivery to 
the state market. Second, in early 1985, the government introduced a 
contract system to replace the quota system for grain. According to the 
contract, the government negotiates its purchase with agricultural 
households before the sowing season. Thus, the households have their own 
right to decide whether or not to sign the contract with the government. 
In theory, the contracts are voluntary, but in practice, the contracts 
become semi-mandatory to a great extent. In a certain sense, this 
contract system can be thought of as a new quota system. 
Market operation There are dual grain markets in the mixed 
economy. The state market is considered to be dominated by the govern­
ment whereas the free market is regarded as a supplement to state 
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commerce. The government made an effort to improve the situation in the 
state grain market. It raised the grain quota price about 30% to 50% and 
set a higher above quota purchase price for grain delivered above the 
quota. The government even tried to use a negotiated purchase price in 
response to the free market price. In general, the above quota price is 
less than the negotiated purchase price, which may be very close to and 
even exceed the free market price. Since 1985, the government abolished 
multiple prices in the state market. Instead, it set a uniform contract 
price, 30 percent of the quota price plus 70 percent of the above-quota 
price. Thus, this contract price seems to be more than the quota price 
but less than the above-quota price and, of course, less than the free 
market price. Besides, the government maintains the negotiated price, 
which may approximate the free market price. 
To be consistent with the analysis for the planned economy, we still 
classify the agricultural households into three types by their activities 
in the state market rather than in the dual markets. The first type is 
called nonbuyer or complete seller in the state market because it has to 
sign contracts and fulfill their obligations. Among the first type of 
agricultural households, a majority generally produce grain to supply 
themselves and the state market, even the free market. The minority may 
produce other cash crops to make a profit and buy grain from the free 
market for their own use and resale to the government. Hence, the 
nonbuyer in the state market may be either a nonbuyer or a complete buyer 
in the free market. 
The second type is a partial buyer or a partial seller in the state 
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market because it has to fulfill its obligation by the contract and can 
buy some grain back with the government's permission because of unex­
pected natural disasters. According to their situations in the free 
market the second type of agricultural households can be subdivided into 
two: one is a nonbuyer who does not need to buy grain from the free 
market, the other one is a complete buyer who buys part of the consumed 
grain from the free market to satisfy itself fully. 
The last type of agricultural household is called a complete buyer 
or nonseller in the state market because it does not need to produce and 
sell grain by the government's plan. This type also contains two sub­
types: the nonbuyer who does not buy any grain in the free market, and 
the complete buyer who buys but does not sell grain in the free market. 
The basic situations are the same in the input markets. In brief, 
there are also dual markets and dual (multiple) prices for the inputs 
used by the agricultural households. Generally, the households purchase 
their initial needs up to the official ration level in the state market, 
then their additional needs at the higher prices in the free market. 
Agricultural household model 
For an agricultural household in the mixed economy, both its produc­
tion and consumption are managed by itself and guided by the government's 
plan and information from both the state market and the free market. 
Suppose that the household's objective is to maximize its utility, sub­
ject to its budget, production function, and other constraints given by 
the plan control and that its utility function and production function 
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have the usual properties mentioned In Chapter III as well as in general 
mlcroeconomlc theory. 
To build a general agricultural household model in the mixed 
economy, we have to take into further consideration the changes in the 
price policy of the state government. It is known that there were 
multiple prices and there are dual prices in the state grain market. In 
fact, any multiple (more than two) price system can be seen as an 
extension of a dual price system in which a quota price Pg and an above 
quota price Pg^  exist and, of course, Pg^  > Pg. Considering the rela­
tionship between Pg^  and the free market price Pp, we ignore the cases 
PgA > Pp or PgA - Pp. Readers can refer to the reasons from the discus­
sion about the relationship between Pg (Pg^  here now) and Pp in the last 
section. Now we discuss the case Pg^  < Pp. 
The reasons for an agricultural household to sell its product to the 
state market at the lower Pg^  rather than to the free market at the 
higher price Pp may be briefly summarized as follows: 1) lack of the 
free market information; 2) consideration of additional transportation 
cost; 3) receipt of the government's benefits, for example, receiving 
lower cost inputs such as chemical fertilizer or an awarded right to buy 
a good in shortage such as a name brand bicycle; or 4) influence of local 
authorities. From the point of view of economics, the first reason can 
be considered as the value of market information and the second reason 
can be treated as sales cost. In fact, both of the reasons are deducting 
some value from the free market price Pp. The third reason, actually, is 
adding some value to the above-quota price, Pg^ . All three reasons are 
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reductions in the difference between Pg^  and Pp, even a change in sign in 
case Pg^  < Pp. For simplicity, we ignore these three situations in our 
theoretical model. The last reason is apparently noneconomic and, 
therefore, is not discussed in this study. 
Overall, there is no real economic reason for an agricultural house­
hold facing a free market to take such a voluntary action unless the gov­
ernment asks it to do so. Furthermore, the negotiated price can be seen 
as the approximate free market price and can be ignored in this study 
because it plays a role to transfer part of supply in the free market to 
the state market. Under these circumstances, we assume a unique and 
uniform price Pg that can be considered as either the above-quota price 
(in the earlier stage of the mixed economy) or the contract price (in the 
later stage of the mixed economy)--the new quota price--in our model. 
Under all of these assumptions, we extend Sicular's (1988) model 
from a three-good case to a multiple-good case and change her decision 
variables from unreasonable and 7^  to reasonable X^ . Our Lagrangian 
function for the agricultural household in the Chinese mixed economy is 
then as follows; 
L - U [X^  (X^ g + X^ p) X^ , X^ ] 
k k n k k 
+ Ag G [Qi' 
k 
(Qis + Qip) > • • • > Q^ i I I Qjj] 
k 
(4.87) 
where 
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- the commodity consumed by the household (i - 1, ..., n) 
- the i^  ^commodity consumed by the household in the state 
market (i - 1, ..., k) 
XiF - the i^  ^commodity consumed by the household in the free market 
(i - 1 k) 
X^ g - the state market ration for the i^  ^commodity (i - 1, .k) 
- the i^  ^commodity produced by the household (i - 1 n) 
Q^ g - the i^  ^commodity sold to the state market (i - 1 k) 
Q^ p - the i^  ^commodity accounted at the free market price 
(i - 1, ..., k) 
- the sales quota to the state market for the i^  ^commodity 
(i - 1 k) 
iS " P.- - the state market price for the i*"^  commodity (i - 1, . . . , k) 
P^ p - the free market price for the i'^  commodity (i - 1 k) 
P^  - the price for the i^  ^commodity (i - 1, ..., n) 
M - other income received by the household 
For the household, X^ g & X^ g is a rationing constraint and Q^ g^ > Q^ g 
is a sales quota constraint in the state market. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are; 
 ^^ 0 i - 1 k (4.88) 
i 
âL_ m_ 
îi " ax^  
aL_ 
'i 
5L_ 
)i 
dX  ~  dX  '  ^ ^ i - 1, ..., n (4.89) 
*i ax" " 0 i - 1 (4.90) 
aq 3 0 i - 1 k (4.91) 
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+ Al9i < ° i - 1 n (4.92) 
i - 1, ..., n (4.93) 
âL__ 
3A, --M+S Pij,Q„+s PjQ,-s PisX^  .s P,pXip.Z P,Xj; 1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 
0 
1 dh  
-s P,x,&0 (4.94) 
(4.95) 
- G [Q^  (Qig + Qip) Qjç. Q*] & 0 (4.96) 
^ 2  I t - "  
ax^  • *is • ^ is ^  ° 
aL__ _ n 
31 ax 31 
\s ^  ° 
aL-, 
41 
x^ , Qi ^  0 
*1S' *1F' ^ IS' ^ IF ^  ° 
1^' ^ 2' ^ 31' ^ 41 ^  ^ 
The second tvne of agricultural household 
then (4.94) becomes 
k n k 
2L__ 
aA, 
(4.97) 
k (4.98) 
k (4.99) 
k (4.100) 
k (4.101) 
, .... n (4.102) 
k (4.103) 
k (4.104) 
Suppose that > 0, 
n 
,-S P.X,-0 (4.105) 
•r-xf, fis-'isf, '•Ar^  hshsf, fi 
1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 1-1 
so that (4.95) can be dropped out. Moreover, suppose A^  > 0, then we 
have 
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- G [Q^  (Q^ g + Qip) Q^ , Q„] - 0 (4.106) 
Hence, (4.97) can be omitted. Now we work with (4.88) and (4.91). 
Suppose all and (i - 1 n) are positive, that is, the house­
hold consumes and produces each commodity. Then 
^ - 0 i - 1 n (4.107) 
^  -0  i - 1  n  ( 4 . 1 0 8 )  
Immediately applying the mathematical transformation (4.16), assum­
ing the household makes both its initial purchase and sale from and to 
the state market rather than the free market, both and > 0, and 
considering the possible situations in the mixed economy, both (4.107) 
and (4.108) imply only three cases; 
Case 1: 
™ 
Case 2: 
Case 3: 
Furthermore, suppose that for the agricultural household, the first 
d^^ within the first k'^ commodities belong to case 1, the e^^ through 
the g^^ commodities belong to case 2, and the remaining h*"^ through the 
k^^ commodities belong to case 3. We then have 
ax, • ax,_ ' •^l^iS ' ^3i • ° i-1 d (4.112) 
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1%; - "iPis - "31 > ° ^ »= <4113' 
(4 114) 
ViF - » 1 - ' " <411: 
1 ^ - % ; - • ^ i ^ s •  \ i - V  1 - 1  s  < 4 1 1 * )  
^ ^ • "I'lS * ^41 > ° 1-" •= (4 llf' . 
V i F 1 - 1  e  < 4 1 1 * )  
ViF-" 1-" " <"11" 
Finally, consider situations of both constraints (4.98) and (4.100). 
Because of a shortage of consumed goods and the price difference between 
the state market and the free market, rural households usually use up 
their purchase rations. On the other hand, by the contract, the sales 
quotas must be fulfilled. Thus, we simply assume that all and > 
0 (1 - 1 k), immediately; 
-  X ,  -  X ,  -  0  1 - 1  k  ( 4 . 1 2 0 )  
IS LS 
It;; - Sis - Si: - 0 1-1 k (4.121) 
Apparently both (4.120) and (4.121) imply deletions of (4.99), 
(4.101), (4.112), and (4.116). Consequently, our model is composed of 
(4.113) through (4.115), (4.117) through (4.119), part of (4.107) and 
(4.108) (1-1, ..., n), and (4.105) through (4.106). 
Due to the assumption of positiveness of all Ag^^ and A^^, there are 
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no free choices for the agricultural household in the state market. 
After fulfilling the sales quotas and using up purchase rations, the 
agricultural household can have free choices in the market. Thus, we let 
M' - M + s Pjs «IS - ifis) , (4.122) 
i-l 
M' represents the real disposable income of the agricultural 
household before its free choices both in the state market without any 
restriction and in the free market. 
Provided that the second-order conditions are satisfied, considering 
final Kuhn-Tucker conditions simultaneously, and letting 
P[p - (1 - h, ..., k) and P^ - P^ (1 - 1 n), 
the implicit (If any) grain demand and supply functions for the agricul­
tural household would be 
i - 1 d (4.123) 
*i " ^iS "*• ^IF 
- X^s + ^ IF (flF' ^ 1' M') > *18 i - e k (4.124) 
Xi - X^ (P|p, P[, M') i - 1, ..., n (4.125) 
- Qjg i - 1 g (4.126) 
^i " ^iS ^IF 
- Qis + Qip ('ÎF' *1' M') > k (4.127) 
Qi - Qi (P^p, P(, M') i - 1 n (4.128) 
Because we derive the above results by assuming both X^^g and > 
0, these results fit the case of the partial buyer or partial seller, 
the second type of agricultural household. Thus, we can conclude that 
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the possible combination of grain demand and grain supply functions for 
any of the second type of households might be (4.123) and (4.126), or 
(4.124) and (4.126), or (4.124) and (4.127). In other words, we have 
Xjiii - ïjj (4.129) 
*jII2 " *jII3 " *jS "*• *jF (*iF' ^ *jS (4.130) 
and 
Sjlll • ^jn2 • ^jS _ <4 131' 
9jII3 - SjS + QjF > Sjs (4 1:2) 
These results indicate that, for the second type of agricultural 
household, the grain demand is either the grain ration (the first sub­
type) or a function of the free market price vector, the prices of other 
goods, and its disposable income (the second and the third subtype), 
whereas its grain supply is either the sales quota (the first ^ nd the 
second subtype) or a function of the same factors used in its demand 
functions plus its grain sales quotas (the third subtype). 
To obtain the grain demand and supply functions for the first and 
the third types of agricultural households, we can use our basic model 
but adjust part of our assumptions to fit their situations. 
The first type of agricultural household For the first type of 
household, the nonbuyer in the state market, the only thing we need to do 
is note that assumption - 0 for 1-1, ..., b has replaced part of 
the assumption of > 0 for 1-1 k. Consequently, the change in 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are that part of (4.114), (4.120) and (4.121) 
for 1-1 b drop out, and part of (4.117) for i - 1, ..., b 
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Is added in the model used for the second type of agricultural household. 
In this case, the results of this model become 
-  1 ,  .  X. - XiF (PÏF- Pi' M') 
- X, is 
-X, (p;,, Pi. M') 
-Xis+XjF (P;?, Pi. M') 
- \ (PJlF' *1' M') 
- c, 
- e, 
- 1, 
- e, 
b (4.133) 
d (4.134) 
k (4.135) 
n (4.136) 
k (4.135) 
where 
^iF • ^iF (1 - •» b| h| . .# k) 
and other results are unchanged except that Pj^p has replaced P^p in all 
new functional forms, which are numbered (4.137) through (4.139) corre­
sponding to (4.126) through (4.128) and are not listed here. All 
possible solutions of grain demand and supply by the first type of 
agricultural household are then 
and 
Xjll - XjI2 - XjF (PÎF' ^ i' M') 
Qjii " 9js 
QjI2 - Qjs + Qjp (p;p, Pi. M') 
(4.140) 
(4.141) 
(4.142) 
That is, for the first type of agricultural household, its grain 
demand is a function of the free market price vector, the other price 
vector, and its disposable income, whereas its grain supply is either its 
sales quota or a function of the same factors used in its grain demand 
function plus its grain sales quota. 
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The third type of agricultural household Similarly, for the 
third type of households, complete buyers or nonsellers in the state 
market, we need to use - 0; therefore, - 0 for i - l,...,b 
replaces part of the assumption > 0 and > 0 for i - 1,... ,n. 
Furthermore, we cancel part of (4.100) for i - 1, b and add part of 
(4.117) for i - 1, ..., b to the model of the second type of household. 
All possible solutions of grain demand and supply of the third type of 
agricultural household are 
Xjllll • *jS (4.143) 
XjIII2 - XjS + XjF (PiF' (4.144) 
and 
Qjlll - 0 (4.145) 
These results mean that, for the third type of agricultural house­
hold, its grain demand is either the official ration (the first subtype) 
or a function of the free market price vector, the other price vector, 
and its disposable income (the second subtype), whereas its grain supply 
is always zero. 
Comparative statics The comparative statics are shown for the 
grain demands and grain supplies of all three types of agricultural 
household. To save time and space, we calculate only grain price, grain 
ration, and grain quota effects. 
1. The first type of agricultural household 
a. the first subtype 
*jll • *jF (^iF' M')' Qjii • Qjs 
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Thus, 
iîj'- S" i!i< • " iif • • 
ïr-î;-
ax.Ti 3X,„ -Lf. 8X._ aq 
ill 
s "  
These results imply that, for the first subtype within the first 
type of agricultural households, (1) grain demand decreases but grain 
supply does not change if the state market price or the free market price 
increases; and (2) grain demand decreases but grain supply increases if 
the sales quota increases. 
b. the second subtype 
XjI2 - XjF (PiF' *1' M') 
QjI2 " QjS QjF (^iF' ^ i' **') 
Because Xj^g " do not need to discuss the partial deriva­
tives for Xjj2 here. For we have 
Sî'-Sï-
If-'*-
The results illustrate that, for the second subtype within the first 
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type of agricultural household, grain supply increases when the state 
market price, the free market price, or the sales quota increases. 
2. The second type of agricultural household 
a. the first subtype 
*jiii " *js' Qjiii • QjS 
fiuii. Hmi _ 0 _ fSmi _ o 
aXjs aXjs 
_ 0 . 1 
The results illustrate that, for the first subtype within the second 
type of agricultural household, (1) grain demand and supply do not change 
when either the state market price or the free market price increases; 
(2) grain demand increases but grain supply does not change when the 
grain ration increases; and (3) grain demand does not change but grain 
supply increases when the sales quota increases. 
b. the second subtype 
*jII2 ' *jS *jF (^iF' ^ i' M')' QJII2 " Qjs 
Because Qjjj2 " Qjm' partial derivatives for Qjjj2 the 
same as those for and, hence, do not need to be repeated and 
rediscussed here. For we have 
J® . J» 
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film . fïjE ^ „ 
'"jP "JF 
'"js '*JS *XjS 
t^jui. f^E an < 0 
The results mean that, for the second subtype within the second type 
of agricultural household, the grain demand is decreasing if the state 
market price, the free market price, or the sales quota increases; and it 
increases if the ration level increases. 
c. the third subtype 
*jII3 " *jS *jF (^iF' ^ i' **') 
QjII32 " ^jS "*• ^JF (*iF' ^ i' **') 
Because - Xjjj2' not repeat calculations and discussion 
for the partial derivatives of X.,,? here. For Q.-,., we have 
ja ja 
« S " "  
axjs aXjs 
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For the third subtype within the second type of agricultural house­
hold, the grain supply increases as the state market price, the free 
market price, or the sales quota Increase; and it decreases as the ration 
level increases. 
3. The third type of agricultural household 
a. the first subtype 
Using formula (4.143) and (4.145) we have 
*jllll • XjS 
Qjllll " ° 
thus, 
fiiUIl _ fiiUU _ 0 
fiiui _ 1 
axjs 
For the first subtype within the third type of agricultural house­
hold, its grain demand increases if the official ration increases, and 
its grain supply is always zero. 
b. the second subtype 
From formula (4.144) and (4.145) 
*JIII2 " *JS '^iF' ''i' " ' 
"jiiiz - " 
hence 
JO ja 
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•JS 
JUIZ > 0 if 
ax 
mi2_ 0 
We can conclude that, for the second subtype within the third type 
of agricultural household, the grain demand (1) decreases if the state 
market price or the free market price increases, (2) increases if the 
official ration increases, and (3) does not change if the sales quota 
increases. On the other hand, its grain supply always remains fixed at 
three types of agricultural households in both the state market and the 
united market that combines the free market with the household-own 
market. Thus, we need to change our previous dual market graph (graph 
for the state market and the free market) into a new dual market graph 
(graph for the state market and the united market) but use the same 
procedures used before. 
1. The first type of agricultural household 
a. the first subtype 
For the first subtype of nonbuyer in the state market, its demand in 
the (Q", P" - P^) subspace is a downward-sloping line, and its supply in 
S s  
the (Q ,P ) subspace is a vertical line (Figure 4.9a). 
zero. 
Graphic analysis The graphic analyses are presented for all 
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,U, 
<jll 
VjS ^ 
(a) 
Figure 4.9. Grain demands and supplies of the first type of agricultural 
household 
b. the second subtype 
For the second subtype of nonbuyer, its only demand in the united 
market is a downward sloping line, and its supply consists of one 
G C 
vertical line in the (Q , P ) subspace and one upward-sloping line in the 
(Q^, P^) subspace (Figure 4.9b). 
2. The second type of agricultural household 
a. the first subtype 
For the first subtype of partial buyer in the state market, both 
S s grain demand and supply are vertical lines in the (Q , P ) subspace 
(Figure 4.10a). 
b. the second subtype 
For the second subtype of partial buyer in the state market, grain 
S s demand consists of two segments: one is a vertical line in the (Q , P ) 
subspace, and the other one is a downward sloping line in the (Q^, P^) 
S s 
subspace. Grain supply is a vertical line in the (Q , P ) subspace 
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(Figure 4.10b), 
„U 
jiii Qjlll Q" 
*js ^ js 
(a) 
„U 
*js QjS 
(b) 
JII2_ç 
.U 
jII3 
jII3 
Xjs QjS 
(c) 
Figure 4.10. Grain demands and supplies of the second type of 
agricultural household 
c. the third subtype 
As Figure 4.10c shows, for the third subtype of partial buyers in 
the state market, both demand and supply are composed of two segments. 
S s For the former, one is a vertical line in the (Q , F ) subspace, and the 
other one is a downward-sloping line in the (Q^, P^) subspace. For the 
S s latter, one is a vertical line in the (Q , P ) subspace, and the other 
one is an upward-sloping line in the (Q^, P^) space. 
3. The third type of agricultural household 
a. the first subtype 
For the first subtype of complete buyer in the state market the 
S s demand curve is only a vertical line in the (Q , P ) subspace (Figure 
4.11a). 
b. the second subtype 
As Figure 4.11b indicates, for the second subtype of complete buyer 
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in the state market, its demand curve is the same as that in Figure 
4.10b. 
jS 
(b) 
Figure 4.11. Grain demands and supplies of the third type of 
agricultural household 
Aggregate grain demand and supply of agricultural households 
Aggregate grain demand of agricultural households As we pointed 
out, agricultural households in the mixed economy can be classified into 
three types by their behavior in the state market. To aggregate grain 
demand of agricultural households, we start with aggregation of grain 
demand of the first type of household. Assuming that the total numbers 
of all agricultural households is n^, that the relative frequency of the 
first type and the first subtype within the first type of agricultural 
households is and , respectively, and that all households of the 
first type are identical except for their behavior in the market(s), we 
HI 
can draw D , the aggregate grain demand of the first type of agricul­
tural household, as the following: 
(4,146) 
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where 
HI l  
^ " ^HI ^ HIl "H Xjll 
" ^HI ^ HIl "H *jF (^IF' 
ml 
- (Pjjj, n^ , PJp, P^ . M') (4.147) 
HT9 
° " ^HI ^HIl^ "H XjI2 
" ^Hi " ^Hii^ "H *JF (^iF' 
- oHIZ (Pj^ j, rijj, P^ p. P^ , M') (4.148) 
Consequently, 
- 'HI "H V (PÏF' n' 
HT 
" ^ (^Hr "H' PiF' ^ i' "") (4.149) 
That is, aggregate grain demand of the first type of agricultural 
households is a function of the relative frequency P^^ , the total number 
of agricultural households, the free market price vector P^^, the other 
prices P^, and the disposable income M'. 
HII HIII In the same way, we can get D and D , aggregate grain demand 
of the second and the third type of agricultural households. Algebrai­
cally, 
D"" -  ^ (4.150) 
where 
_HII1 _ 
" ^HII ^ HIIl "H Xjlll 
- P, 
HII ^HIIl "H ^ jS 
^ (^HII' ^ HIIl' "H* Xjg) (4.151) 
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HII2 _ 
HII HII2 "H jII2 
" ^HII ^ HII2 "H [XjS "*• ^jF (^IF' M')] 
" ^ (^HII' ^ HII12' "H* *jS' ^ iF' (4.152) 
HTI3  
^ " ^HII • ^HII2^ "H XjII3 
" ^HII " ^HIIl • ^HII2^ "H [*jS *jF (^IF' ' M')] 
UTTO — 
" ^ ^HIIl' ^ HII2' "h' *jS' ^ IF' (4.153) 
Hence 
HTT — 
^ " ^HII ^ HIIl "H *JS ^HII ^ HII2 "H^*jS"'"*jF (*iF' 
^HII • ^ HIIl • ^HII2^ "H [XjS •*• ^jF (^IF' ^ i' M')] 
• ^HII "H ^ jS "*" ^HII • ^HIIl^ "H ^ jF (^iF" 
HII — 
" ^ (^HII' ^ HIIl' "H* *jS' ^ IF' ^ i' ) (4.154) 
Similarly, 
(4.155) 
where 
^ " ^HI ^HII^ ^HIIIl "h ^ jllll 
" ^HI • ^HII^ ^HIIIl "H ^ JS 
" ^ ^^HI' ^ HII' ^ HIIIl' "H' *js) (4.156) 
^ " ^ HI ^HIl) ' ^HIIIl^ "h *jIII2 
(^'^Hl'^HII^ ^^"^HIIIl^ "H [*jS *jF (^IF' ^ l' 
• ^ ^^HI' ^HII' ^ HIIl' "H' *jS' ^ IF' ^ i' (4-157) 
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Thus, 
^ ^HII^ "H ^ jS 
" ^HI ' " ^HIIIl)"H^^jS "*" 
" • ^HI • ^HII^ "H ^ jS 
"*• " ^HI " ^HIl) " ^HIIIl^ "H *jF (^IF' ^ i' 
- D (Pj^j, Pjjjj., ^HIIIl' "H' *jS' ^ IF' ^i' (4.158) 
These results Imply that the aggregate grain demand of the second 
and third type of agricultural households are functions of the relative 
frequencies , P^jj. and the total number of agricultural house­
holds, the free market prices, the prices of other commodities, the 
ration limits, and the disposable income M', and a function of the 
relative frequencies P^^, P^^^ and •PHUH' total number of agricul­
tural households, the free market prices, the prices of other commodi­
ties, the ration limits, and the disposable income M'. 
Finally, adding (4.149), (4.154) and (4.158) together, we obtain D^, 
the aggregate grain demand of all agricultural households: 
d" - (4.159) 
" ^HI "H ^ jF (^iF' ^ i* 
^HII "H ^ jS ^HII ' ^HIIl) "H ^ jF (^iF' ^ i' 
+(1 - Pj^j - Pj^jj) rijj Xjg 
' ^HI ' ^HII^ ' ^HIIIl^ "H *jF (^iF' ^ i' ^ 
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(1 - Pjjj) iijj Xjg + Pjjj rijj Xjp (PJp. M') + [Pjiji (1 -
" ^ HI " ^ HIl) " ^HIIIl)] "H *jF (^IF' 
(1 - Pjjj) Xjg + ^ HI "H *JF (^IF' 
+ [1 - Pj^j - Pjjjj ^HIIl " ^ HIIIl ^HI 
*jF (^IF' ^ i' ^ 
- D (Pjjj, Pjjjj, ^HIIIl' "H' *jS' ^ IF' ^ i' (4.160) 
where 
U 
D - aggregate grain demand of agricultural households 
pHI^ pHII ijHIII _ aggregate grain demand of the first, second, or 
third type of agricultural households 
^HI' relative frequency of the first or the second type 
of agricultural households 
^HIIl' ^ HIIIl " relative frequency of the first subtype within 
the second or third type of agricultural households 
n^j - the total number of agricultural households 
Other symbols used here, such as X.„, Py„, P.', and M", are the same 
JO If 1 
as those mentioned earlier in this section. 
Formula (4.160) indicates that the aggregate grain demand is a 
function of the relative frequencies P^^, Pfjjji ^hIII' ^HIIIl' 
total number of agricultural households, the ration limits, the free 
market prices, the prices of other goods, and the disposable income M". 
Aggregate grain SUPDIV bv agricultural households By using the 
same aggregation method as that used in the analysis of the aggregate 
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grain demand of agricultural households, and making proper assumptions 
about the total number of agricultural households and the relative 
frequencies and identicalness of agricultural households within a certain 
type or subtype, we can obtain 
gHI _ gHIl gHI2 (4.161) 
where 
® " ^HI ^ HIl "H Qjii 
" ^HI ^ HIl "H QjS 
°HI' ^HIl' "H' 
HTl  — 
- (P„-, P_,, n„, Q._) (4.162) 
S - Pjjj (1 - njj QJJ2 
- Pjjj (1 - Pj^ jj^ ) tijj [Qjg + Qjp (PiF' M')] 
HTl  — 
" ® ^^HI' ^HIl' "H' 9js' PjLF' (4.163) 
Then, 
HI — 
^ " ^HI "H ^ jS ^HI " ^HIl^ "H "^JF (^iF' ^ i' 
HT — 
- s (Pj^j, n^, Qjg, PiF' M') (4.164) 
Similarly, 
gHII _ gHIIl ^  gHII2 ^  gHII3 (4.165) 
where 
Hill 
^ " ^HII ^ HIIl "H Qjlll 
- P, HII ^HIIl "H QjS 
" ^ (^HII' ^ HIIl' "H' Ôjg) (4.166) 
238 
sHII2 . p p no 
HIT HII2 H ^ jII2 
P, 
HII ^HII2 "H ^ jS 
- S (^HII' ^ HII2' "H' Ôjg) (4.167) 
UTTQ 
® " ^HII " ^HIIl " ^HII2^ "h 9jII3 
' ^HII^^ " ^ HIIl " ^ HII2^"H^^jS 
" ^ (^HII' ^ HIIl' ^ HII2' "H' Ôjs' ^ ÎF' (4.168) 
Thus, substituting (4.166) through (4.168) into (4.165) we obtain 
HIT — — 
^ " ^HIl"H^jS •*• ^HII^l • ^ HIIl • ^HII2^"H^jF^^iF' '^i' ^jS ' 
HI I — 
" ® (^HII' ^ HIIl' ^ HII2' "H' QjS' ^iF' ^ i' (4.169) 
Finally, 
SHIII - gHIIIl + sH:I:2 (4.170) 
where 
^ - (1 - ^HII • ^HII^'^HIIII "H Qjllll 
- 0 (4.171) 
HT T  T  9  
^ - ^HII " ^ HII^ • ^HIIIl) "H 9jIII2 
- 0 (4.172) 
Substituting (4.171) and (4.172) into (4.170) we have 
- 0 (4.173) 
Adding (4.164), (4.169), and (4.173) together) we have S^, the 
aggregate grain supply of all agricultural households: 
s" - (4.174) 
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" "H ^ jS "H QjP (^iF' ^ i' "*" ^HII "H ^ jS 
•*" ^HII • ^HIIl " ^HII2^ "H ^ JF (^IF' ^ l' ^ JS' 
' (^HI ^HII^ "H ^ jS 
+ [Pjjj + Pjjjj (1 - - i'ljjjg)] "H ^ jF (^ IF' ^ i' ^ iS' 
• ® (^HI' ^ HII' ^ HIIl' ^ HII2' "H' Ôjs' ^ iF' ^ (^-175) 
where 
H 
s - aggregate grain supply of agricultural households 
gHI^ gHII gHIII _ aggregate grain supply of the first, the second, 
or the third type of agricultural households 
Other symbols, such as ^HII2' "H* *iF' ^ i* ^jS' 
M', are the same as before. 
Formula (4.175) shows that the aggregate grain supply of all agri­
cultural households in the mixed economy is a function of the relative 
frequencies P^^, Pjjjj. and the total number of agricultural 
households, the sales quotas, the free market prices, the prices of other 
goods, and the disposable income H', respectively. 
Comparative statics Comparative statics are calculated for both 
aggregate grain demand and supply by agricultural households. 
1. Aggregate grain demand of agricultural households 
From (4.159) and other relevant formulas we have 
D" - f D"" + D»::: 
a. D": _ + D»:: 
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â£ . âDilll ^ âEÏIi , „ 
asE: _ âi£El + acîîE > q 
an^ atijj 3n, H 
âEÏi _ ^ âcîîH ^ „ 
3Qjs aSjs »Qjs 
âEÏL _ acîlii aaïiî „ 
«fjs "js 
âi£i . ap"" + ap"" < „ 
aPjF aPjF sfjF 
The aggregate grain demand of the first type of household increases 
if the relative frequency f , or the total number of agricultural house-
Hi 
holds increases; and it decreases if the sales quota, the state market 
price, or the free market price increases. 
b ^nil _ pHIIl ^  pHII2 + pHII3 
^^HII ^^HII ^^HII ^^HII 
**HII1 *^HII1 ^^HIIl ^^HIIl 
^^HII2 ^^HII2 ^^HII2 ^^HII2 
^"h ^"H ^"H ^"H 
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axjs «js 
'^js »Qjs «Qjs 
acH aïïIH ^ âîlî^H , „ 
»'js "^fjs "js 
The results imply that aggregate grain demand of the second type of 
agricultural household increases as the relative frequency Pjjjj, the 
total number of agricultural households, or the ration level, increases; 
and it decreases as the sales quota, the state market price, or the free 
market price increases. 
o. D""' - d""" + D""" 
iliîfîi ,„Hni2 
"«''HI 
""HII "HII ®''HII 
_ apHIIIl an""" < 
^^HIIIl ^^HIIIl ^^HIIIl ^  
anHlll apHllll apHlllZ 
.pHIII _ apHIIIl ^  ,pHIII2 ^  ^ 
5Xjs aXjs aXjs 
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,„Hin _ 
-JP 
For the third type of agricultural household, the aggregate grain 
demand is increasing when the total number of agricultural households 
or the ration level increase; and its grain demand is decreasing when the 
relative frequency or , the state market price, or the free 
market price increases. 
Finally, we have 
âCÎL _ âûîï apHiii > 
^ 
gp" _ gp"" âniiiE > 0 
^^HII ^^HII ^^HII ^ 
âDÎÎ ap"" 0 
2pÎL_ . ^D!1££L > 0 
^^HIIl ^^HIIIl 
flpL _ âfiiEi ^ âcEfi > Q 
axjs aXjs aXjs 
a s !L_ a D !!I + ac!Hi + a)!!Hi<o 
aPjs aPjs aPjs 
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an" an"' an"" an*"'' 
«V afjP aPjp WPjF 
Hence, the aggregate grain demand of agricultural households 
Increases If the relative frequency or the total number of 
agricultural households, or the state ration Increases; and It decreases 
If the state market price, Pjg, or the free market price, Pjp, Increases. 
2. Aggregate grain supply of agricultural households 
From (4.174) and other relevant formulas we have 
s" - s": + s":: + 
a. s": _ sHii + s"i2 
âsE _ asEi âsîîii « 
as"! _ agHii agHiz > 
^^HIl *^HI1 ^^HIl ^  
asH _ âsïïl ^  agHiZ ^ Q 
aOjs aOjs aOjs 
_ âsilfî > 0 
The aggregate grain supply of the first type of agricultural 
household Increases If the relative frequency P , the total number of 
HI 
agricultural households, the sales quota, the state market price, or the 
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free market price Increases. 
b. s"" - s""" + s"'" + s""' 
âs!E . âsïill  ^ asïïffî  ^ âsîEi > 0 
^^HII ^^HII 
aa!!IL_as!2H + aa!H!>o 
^^HIIl ^^HIIl ^^HIIl ^  
âs ï iL .â^ ,âs!Ei>o 
^^HII2 ^^HII2 ^^HII2 < 
-.HII ..Hill --HII2 HII3 
QÂ _ as + flS + flS > 0 
anjj gn^  3njj dn^  
a-HII HII3 
fiS— _ as < 0 
»JS aXjs 
asH_a5HH + as!!H! + as!EH>o 
sQjs aSjs aSjs ^ 
ï7-ïr-
*7-*r-
For the second type of agricultural household, the aggregate grain 
supply increases as the relative frequency , the total number of 
agricultural households, the sales quota Q. , the state market price, or 
the free market price increases; it is uncertain if the relative fre­
quency or increases or decreases as the ration level in­
creases. 
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c. s"::: - o 
Thus, we have 
®^HII °^HII 
âsH . âslîi + as"" > 0 
ÔHH atiH atijj 
âsî!_ . âsïlf < 0 
*Xjs axjs 
âsîL _ asH + gs"" > 0 
> 0 
aSjs aSjs aSjs 
"js 
+ 85"" . 
4" aPjF "JF 
> 0 
These results indicate that the aggregate grain supply is increasing 
if the relative frequency P„_ or P»__, the total number of agricultural 
HI nil 
households, the sales quota, the state market price, or the free market 
price increases. It decreases if the ration level Increases. 
Graphic analysis Graphic analyses are performed for the aggre­
gate grain demand and supply of all three types of agricultural house­
holds individually. 
1. The first type of agricultural household 
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There are two subtypes within the first type of agricultural house-
HXl 
holds. Aggregate grain demands and supplies of the first subtype (D 
HIl HI2 HI2 
and S ) and the second subtype (D and S ) of agricultural house­
holds are similar in their curves' shape to those individual agricultural 
households within the first subtype and the second subtype. For the 
former, the aggregate grain demand is a downward-sioping line in the (Q^, 
p") subspace, and the aggregate supply is a vertical line in the (Q^, P^) 
subspace with an intercept - Pjjj n^ Qjg (Figure 4.12a). For 
the latter, the aggregate grain demand is a downward-sloping line in the 
(Q^, P^) subspace, and the aggregate supply is composed of two segments: 
one is a vertical line with an intercept - P^j (1 - "h ^ jS 
S s s 
the Q axis in the (Q , P ) subspace. The other is an upward-sloping 
line in the (Q", P") subspace (Figure 4.12b). 
pU, HI2gHI2 pU,,D": s": 
(C) 
Figure 4.12. Aggregation of grain demands and supplies of two subtypes 
within the first type of agricultural households 
HI HI 
Figure 4.12c shows the aggregate grain demand D and supply S of 
HI the first type of agricultural households. D is a downward-'si oping 
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line in the (Q^, P^) subspace, and is similar to in shape, but 
S " ""F 
its intercept on the Q axis is now Qjjj^ - Ppjj n^ Qjg. At P , the 
equilibrium price of the free market, there is a surplus in the united 
market so that the second subtype of the first type of agricultural 
households are main suppliers in the free market. 
2. The second type of agricultural household 
There are three subtypes within the second type of agricultural 
households. The aggregate grain demands and supplies for the first 
and the second and and the third and 
gHII3j subtype are illustrated in Figure 4.13a, b, and c. Both and 
gHIIl vertical lines with intercepts on the axis: Qnnia " 
^HII^HIIl .Vj£ and Q, Hlllb • ^HII^HIIl"H^jS' D 
HII2 is composed of two 
pieces; one is a vertical line with an intercept Qjjjj2a " ^HII^HII2"H^jS 
S s in the (Q , P ) subspace, the other one is a downward-sloping line in 
(Q"\ p") subspace. is only a vertical line that has an intercept 
— s S HII3 HII3 
^HII2b " (Q , P ) space. Both D and S 
consist of two segments. The former has one vertical segment in 
,u, 
d"" S«" -S 
" " q" ' 
%IIla^HIIlb 
(a) 
p"l p: 
HII2 
HII3„HII3 
^HII2a^HIl2b Q® 
(b) 
'^HII3a^HII3b 
(c) 
Figure 4.13. Aggregate grain demands and supplies of three subtypes 
within the second type of agricultural households 
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S S the (Q , P ) subspace, with an intercept 
n^ XJG on the axis and one downward-sioping segment in the (Q", P*^ ) 
S s 
subspace. The latter has one vertical segment in the (Q , F ) subspace 
" S 
with an intercept the Q axis, and 
one downward-sloping segment in the (Q", P") subspace. 
By summing Figure 4.13a, b, and c, we obtain the aggregate grain 
HIT HII demand D and supply S of the second type of agricultural household 
HII HII in Figure 4.14. Both D and S contain two segments and are similar 
S HII in shape to Figure 4.13c, but the intercept on the Q axis for D is 
HII 
H^lla " %IIla H^II2a %II3a ® H^llb " %IIlb 
%II2b H^II3b' 
HII JHII 
rS 
H^lla ^ Hllb qS 
(a) 
Figure 4.14. Aggregate grain demand and supply of the second type 
of agricultural households 
3. The third type of agricultural household 
There also are two subtypes within the third type of agricultural 
household. As Figures 4.15a and b show, the shapes of the aggregate 
grain demands and supplies for both the first subtype and 
HIII2 HIII2 
and the second subtype (D and S ) are similar to those in 
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HIIIl HIII2 Figures 4.11a and b. The Intercepts for D and D now are 
H^lllla " ' ^HI • ^HII^  ^ HIIIl "H *jS %III2a " ' ^HI " ^ HII^  
(1  
H^IIIl^  "H *jS' 
„U 
DHIIII qU 
pU HIII2 pU. 
.u 
H^llllba qS 
(a) 
H^III2a qS 
(b) 
Hllla 
Figure 4.15. Aggregation of grain demands and supplies of the third type 
of agricultural households 
The aggregate grain demand and supply of the third 
type of agricultural household are drawn in Figure 4.15c. They look like 
HIII S those in Figure 4.15b, but the intercept of D on the Q axis is 
H^llla " ^Hlllla H^III2a' 
Finally, adding Figure 4.12c, 4.14, and 4.15c together, we obtain 
H H the aggregate grain demand, D , and supply, S , of all agricultural 
H H H households in Figure 4.16. Both D and S contain two segments. D 
S s 
consists of one vertical line in the (Q , P ) subspace, with an intercept 
Qjla " ^Hla %IIa ^  ^Hllla Q axis and a downward-sioping line in 
the (q",p") subspace. S^ , on the other hand, consists of one vertical 
S s line in the (Q , P ) subspace, with an intercept + 
Qniiib o" the axis and an upward-sloping line in the (Q^ , p") sub-
—p H H 
space. Given P , obviously S > D so that agricultural households, 
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especially the first type, are main suppliers in the free market. 
-S 
S 
Figure 4.16. Aggregate grain demand and supply of all types of 
agricultural households 
The state market analysis 
Because grain demand of the state farm households is the same as 
that of the urban households and grain supply of the state farms occurs 
in the state market only, it is not necessary to repeat the state market 
analysis for the state farm (households) in this part. Instead, the 
state market analysis concentrates on grain demand and supply of the 
agricultural households in the state market. This part is subdivided 
into two parts: one analyzes individual behavior of agricultural 
households; the other analyzes aggregate behavior of agricultural 
households. Now we work on the first subpart. 
Grain demand and supply bv agricultural household in the state 
market There are three types of agricultural household in the state 
market. 
1. Nonbuyer 
Xjgj - 0 (4.176) 
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QjSi-Qjs (4.177) 
The grain demand of nonbuyer in the state market is zero and the 
grain supply of nonbuyer in the state market is fixed at Qjg. 
2. Partial buyer 
XjSII " ^jS (4.178) 
QjSII • QjS (4.179) 
For a partial buyer, both grain demand and supply in the state 
market are fixed at X^ g and Qjg. If Xjg < Qjg, this partial buyer is a 
net seller in the state market. Otherwise, he is a net buyer in the 
state market. 
3. Complete buyer 
KjSIII " ^jS (4.180) 
QjSIII - 0 (4.181) 
For a complete buyer, the grain demand is fixed at X.„ at the state 
J® 
market and the grain supply is zero. 
Comparative statics for the individual grain demands and supplies 
Comparative statics are made for individual grain demands and supplies 
of these three types of agricultural household. 
1. Nonbuyer 
XjSI - ° "jsi - QjS 
For a nonbuyer in the state market, the grain demand is zero and 
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unaffected by any policy instruments, and its grain supply is only 
affected by the sales quota in the same direction. 
2. Partial buyer 
*jSII • ^jS QjSII " QjS 
_ fibsii , 0 fSisu . fSjsn . 0 
aXjs aXjs 
0 !Smi_ 1 
"Qjs Q^js 
For a partial buyer in the state market, grain demand increases if 
the ration level increases, and grain supply increases if the sales quota 
increases. 
3. Complete buyer 
*jSIII " ^jS j^SIII " ^jS 
The comparative statics for are the same as that for Xjgjj, 
whereas the comparative statics for Qjgjjj are always zero. 
Next are analyses of the second subpart. 
Aggreeate grain demand of agricultural households in the state 
HTS HTTS  HTT IS  
market First, we aggregate D , D and D , grain demands of 
the first, the second, and the third type of agricultural households, 
HS then add them together to obtain D , aggregate grain demand of all 
agricultural households, 
- D"" + (4.182) 
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From formulas (4.149), (4.154), and (4.158), we easily conclude that 
_ 0 (4.183) 
In the state market, aggregate grain demand of nonbuyers is zero. 
• ^HII "H *jS 
- (Pjjjj, njj, Xjg) (4.184) 
Aggregate grain demand of partial buyers in the state market is a 
function of the relative frequency , the total number of agricultural 
households, and the ration level. 
- (1 - "H ^ jS 
- D (Pjjj, Pjjjj, Hjj, Xjg) (4.185) 
For complete buyers, aggregate grain demand in the state market is a 
function of the relative frequencies and , the total number of 
all agricultural households, and the ration level. 
Substituting (4.183), (4.184), and (4.185) into (4.182), we have 
HS " ~ • 
" ^HII "H *jS • ^ HI " ^ HII^  "H *jS 
• "H ^ jS 
uc — 
- (P„J. njj, Xjg) (4.186) 
Thus, aggregate grain demand of agricultural households in the state 
market is a function of the relative frequency , the total number of 
agricultural households, and the ration level X._. 
J® 
Aggregate grain supply of agricultural households in the state 
HS 
market Similarly, we have the following formula for S , aggregate 
grain supply of agricultural households in the state market; 
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gHS _ gHIS + gHIIS ^  gHIIIS (4.187) 
HIS HIIS HIIXS 
where S , S , and S are aggregate grain supply for the first, 
second, and third types of agricultural households and can be obtained 
from formulas (4.164), (4.169), and (4.173): 
HIS 
" "HI "H ^ jS 
HIS 
S - P.„ Q 
(^ 'hi' "h' Qjs) (4.188) 
HIIS 
" "HII "H ""jS S - P..„ n^  Q 
UTTC — 
- (Pjjjj, njj, Qjg) (4.189) 
In the state market, grain supplies of both nonbuyers and partial 
buyers are functions of the relative frequency, the total number of 
agricultural households, and the sales quota. 
_ 0 (4.190) 
For complete buyers in the state market, the grain supply is zero. 
Adding (4.188), (4.189) and (4.190) we have 
HS " — 
® " ^HI "H QjS H^II "H QjS 
(PHI + Pj^ jj) tijj Qjg 
HS — 
- S (Pj^ j, Pjjjj, njj, Qjg) (4.191) 
In the state market, aggregate grain supply of all agricultural 
households is a function of the relative frequency P and P , the 
Hi Hll 
total number of agricultural households, and the'sales quotas. 
Comparative statics for the aggregate grain demands and supplies 
Comparative statics are assessed for the aggregate grain demands and 
supplies of three types of agricultural households, then for the 
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aggregate grain demand and supply by all agricultural households. 
1. Nonbuyers 
HIS 
D - 0 s":s - p. HI "H QJS 
SI HIS 
dP, 
2É 
HI 
HIS 
Vj£ > 0 
3n 
âS. 
H 
HIS 
aq 
" ^Hl^ jS ^  ° 
h^i"H ^  ° 
JS 
For the first type of agricultural households in the state market, 
aggregate grain demand is always restricted at zero, and aggregate grain 
supply increases if the relative frequency P , the total number of 
agricultural households, or the sales quotas Increase. 
2. Partial buyers 
HI I "H J^S 
m 
HI IS 
ap 
m 
HI I 
HIIS 
" "H *JS 
> 0 
s"'" - 'HIT QjS 
agHils 
ap..,, " "H J^S  ^ ° 
dn, 
an 
H 
HIIS 
ax 
• ^HII *jS ^  ° 
" ^HII "H ^  ° 
aa 
HII 
HIIS 
dn, 
âS 
H 
HIIS 
jS ax 
- ^ HII QjS > ° 
" ^HII "H ^  ° 
jS 
For the second type of agricultural households in the state market, 
(1) both aggregate grain demand and supply increase as the relative 
frequency Pf|jj. or the total number of agricultural households Increases; 
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(2) aggregate grain demand increases, but aggregate grain supply does not 
change, as the ration level increases; and (3) aggregate grain demand 
does not change, but aggregate grain supply increases, as the sales quota 
increases. 
3. Complete buyers 
.HIIIS - „HIIIS 
JS  ^ " ^ HI H^II^  "H ^ i ® ° 
an^  " ' ^HI • ^ HII^  *jS ^  ° 
„ HIIS 
- - (1 - H^I " ^ HII^  "H  ^° 
**jS 
For the third type of agricultural household in the state market, 
aggregate grain demand decreases if the relative frequency or 
increases, or it increases if the total number of agricultural households 
or the ration level increases; and the aggregate grain supply is always 
zero. 
Lastly, we have comparative statics for and where 
dHS _ jjHIIS + pHIIIS gHS _ gHIS + gHIIS 
Thus, 
âcî!! . > 0 is!^_âs!l^>o 
ac!!! _ gpHiis gpHiiis Q âs!î! .  âsîlii! > 0 
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âfi. 
an, 
HS 
aa 
dn, 
HI IS HIIIS 
dn, 
HS 
as 
ân, 
,HIS HIIS 
> 0 > 0 
H H H H H H 
.HIIS .HIIIS 
,HIIS 
For ail agricultural households in the state market, (1) both 
aggregate grain demand and supply Increase if the relative frequency 
or the total number of agricultural households increases; (2) aggregate 
grain demand does not change, but aggregate grain supply increases, if 
the relative frequency or the sales quota increases; and (3) 
aggregate grain demand increases, but aggregate grain supply does not 
change, if the ration level increases. 
Graphic analysis The graphic analyses for either individual or 
aggregate grain demands and supplies of either individual type or 
aggregate of agricultural households in the state market are available in 
S s 
the (Q , P ) subspace in the dual market graphs. Readers can refer to 
Figures 4.9 through 4.11 and Figures 4.12 through 4.16. 
The free market analysts 
For state farm households, their activities in the free market are 
similar to the activities of urban households and hence are deleted here. 
We are only studying the behavior of agricultural households in the free 
market in this part. Like the state market analysis, this part also is 
subdivided into two parts. The first one studies individual behavior of 
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agricultural households. The second one studies aggregate behavior of 
agricultural households. We begin with the first subpart. 
Grain demand and supply of individual agricultural household in the 
free market When making the free market analysis, we depend on the 
results obtained from the united market analysis. Generally, grain de­
mand or grain supply in the free market can be derived easily from the 
difference between the grain demand and the grain supply in the united 
market. In detail, both the grain demand and the gra^ n supply in the 
free market are just the excess grain demand and the excess grain supply 
in the united market. To be consistent with the previous studies, we 
still Insist on the previous classification of the three agricultural 
households by their behavior in the state market. 
1. Nonbuyer 
There are two subtypes of nonbuyer in the state market. The grain 
demand or grain supply in the free market for these two subtype nonbuyers 
can be derived from formulas (4.140) and (4.141) or (4.140) and (4.142). 
*jFIl • XjUIl " QjUIl 
- Xjp (P^ p, P;, M') (4.192) 
For the first subtype of nonbuyer in the state market, the grain 
demand in the free market is a function of the free market price vector 
P^ p, the other goods' prices, and disposable income. 
*jFI2 " *jUI2 ' ^jUI2 *jUI2 ^  9jUI2 
- XjF (PiF' ^ 1' ' V (PÎF' M') 
- XjFI2 (PlF' M') (4.193) 
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or Xjpi2 • QjFi2 " ° XjUI2 " QjUI2 
QjFI2 " QjUI2 " *jUI2 *jUI2 9jUI2 
- V (PÏF' ?!' M') - XjF (PiF' Pi' M') 
• Vl2 (PÏF'  M') (4.194) 
For the second subtype of nonbuyer in the state market, the grain 
demand (supply) in the free market is a function of the free market price 
vector, the prices of other goods, and the disposable income; or both its 
grain demand and supply in the free market are zero. In fact, the most 
frequent case for the nonbuyers in the state market is that they become 
nonbuyers in the free market, too. The main grain suppliers in the free 
market mainly come from this subtype. 
2. Partial buyer 
There are three subtypes of partial buyers in the state market. 
Their grain demands or supplies in the free market can be calculated from 
formulas (4.129) and (4.131), (4.130) and (4.131), and (4.130) and 
(4.132). 
XjFIIl - "jFIIl - ° (4 195) 
There is no grain demand or supply in the free market for the first 
subtype of partial buyer. 
*jFII2 " *jUII2 " QjUII2 
- XjF (?!?' Pi' M') 
- XjFII2 (PiF' Pi' M') (4.196) 
For the second subtype of partial buyer in the state market, the 
grain demand in the free market is a function of the free market price 
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vector, the prices of other goods, and the disposable Income. 
*jFII3 " XjUII3 • QjUIIS %jUII3 ^  QjUIIS 
- XjF (PiF' ^ 1' «'> - V (PiF' 
" *JFII3 (^ IF' ^ 1' 
*jFII3 " 9jFII3 • ° XjUII3 " 9jUII3 
9jFII3 • 9jUII3 " *jUII3 *jUII3 QjUII3 
- V (flF' ^ 1' - XjF (PiF' ^ 1' 
" QjFII3 (^ IF' ^ 1' 
For the third subtype of partial buyer In the state market, the 
grain demand or supply In the free market Is a function of the free 
market price vector, the prices of other goods, and disposable Income; 
or, both of them are zero. 
3. Complete buyer 
There are two subtypes of complete buyer In the state market. Their 
grain demands and supply in the free market can be figured out by using 
formulas (4.143) and (4.145) or (4.144) and (4.145). 
XjFIIIl " SjFIIIl " ° (4.200) 
*jFIII2 " ^jUIII2 ' QjUIII2 
- XjF (PlF' *1' *') 
" *jFIII2 (^ IF' ^ 1' ^  ^ (4.201) 
For the first subtype of complete buyer in the state market, both 
(4.197) 
(4.198) 
(4.199) 
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grain demand and supply in the free market are zero. For the second . 
subtype of complete buyer in the state market, the grain demand in the 
free market is a function of free market prices, the prices of other 
goods, and disposable income. 
Comparative statics for individual grain demands and supplies 
Comparative statics are assessed for individual grain demands and 
supplies of all these three types of agricultural households. 
1. Nonbuyer 
XjFIl - XjF (PiF' n- M') 
Comparative statics for X.__. are the same as those for X._. and are 
Jtli. JiX 
omitted here. 
By formula (4.193), if 
XjFI2 - XjF (PiF' Pi' «'> - QjF (PÎF' ^ i' 
aPjs aPjs ' aPjs 
 ^_ fSji < 0 
P^jF *PjF *PjF 
_ fiiE . fSjz < Q 
aSjs aM' apjg aM' aq^ g 
In case Xj^ g > ^ jui2' *jFI2 decreasing if the state price or the 
market price incre 
opposite results for Q. 
free ases. If Xj^ g^ < ^ jui2' cl®*rly, we have the 
'jFI2 
2. Partial buyer 
*jFIIl " SjFIIl " ° 
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There are no changes for both and when any factor 
changes. 
*jFII2 " *jF (^ IF' 
fïjEiiz _ fïjE am. > 0 
aPjs «"• aPjs 
fîiEin . ^ < 0 
"JF, «^ jP 
"iFiiz. f!LjE am > 0 
-JS -JS 
Emiz. Hjf SOL.. „ 
»Qjs S 
For the second subtype of partial buyer in the state market, its 
grain demand in the free market decreases as the state market prices, the 
sales quota, or the free market price increases, and increases as the 
state ration level increases. 
In case > Qjuna 
*jFII3 " *jF (^ iF' ^ i' • QjF ^ i^F' ^ i* 
fijEm 5jE mL_ fSjE an:-. n  
aPjs aPjs - aM' aPjg 
_ f5E fSjE 0  
**jFII3 , m. f&E ML. 0  
ay - - aM' -
aXjs aXjg aXjg 
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**jFII3 _ mL. fSjE Ml- . n 
For the third subtype of partial buyer in the state market, in case 
J^UII3 ^  ^jUII3' grain demand in the free market decreases as the 
state market price, the free market price, or the sales quota increases, 
and increases as the state ration level increases. In case < 
QJUII3> we have opposite results for Qjujj3' Thus, there is no need to 
calculate comparative statics for this case. 
3. Complete buyer 
XjFIIIl " ° 
*jFIII2 " ^jF (^ iF' ^ i' 
**jFIII2 fiiE mi_ . n 
aPjs aPjs 
**jFIII2 _ filE < 0 
*^ jF *^ jF 
**jFIII2 filE mi_ . n 
jS **jS 
Thus, for the first subtype of complete buyer in the state market, 
the grain demand in the free market is unaffected by any factor's change. 
For the second subtype of complete buyer, the grain demand in the free 
market decreases if the free market price or the state market price 
increases, and it increases if the state ration level increases. 
The following is the second subpart of the free market analysis. 
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Aggregate demand of agricultural households in the free market 
HIP HTIF HITIP 
First, we aggregate D , D , and D , grain demand of the first, 
the second, and the third type of agricultural households in the free 
HP 
market, then add them into D , aggregate grain demand of all agricul­
tural households in the free market: 
pHF _ jjHIF ^  pHIIF pHIIIF (4.202) 
Using formulas (4.192) through (4.201) and referring to formulas 
(4.149), (4.154), (4.158), (4.164), (4.169) and (4.173), we can derive 
pHIF, pHIIF pHIIIF individually. 
DHIF _ D»:?! + (4.203) 
• ^HI ^ HIl "h XjFIl H^X ' ^HIl^  ^ HIll "h *jFI2 
" ^HI ^ HIl "H *jF (^ iF' ^ i' H^I ' ^HIl^  ^ HIll "H 
[XjF (PÏF' Pi' M') - Qjf (Pip. Pi' M')] 
-D (Pjjj, "H' PjLF'. i^' ) (4.204) 
The aggregate grain demand in the free market for the first type of 
agricultural households is a function of the relative frequency P , 
HI 
•^ HIl' '^ HIll' total number of agricultural households, the free market 
prices the prices of other goods, and disposable income. 
dhiif _ + phiifs (4.205) 
" ° H^II ''HII2 "h *jFII2 
^HII " ^ HIIl " PHII2^  PHII31 "H *jFII3 
" ^HII ^ HII2 "H XjF^ PiF' ^ i' 
H^II • ^ HIIl " PHII2^  ^ HII31 "H 
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[XjF (PÎF' Pi' M') - Qjp (Pip- Pi' M')] 
" ^ PHIII' PHII2' ^ HII31' "H' ^ ÏF' P^  (^ -206) 
For the second type of agricultural households, the aggregate grain 
demand in the free market is a function of the relative frequencies , 
H^IIl' PhII2' PHII31' H^IIS' ^ o^ al number of agricultural house­
holds, the free market price P^ p, the prices of other goods, and 
disposable income. 
DHIIIF - DHIIIFI + DHIIIF2 (4.207) 
- 0 + (1 - Pjji - (1 - rijj XjFiii2 
" PHI " PHII^  ' ^HIIII^  "H ^ JF ^ PIF' 
- D (Pjjj, Pjjjj, Hjj, Pip, p^ , M') (4.208) 
That is, for the third type of agricultural household, the aggregate 
grain demand in the free market is a function of the relative frequencies 
Pjji. •Phii» and fpi^ Ill' total number of agricultural households, the 
free market price P^ p, the prices of other goods, and disposable income. 
Lastly, substituting (4.204), (4.206) and (4.208) into (4.202), we 
get 
HF 
® " PHI PHII "H ^ JF ^ PIF' PIS' H^I ' ^HII^  PHIII "H 
[XjF (PiF' Pi' • QjF (PiF' Pi' M')] 
PHII ^ HII2 "H ^ JF^ PIF' P^  
PHII " PHIII ' PHII2^  ^ HIIBI "H 
[XjF (PiF' Pi' - QjF (PiF' Pi' M')] 
(^  ' PHI " PHII^  (^  " PHIIII^  "H ^ JF (PIF' Pi' 
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HF 
- D (Pjjj, H^IIl' ^ HII2' ^ HII31' ^ HIIIl' 
"H- PlF' (4.209) 
The aggregate grain demand of all agricultural households in the 
free market is a function of the relative frequencies P^ ,^ P^ ^^ ., 
H^Ill' ^ HIIl' ^ HII2' ^ HII31' H^IIIl' total number of agricultural 
households, the free market prices P^ p, the prices of other goods, and 
disposable income. 
Aggregate grain supply of agricultural households in the free market 
Similarly, we first aggregate and grain supply of 
the first, the second, and the third type of agricultural households in 
HF the free market, then combine these together to obtain S , aggregate 
grain supply of all agricultural households in the free market: 
gHF _ gHIF ^  gHIIF gHIIIF (4,210) 
Using formulas (4.192) through (4.201) and referring to formulas 
(4.164), (4.169), and (4.171), we obtain 
gHIF _ gHIFl ^  gHIF2 (4.211) 
- 0 + (1 - Pj^ jj^ ) njj Qjp22 
- Pj^ I (1 - Pjjjj^ ) njj 
[QjF (fiF' ^ i- - V M')] 
HIF 
" ^ (^ HI' ^ HIl' ^ HIll' ^ HI13' "H' ^ ÏF* ) (4.212) 
For the first type of agricultural household, the aggregate grain 
supply in the free market is a function of the relative frequencies P , 
HI 
H^Il' ^ HIll ' H^I13 twhich is (1 - total number 
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of agricultural households, the free market price P^ p, the prices of 
other goods, and disposable income. 
SHIIF - gHIIFl + sHIIF2 + gHIIFS (4.213) 
- 0 + 0 + Pjjjj (1 - - H^II2^  "H 9jFII3 
" ^HII " H^IIl " H^II2^  " ^ HII33^  "H 
[QjF (PÏF' Pi' M") - Xjp (PÏF' Pi' M")] 
" ® H^IIl' PHII2' PHII31' "H' ^ iF' ^ i' (^ -214) 
The aggregate grain supply in the free market for the second type of 
agricultural households is a function of the relative frequencies Pjjjj. 
H^IIl' PHII2' ^ HII31' PhII33' total number of agricultural 
households, the free market prices, the prices of other goods, and the 
disposable Income. 
gHIIIF _ gHIIIFl + gHIIIF2 (4.215) 
- 0 . (4.216) 
The aggregate grain supply in the free market for the third type of 
agricultural households is zero. Subsitutlng (4.212), (4.214) and 
(4.216) into (4.210) we obtain 
 ^ " ^HI H^Il) PHI13 "H 
[QjF (PiF' Pi' M') - Xjp (P%p, ? [ ,  M')] 
H^II " PHIII " PHII2^  ^ HII33 "H 
[QjF (PiF' Pi' M') - V (*iF' ^ i' M')] 
HF 
• ® H^Il' ^ HIll' PHI13' ^ HII' PHIII' ^ HirZ' ^ HII31* 
PHII33' "H' PiF' Pi'  ^ (4.217) 
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For agricultural households, the aggregate grain supply In the free 
market Is a function of the relative frequencies ^HIII' ^ HI13' 
H^II' ^ HIIl' ^ HII2' ^ HII31' H^II33' total number of agricultural 
households, the free market price P|p, the prices of other goods, and 
disposable Income. 
Comparative statics for aggregate grain demands and supplies 
Comparative statics are made for three types of agricultural households 
separately. 
1. Nonbuyers 
Using formulas (4.203) and (4.211) we have 
sdUL.  ^  ^. âsiii! . âsE!! ^  0 
''hi '^'HI '^'HI 
4E!E; . sfiïEÎ.  ^ âaEfî > „ 
'^ HIl ''hII ''HII  ^ ""HIX 
âsiEL. âsHi!!, 0 
'^hiii "'HHI '^HIII 
âEÎiZ  ^^  ^
% % % % 
aa5!.as!!Z! > o  
GZjS 
*'jF 
acEL. âoiEi ^  âEÎÎZi ^  „ asEL . as!!Hi ^  „ 
aôjs 39js aSjs aQjs aPj; 
The results indicate that, for the first type of agricultural 
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HIF households in the free market, (1) both the aggregate grain demand, D 
HIF 
and the aggregate grain supply, S , increase if the relative frequency 
HIF 
or the total number of agricultural households increases; (2) D 
HIF 
uncertain, but S decreases, if the relative frequency increases; 
HIF HIF (3) D increases, but S decreases, if the relative frequency 
HIF HIF increases; and (4) D decreases, but S increases, if the state 
is 
market price P. , or the free market price P.„, or the sales quote Q 
Js jF' 
increases. 
2. Partial buyers 
Using formulas (4.205) and (4.213) we have 
<jS 
aa 
HIIF 
aa 
HIIF2 HIIF3 
ap 
22 
HII 
HIIF 
3P, 
HII 
3P, > 0 
HII 
m 
HIIF3 
dP, 
ao 
Hill 
HIIF 
3P, < 0 
m 
Hill 
HIIF2 
dP. 
HII2 
ap 
22 
HIIF 
ao 
HII2 
HIIF3 
*^ HII2  ^
ap, 
HII31 
ap. < 0 
HII31 
ac! HII 
HII 
ac! HIIF2 ad HIIF3 
'"H % > 0 
aa an 
HIIF2 
an 
HIIF3 
ap jS ap 
ao 
ap 
HII 
jF 
an 
ap 
js 
HIIF2 
jF 
ap < 0 
an 
ap 
js 
HIIF3 
jF 
< 0 
a& HIIF aa HIIF3 
ap 
aa 
HII 
HIIF 
ap, > 0 
aa 
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âlEi . âclEE  ^0 
™JS aXjs «*JS »^ js "js 
âEÏif! . âEÏilfî ^   ^„ as!!IE.as!!H!!>o 
aSjs »Qjs "Qjs 
The above results show that, for the second type of agricultural 
households in the free market, (1) both the aggregate grain demand, 
HIIF HIIF D , and the aggregate grain supply, S , increase when the relative 
frequency , or the total number of agricultural households increases; 
HIIF HIIF (2) both D and S decrease when the relative frequency or 
HIIF HIIF 
H^II31' increases; (3) D is uncertain, but S decreases, when the 
HIIF HIIF 
relative frequency decreases; and (4) D decreases, but S 
increases, when the state market price Pjg, or the free market price Pjp, 
or the ration, or the sales quota increases. 
3. Complete buyers 
From formulas (4.207) and (4.213) we have 
--HIIIF ._.HIIIF2 
._HIIIF ._HIIIF2 
.-IÎÏXÏF __HIIIF2 
§- ?? < 0 
HIIIl "HUH 
..HIIIF __HIIIF2 
^ - ^ < 0  
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._HIIIF ._HIIIF2 
,„HII1F _ ,„HIIIF2 
aXjs aXjs 
These results Illustrate that, for the third type of agricultural 
households in the free market, the aggregate grain demand, 
declines if the relative frequency or or the total 
number of agricultural households, or the state market price, or the free 
market price, or the state ration rises. 
Lastly, using formulas (4.209) and (4.217) we have 
21^  _ âfiîî!! + + 2D!1^  > Q 
^^ HII ^^ HII ^^ HII ^^ HII 
o^ HIl °^ HI1 
"'^ HIll ''^ HIll 
^^ HII2 ^^ HII2 
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mE âcîîHL _ 0  
an ap v U 
* HIIIl HIIIl 
acE _ apHiF apHiiF ap""^  ^ q 
"^H "^h "^H "^H 
âcîîL- .qHIF „HIIF ,HIIIF 
''js "^ j^s NS *Pjs 
aiE_ae + a^ + aaEH<o 
*^ jF *FjF *FjF *PjF 
a2!!I_aEH + aie< o  
aâjs aXjs ax,; 
aig.aig + aigl^ o 
'Qjs ^Qjs ^Qjs 
âsî!£. âsîE!> 0  
^^ HI ^^ HI 
ifiî!! _ âsH > 0  
^^ HII ^^ HII 
asE__as!E_ 
^^ HIl ^^ HIl 
^-^>0 
* Hill Hill 
âsEL- _ 5SÎEL < 0 
^^ HI13 ^^ HI132 
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âsE_ _ isEE 0 
ap ap  ^^  
HI13 HI13 
isE_,âsEiL,„ 
^^ HII31 ^^ HII31 
as!!! âsîEI . âsEI£. 0  
%  "%  %  
aqHF a-HIF .-HIIF 
-„HF ._HIF flçHIIF 
a ^ _ a ^ > o  
aXjg 3Xjg 
âsî!! _ âsHf! + asïii! > q 
'Qjs 'Qjs 
These results tell us that, for agricultural households in the free 
market, (1) the aggregate grain demand is uncertain, but the aggregate 
grain supply decreases if the relative frequency, or in­
creases; (2) decreases, but increases, if the relative frequency 
H^Il H^II31' state market price Pjg, or the free market price Pj^ , 
or the state ration or the sales quota increases; (3) D increases, but 
HF S decreases, if the relative frequency ,P^ ^^  or P^ , increases; (4) both 
HF HF 
D and S decrease if the relative frequency, or P^ ^^ g' 
HF HF 
creases; or (5) both D and S increase if the total number of 
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agricultural households increases. 
Graphic analysis .u To convert a graph in the united market, (Q , 
p") subspace into a graph in the free market, (Q^ , P^ ) subspace, we only 
need to draw an excess demand or an excess supply from the (Q^ , p") 
subspace as a demand or a supply in the (Q^ , P^ ) subspace. By using this 
procedure, it is easy to give a graphic analysis for all three types of 
agricultural households in this part. 
1. Nonbuyers 
There are two subtypes of nonbuyers in the free market. For the 
.HIFl first subtype, the aggregate grain demand D is a downward-sloping 
HIFX F F line, and aggregate grain supply S does not exist in the (Q , P ) 
subspace (Figure 4.17a). 
.HIFl 
—F \ —F P  ^— -J" p 
jjHIF2 gHIF2 HIF 
-F 
HIF 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4.17. Aggregation of grain demands and supplies of the first type 
of agricultural households in the free market 
On the other hand. Figure 4.17b shows that, for the second subtype, 
aggregate grain demand is downward-sloping and aggregate grain supply is 
F F 
upward-sloping in the (Q , P ) subspace. Adding both Figure 4.17a and 
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Figure 4.17b, we obtain Figure 4.17c, which shows a downward-sloping 
HIF 
aggregate grain demand D and an upward-sloping aggregate grain supply 
SHIF 
2. Partial buyers 
There are three subtypes of partial buyers in the free market. For 
the first subtype, the aggregate grain demand is zero; but the demands 
F F 
are downward-sloping in the (Q , P ) subspace for both the second and 
third subtypes. On the other hand, for both the first and the second 
subtype, the aggregate grain supply does not exist; but it is upward-
F F 
sloping in the (Q , P ) subspace for the third subtype (Figure 4.18a, b). 
Figure 4.18c shows the situation for the second type of agricultural 
household in the free market. 
HIIF2 HIIF3 „HIIF3 
-F 
F F 
,F 
HIIF HIIF 
-F 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4.18. Aggregation of grain demands and supplies of the second 
type of agricultural households in the free market 
3. Complete buyers 
There are two subtypes of complete buyers in the free market. For 
the first subtype, both grain demand and supply are zero. For the second 
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F F 
subtype, grain demand is downward-sloping in the (Q , P ) subspace, and 
grain supply is zero (Figure 4.19). Thus, aggregate grain demand and 
supply of complete buyers are similar to that shown in Figure 4.19. 
HIIIF(2) 
Figure 4.19. Aggregate grain demand and supply of the third type 
of agricultural households in the free market 
Lastly, adding Figure 4.17c, Figure 4.18c and Figure 4.19 together, 
we obtain Figure 4.20, which shows the normal demand and supply 
F F in the (Q , P ) subspace. 
Figure 4.20. Aggregate grain demand and supply of all agricultural 
households in the free market 
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Theory of International Grain Trade 
In the Mixed Economy 
In the Chinese mixed economy, the state government has applied an 
organizational reform to decentralize the state trading system. Without 
changing the feature of the state monopoly In foreign trade management, 
the government still has significant power to use trade to achieve Its 
goals. 
The discussion of International grain trade in the Chinese mixed 
economy consists of four major parts: policy environment, the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade (MOFT) model, aggregate grain Import demand or export 
supply, and interactions of plans and markets. Under the discussion of 
policy environment, the changed decision environment faced by the MOFT in 
the mixed economy is provided so that theoretical work can be further 
developed. Later, individual grain import demands and/or export supplies 
are derived from the MOFT model in which the MOFT Is assumed to maximize 
its utility subject to its constraints due to planning control. The 
aggregate grain Import demand or export supply is summed from all 
individual grain import demands or export supplies. Lastly, the plan's 
Impacts on both the domestic grain market(s) (Including the state market 
and the free market) and the international grain market are Inspected and 
evaluated. 
Pollev environment 
State monopolv and decentralization of foreign trade Since the 
economic reform, the Chinese government has decentralized foreign trade 
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management in two directions: horizontally to several ministries other 
than the HOFT and vertically to local governments. This is an attempt to 
provide flexibility and Improve efficiency for the MOFT's planning. 
At the ministerial level, several new export and import corporations 
(FTCs) have been established under the guidance of some production 
ministries to conduct foreign trade directly. Among these corporations, 
China National Seeds Import and Export Corporation (CNSIEC) is the only 
one relevant to the foreign grain trade. At the local level, the 
governments of several provinces and cities have been granted authority 
to organize local corporations to direct the operations of local FTC 
branches. These branches still need to report their plan and budget 
matters to national FTCs and, hence, the HOFT. 
Although there is an organizational reform in the state trading 
system, individuals still are not allowed to do an import-export business 
in the Chinese mixed economy. The bulk of China's foreign trade, 
especially foreign grain trade, still is mainly carried out by FTCs and, 
hence, the MOFT. 
Objective of foreign trade With a more flexible attitude, the 
Chinese government still thinks that foreign trade can play a very 
important role in China's industrialization. Thus, the main task of 
foreign trade in the national economy has not changed fundamentally. 
The government tries, to the maximum feasible extent, to export 
available goods to earn valuable foreign currency to ensure its import 
capacity for industrial plants and equipment. On the other hand, it 
tries to encourage China's own production of agricultural and light-
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industrial commodities to satisfy basic needs in the domestic markets and 
needs in the international markets if possible. 
In the international market, the MOFT may still behave as a specific 
consumer with a utility function within imported commodity space subject 
to constraints due to planning controls. The assumed objective for the 
MOFT still is to maximize its utility from purchasing commodities in the 
international markets. 
Plan control The MOFT still makes its trade plan which il­
lustrates its revenues and expenditures, imposes quotas for imports and 
exports, and target quantities of goods to be exported and imported. 
The MOFT still is concerned with its external balance, which is its 
budget in the foreign exchange. In addition, although its loss can still 
be covered by the State Treasurer, it now pays considerable attention to 
its internal balance, which is its budget in the domestic currency. The 
reason the MOFT does this is that the State Council sets the profit 
target in the domestic currency to the MOFT and will reward the income 
bonus as a money incentive to the staff members of the MOFT if the MOFT 
can achieve at least or above the target. 
The remaining concern for the MOFT, such as the planned balance 
(rather than real balance) of domestic demand and supply in the state 
market (rather than the combined market), has not changed from that under 
the planned econmomy. 
Market operation Because this section concentrates on the 
foreign grain trade in the mixed economy only, we simply assume that the 
MOFT is a price taker in all international markets except the 
I 
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international grain markets. The behavior of the MOFT in the foreign 
grain markets in the mixed economy is the same as that in the planned 
economy. In detail, the MOFT acts as a price taker when it purchases 
grain from the foreign markets and acts as a price follower when it sells 
grain to the foreign markets. 
Other bilateral trade agreements In the mixed economy, the MOFT 
has several bilateral agreements with other countries. In general, the 
contents of the agreements may be very similar to those carried out in 
the planned economy. 
Model of the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
In the Chinese mixed economy, the MOFT still is assumed to maximize 
its utility in the import commodity space, subject to given constraints. 
Suppose the MOFT continuously has a utility function , ..., Xj^ , 
Xj^ j, ..., X^ j) where X^ j (1-1, ... , n) is the 1^  ^imported good. 
Furthermore, to guarantee utility maximization, we still suppose U(X^ )^ 
has all the proper properties such as completeness, reflexivity, tran-
sivity, continuity, nonsatiatlon, and strict convexity. The new La-
grangian function is formulated as follows: 
L "• U(X^ j, . . . , Xj^ , X^ ,^ . . . , 
n I _  ^ T 
+ A-( S P, X,_ + «FR + r)FL - S P, X,_) 
1 1 IE i_i i 
+ Ajl J (^e p: - P») - J (^e Pj - pf) 
* A3I E - X^ j) - (S%S -
1 — 1 
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 ^ — pc pc 
- ''ll' - -"I'l 
1-1 
n 
+ s IjlCXil - Xii) (4-218) 
1—1 
where 
Xj, J - the 1^  ^Imported commodity 
Xj^ j - the Import quota for the 1^  ^commodity, In case there is no 
desire to import, X^ j^ - 0 
— til 
XiE - the export quota for the 1 commodity, in case there is no 
potential to export, X^ g^ - 0 
pj - international price for the 1^  ^commodity 
- domestic (the state market) price for the 1^  ^commodity 
e - the exchange rate in Yuan/$^  ^
JT - the Internal profit target for the MOFT 
FR - the foreign currency reserves 
FL - the foreign loans 
PS 
Sg - planned domestic grain supply in the state market 
PS Dg - planned domestic grain demand in the state market 
- planned domestic supply of 1^  ^commodity in the state market 
PS (h 
- planned domestic demand of 1 commodity in the state market 
Yuan (1 Yuan - 100 Fen) is the basic unit of the Chinese currency 
--ReMingBe (RMB), according to the current exchange rate, 1 Yuan - $0.268 
or $1 - 3.73 Yuan. 
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K, % - fixed proportional coefficients 0 3 % 5 1, 0 ^   ^1 
The constraints in the Lagranglan function can be classified into 
four categories. Three of these four categories are exactly the same as 
those listed in the MOFT model In the planned economy, and are not 
explained in detail in this section. The remaining one is the newly 
added internal balance in the current MOFT model. Now we introduce these 
four categories as follows: 
n I _ n J 
1) External balance. S P. X._ + /cFR + f^ FL - Z P. X,? is an 
1-1 ^  1-1 ^  " 
external balance constraint. It requires that total expenditures for 
importing goods must be covered by total earnings from exporting goods 
plus other possible sources of foreign currency. 
n T 
s. -2) Internal balance. Z (e P^  - P^ )^ - S (e P^  - P^ )^ X 
1-1 1-1 
n 
II TT 
I g — is an internal balance constraint. It says that S (e P. - P ) X , 
1-1  ^  ^ IB 
total earnings converted to domestic currency from importing goods, minus 
total expenditures converted to domestic currency for importing goods, 
 ^ IS — S (e P. - P,)X.y, must reach at least jr, the profit target set by the 
1-1  ^  ^
state government. 
— DC DC 
3) Balance of domestic demand and supply. (X^ g - X^ )^ - (S^  - ) 
- 0 is a planned balance constraint for the domestic demand and supply of 
the 1^  ^commodity. It means th#t, for the 1^  ^commodity, the planned 
domestic surplus or shortage in the state market must be disposed of or 
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n _ 
be covered by using the international market. In particular, S (X.„ -
i-1 
PS pg 
Xii) - (Sg - Dg ) is designed for the planned balance of domestic demand 
and supply for a composite good--grain. 
4) Import quota. - X^ j^ is the Import quota constraint imposed 
for some commodities. That is, import of the 1^  ^commodity must not 
exceed the import quota X^ .^ 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are then: 
'A -
• fP + ^ 3 + >51 s 0 
for X^ j / 0, 1-1, 
- pp + A3 i 0 
for Xj^ j - 0, i " 1, 
for Xj^ j / 0, 1 - k. 
- Pj) + a 0 
(4.219) 
j (4.220) 
(4.221) 
''ii " 
for Xj^ j - 0, 1 - k, 
1 -  1,  
n 
n 
(4.222) 
(4.223) 
ft - + 'f* + SPL 
1 1 — 1 
" I 
S P% T ^  0 
1-1 ^ 
(4.224) 
âL_ 
1 ax. - 0 (4.225) 
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 ^ - fl' He • i 0 (4.226) 
^ 2 % - - °  ( 4  2 2 ' )  
% - j/^ iE - *il' • <C •  ^» (4 22:) 
h ^ - O  (4 229) 
3A^  - (XiE - \j) - (sFS - D^ S) & 0 i - k n (4.230) 
\i Ia"" • ° i - k n (4.231) 
(X^ J - X^ j) ^  0 for / 0, i - 1. ..., n (4.232) 
Agi - 0 for X^j / 0, i - 1 n (4.233) 
1^' ^ 2' ^ 3' ^ 5i ~ ® 1 "" 1, • . • I n (4.234) 
& 0 i - k, ..., n (4.235) 
Suppose the MOFT maintains both its external balance and internal 
balance, 
AT  ^ T—  ^ T 
^ - S pfx.P  + /cFR + fjFL - S PTX.T - 0 (4.236) 
1 i-1 i-1 
% - • f") &E - ''ll - 0  (4 237) 
then, (4.224) through (4.227) can be dropped out. 
Similarly, suppose the MOFT maintains grain as well as all other 
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commodities at the planned.balance level, we then have 
It - ° (4 23:' 
3 i—1 
- «IE - *1I> - "i® - "f ' - » i - •= " (4 239) 
These results lead to omitting (4.228) through (4.231) from our 
model. 
Furthermore, suppose the second-order conditions are satisfied; 
solving the first-order conditions, we find three possible ways for 
1. - 0 (4.240) 
2. X^ j-X^ j(P^ , P®, e, FR, PL, n ,  Xg, Xj, S^ -^D^ )^(4.241) 
3. (4.242) 
Apparently, the first formula (4.240) Implies a comer solution, 
that Is, the MOFT does not Import any amount of good 1. The second 
formula (4.241) Illustrates that Import demand for good 1 Is a function 
of international commodity prices, domestic commodity prices (in the 
state market), the exchange rate, the foreign reserves in the country, 
the foreign loans borrowed by the government, the profit target for the 
MOFT, the export quotas, the Import quotas, the planned balance of 
domestic grain supply and demand in the state market, and the planned 
balances of domestic supply and demand of other commodities in the state 
market. The last formula (4.242) indicates that Imported good 1 is just 
equal to its quota. 
Once X^  ^Is determined, the corresponding quantities of either net 
export supply X^ g^ or net Import demand X^ ^^  immediately determined. 
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Comparing our new model (4.218) In the mixed economy with the previous 
model (3.163) in the planned economy, we find out that the only dif­
ference is the constraint of internal balance. Furthermore, comparing 
the results of (4.240) through (4.242) of our new model with the corre­
sponding results (3.182) through (3.184), we find out that the only 
difference is that formula (4.241) for contains three more factors: 
g 
the domestic state market prices P , the exchange rate e, and the profit 
target n for the HOFT. Because we use a similar method to solve a 
similar new model in this section, we can easily use the results provided 
in the previous model with (4.241) to replace corresponding (3.183). 
Thus, except for these different formulas, we only list all results of 
our new model without detailed explanations. 
1 .  -  0  
a. Xj^ g - 0 (4.243) 
This case is dropped out because it is meaningless. 
b. X^ g >0 
*iNE " *iE (4.244) 
The MOFT is a command exporter for good 1. 
2. X^ j - X^ j (pl, P^ , e, FR, FL, n ,  X^ , X^ ,  -  D^ ®) 
a. X^ E - 0 
I^NI -  X i l (P^ '  ® '  FR '  FL, n, Xg, Xj, (4.245) 
Net import demand for good 1 is a function of the international 
price vector, the domestic state market price vector, the exchange rate, 
foreign reserves, foreign loans, the profit target set for the MOFT, 
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export quotas, Import quotas, the planned balance of domestic grain 
supply and demand In the state market, and the planned balance of 
domestic supply and demand of other commodities In the state market. 
Thus, the MOFT is a flexible Importer for good 1. 
b. XiE > 0 
1) ifX,g>X,j 
XiNE - ^lE - Xll(P^ ' FR' FL, X^ , Xj, S^ S-D^ S, 
- X^ g^CpI, P®, e, FR, FL, ff, Xg, X^ , S^ ®-D^ ®)(4.246) 
2) if < Xii 
*1NI " *11 " *iE 
- (P\ P^ . e, FR, FL, n ,  Xg, Xj, -  Xg 
- P^ , e, FR, FL, n ,  Xg, Xj, S^ ®-D^ )^(4.247) 
These results Indicate that either net export supply or net import 
demand for good 1 is a function of international prices, the domestic 
state market prices, the exchange rate, foreign reserves, foreign loans, 
the profit target for the MOFT, export quotas. Import quotas, the planned 
balance of domestic grain supply and demand in the state market, and the 
planned balance of domestic supply and demand for other commodities in 
the state market. The MOFT is either a restricted flexible exporter or 
restricted flexible importer for goods in these cases. 
3) ifX^E-^ii 
*1NI " *iNE • ° (4.248) 
We simply drop this case out. 
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3. \i ' 
l^E - 0 
XiNI - (4 249) 
The MOFT is a command importer in this case. 
"• XlE > 0 
The MOFT is a command exporter for good i. 
1) if 
XlNI - *11 - *1E (4 251) 
The MOFT is a dual command importer. 
2) 1£ îji < ïij 
- ^iE - *11 (4 252) 
The MOFT is a dual command exporter. 
3) if ^ 11 - XiE 
XlNI - &NE - » (4 2::) 
We simply neglect this case. 
All of these results reflect that the MOFT tries to decide all net 
imports and net exports for all goods together, although it may pay prior 
attention to export quotas. The MOFT now is concerned with the interna­
tional prices as well as the domestic state market prices. 
Comparative statics From the above discussion, we can classify 
MOFT's importing or exporting behaviors. We show comparative statics of 
S — 
only the newly added factors P , e, and i r  for only flexible Importer and 
restricted flexible exporter or importer. For the remaining factors 
within the previous three functions and the remaining functions, the 
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readers can refer to the comparative statics for the corresponding part 
in Chapter III because of similarity. 
1. Importer 
a. dual command Importer 
*1NI1 " ^11 " *1E 
b. command Importer 
*1NI2 " *11 
c. flexible Importer 
*1NI3 • Xll(P^ ' ®' FR, FL. n ,  Xg, Xj, 
ax^^ax 
apj d? l  
J" 
ap^  ap® 
de  de  
< 0 
< 0 
< 0 
. fïu > 0 
dn dir ^ 
Net import demand for the 1^  ^good decreases if the exchange rate in 
yuan/dollar, the international price, or the state market price in­
creases, and it is uncertain if the profit target is raised. 
Moreover, we have the following results,which are similar to 
those in Chapter III. 
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but 
=<3 - ' ° 
d. restricted flexible Importer 
XINI4 - P^ , e, FR, FL, n, Xg, Xj. - X^ G 
The partial derivatives for X^ ^^  ^ are exactly the same as those for 
X.„__ and are omitted here. 
INl J 
2. Exporter 
a. dual command exporter 
*iNEl " *1E ' *11 
b. command exporter 
*1NE2 " *iE 
c. restricted flexible exporter 
— T C — — DC pC pC pC 
XiNE3 -  -  Xj^ j  (P \  e, FR, FL, n ,  Xg, Xj, s" -d" ,  s" -D" )  
The partial derivatives for X^ g^^  are the same as those for X^ ^^ g 
but with opposite signs. 
Graphic analysis The graphic analysis also is the same as that 
in the similar part in Chapter III and, hence, is omitted in this 
section. 
Aggregate import grain demand and export grain SUPDIV 
Within the first j grain commodities, suppose that the first e are 
net importing grain commodities and the remaining j-e are net exporting 
grain commodities. In the mixed economy, the aggregate import grain 
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demand is then 
D ,MM 
*iNIl *iNI2 •*• *iNI3 *iNI4 1-e 1-e 1-e l-e 
(4.254) 
S - XiEi) + Z \ i 2  
1-e 1-e 
+ S Xj^ j3 (pl, P®, e. FR, FL, n ,  Xg, Xj, 
1-e 
+ S [X^ 4(pl, P^ , e, FR, FL, n ,  Xg, Xj,  
1-e iE4 
(PL, P^ , e, FR, FL, JT, Xg, Xj, S^ -^DG^ , (4.255) 
That is, as long as the MOFT behaves as a flexible or a restricted 
flexible importer for at least one grain commodity, the aggregate import 
grain demand is a function of international prices of commodities, the 
domestic state market prices of commodities, the exchange rate, the 
foreign reserves, foreign loans, the profit target for the MOFT, export 
quotas, import quotas, the planned balance of domestic grain supply and 
demand in the state market, and the planned balances of domestic supplies 
and demands of other commodities in the state market. 
Similarly, we can obtain S , the aggregate export grain supply in 
the mixed economy as the following: 
(4.256) 
(*iEl ' ^ill) ,^*iE2 
f-J f-J 
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- S™ (pl, P^ , e, FR, FL, H, X^ , Xj, (4.257) 
As long as the MOFT behaves as a restricted flexible exporter for at 
least one grain commodity, the aggregate export grain supply is similar 
to the aggregate grain import demand as a function of international 
prices of commodities, the domestic state market prices of commodities, 
the exchange rate, the foreign currency reserves, the foreign loans, the 
profit target for the MOFT, the export quotas, the import quotas, the 
planned balance of domestic grain supply and demand in the state market, 
and the planned balances of domestic supplies and demands of other goods 
in the state market. 
Three important things need to be noted here. First, both the 
aggregate Import grain demand and the aggregate export grain supply of 
the MOFT do contain both the international price vector, including 
international grain prices, and the domestic state market price vectors, 
including the state grain market prices. This reflects the fact that the 
MOFT's behavior is affected not only by International prices but also by 
the domestic state market prices. Thus, there is a certain connection 
between prices in the state grain market and prices in the international 
grain market in the mixed economy. 
Second, both and contain the exchange rate. The exchange 
rate plays an important role in the mixed economy to adjust the import 
grain demand and export grain supply. Thus, the government can use the 
exchange rate as a new policy Instrument to affect the grain economy. 
Third, whether China becomes a net importing grain country or a net 
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exporting country still depends on the difference between and S^ . 
In case > S^ , the MOFT is a net grain importer; otherwise, it is a 
net grain exporter. In today's world, both domestic and foreign agricul­
tural economists who specialize in Chinese agricultural development 
recognize that a shortage in the domestic grain market will persist in 
the long run in the Chinese economy. If this is true, we obtain the net 
grain import demand as follows: 
pNMM _ pMM _ gXM (4.258) 
It is certain that is a function that contains all the factors 
and/or have/has. 
Comparative statics The comparative statics for both and 
MP XP 
are the same as those for D and S in the corresponding part of 
Chapter III except for those relationships that include the domestic 
state market prices, the exchange rate, and the profit target for the 
MOFT. Thus, we mainly consider only those factors in the comparative 
statics in this subpart of Chapter IV. 
1. Aggregate import grain demand 
_ 2 + s > 0 
apj 1-e apj 1-e apj  ^
as^ _ S îïim+ 2 îïim>0 
ap^  1-e ap^  1-e apj 
2  s  ^ < 0  
ap^  i-e a?l 1-e a?l 
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S  Z  ^ < 0  
8?l l-e 3?l l-e aP= 
i-e l-e 
âfiîîl. 2 **iNI3 + 2 fim>0 
3»r l-e âTT l-e dn  ^  
âEÎÎÎ _ 2 **iNI3 + 3 fïmiâ < 0 
3(sf  - Df ) l-e a(S%S . D^ S) l-e a(sf -
The above results indicate that the aggregate Import grain demand 
(1) is uncertain if the state market price, the International market 
price of a grain commodity, the exchange rate in yuan/dollar, or the 
profit target for the HOFT increases; and (2) decreases if the average 
state grain market price or the average international grain price in­
creases . 
2. Aggregate export grain supply 
isH _ 2 > 0 
apj f-j apj  ^
sÇ.  s 
d? l  f-j ap® 
ap^  f-j aPg 
âS^ . g fiBEÎ<0 
s?l f-j 
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âsiiîî _ 2 **iNB3 > 0 
de  " Je < ° 
âfiï _ g **iNB3 > 0 
ajr f-J dit ^ 
âsi^ î _ g *XiNE3 > 0 
a(sf - of) f-j a(sf - D^ ®) 
The above results Illustrate that (1) the aggregate export grain 
supply is uncertain if the state market price, the international market 
price of a grain commodity, the exchange rate, or the profit target for 
the MOFT increases; (2) the aggregate export grain supply increases if 
the average state grain market price increases; and (3) aggregate export 
grain supply decreases if the average state grain market price increases. 
Graphic analysis The graphic analyses are made for both aggre­
gate import grain demand and aggregate export grain supply. 
1. Aggregate import grain demand 
Given the average international grain price P^ , we can draw aggre­
gate import grain demand. As Figure 4.21a shows, the sum of aggre­
gate import grain demands by both dual command importers and command 
importers, is a vertical line whose intercept on is QQJ" 23 
1-3 
+ S X^ j2 the (Qg, Pg) space. 
1-e 
Figure 4.21b gives , aggregate import grain demand by flexible 
MM 
and restricted flexible importers. Finally, D , aggregate import grain 
demand by the MOFT, is obtained in Figure 4.21c. 
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,MMI \ \ 
mil 
G^I G^ 
(a) (b) <c) 
Figure 4.21. Aggregation of Import grain demands In the mixed economy 
2. Aggregate export grain supply 
Similarly, Figure 4.22 describes the aggregation of export grain 
XMI 
supplies. On the left, S , the sum of aggregate export grain supplies 
of both dual command exporters and command exporters Is given as a 
vertical line with an Intercept Q^ g" Z + Z X^ g^ o" the 
f-j f-j 
axis. In the middle, aggregate grain supply of restricted 
flexible exporters Is given. Lastly, S , aggregate export grain supply 
of the MOFT Is drawn as an upward sloping line In the (Q^ , P^ ) space on 
the right of Figure 4.22. 
,XMI ,XMII 
/ 
/ / 
,XM 
G^E G^ G^ G^ 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4.22. Aggregation of export grain supplies In the mixed economy 
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Interactions of clans and markets 
In the mixed grain economy, the state market has not been changed 
fundamentally. The government sets state market prices by its own 
evaluation. Moreover, on the consumption side, the government still uses 
ration coupons in the urban area to restrict urban grain demand and 
grants permission to the minority of agricultural households to limit the 
rural grain demand in the state market. On the production side, the 
government sets contracts (somewhat different new quotas) to guarantee 
rural grain supply in the state market. Thus, the state government still 
controls not only the prices in the state market but also the quantities 
exchanged in the state market. In this sense, the state market can still 
be seen as an extension of the government policies. 
According to the official opinion, the free market, as newly 
reopened during the economic reform, is only an adjustment and a supple­
ment to the state market. The price in the free market is determined by 
the interaction of market forces. However, the quantity exchanged in the 
free grain market is partly determined by price and is partly influenced 
by the government policies. It is known that grain demand or supply in 
the free market is only a residual grain demand or supply of the sum of 
grain demands and supplies in both the household market and the state 
market. Thus, the government has the power to use a policy instrument to 
change the exchanged quantities in the state market, and, hence, change 
the exchanged quantities in the free market indirectly. In this sense, 
we should not overestimate the roles played by the free market in such a 
mixed economy. In the international grain market, the Chinese government 
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still has no power to decide the prices, but has full monopoly power to 
decide the varieties and quantity imported and exported. Thus, interna­
tional grain markets still can be partially seen partly as an extension 
of the government policies. 
Market equilibrium situations In the mixed economy, the disequi­
librium feature of the state market has not changed. It still is 
believed that the grain price in the state market is well below its 
equilibrium price and, hence, creates a restricted excess demand under 
the rationing coupon system in the state grain market. 
Because the exchange activity occurring in the free market must obey 
the economic principles, noting that the free market price is well above 
the state market price, we may conclude that there is an equilibrium 
existing in the free grain market, and that it is decided by interaction 
of both demand and supply in the market. The average grain price may be 
considered as approximately the equilibrium price. 
In the international grain market, there is an equilibrium. Because 
China is generally a grain importing country and it behaves as a perfect­
ly competitive or a price follower in the international market, the ex­
change prices are determined by excess grain supplies of the rest of the 
world, and the exchange quantity is mainly determined by the excess grain 
demand of the MOFT. 
Domestic policy instruments In the domestic market of the mixed 
economy, the main policy instruments include the ration coupons, the 
ration permissions, the sales quotas, and the state market prices. 
The mechanism of the ration permissions in the state market is the 
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same as that of the ration coupons, so we are discussing the roles of 
only the ration coupons, the sales quotas, and the state market price. 
Apparently, the first two are policy instruments for quantity adjustment, 
the last one is a policy instrument for price adjustment. Next are 
comparative studies for these domestic policy instruments. 
1. The ration coupon 
Figure 4.23 shows how an increase in the issued ration coupon per 
capita in the state market affects both the free market and the interna­
tional market. 
,F P 
F «F F 
,S I P P 
ES(R) 
ED' 
S D-D^ PD-PD -S M «M I 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4.23. The effects of a change in the ration level in the mixed 
economy 
We now Illustrate the initial situations in the domestic markets and 
International market. To save space, we separate our dual graph and move 
the free market to the left. Figure 4.23a shows the situation in the 
free market. and are aggregate grain demand and supply in the free 
market and cross each other to determine the initial equilibrium price, 
F F P^ , and the equilibrium quantity, . Figure 4.23b gives the situation 
in the state market. and represent the aggregate grain demand and 
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supply in the state market in the mixed economy. Given the state market 
S F D price P^ , which is less than P^ , the grain demand is and grain supply 
c D S is Qj^ . In general, does not need to equal Qj^ . The planned grain 
PD PS demand is and the planned grain supply is . They are not affected 
S PD D PS S by the state market price P^ . Obviously, and - Qj^  because 
the government has to guarantee that planned balance fully covers the 
real balance in the state market. Lastly, Figure 4.23c indicates the 
situation in the international market. ED and ES(R) are excess grain 
demand by the HOFT and excess grain supply by the rest of the world, 
respectively. Given an international grain price, pj, we have the 
equilibrium grain quantity, Q^ , in the international market. All of 
the previous descriptions about the initial situations of the markets are 
continuously used in the remaining discussions of all other policy 
instruments but are not illustrated anymore. 
Consider that the government raises the ration coupons per capita, 
in the state market, grain demand, D^ , shifts to the right . At the 
PD PD 
same time, the planned grain demand, , shifts to right Qg . Thus, the 
balance of total grain demand and supply as well as the planned balance 
of total grain demand and supply in the state market is increasing. As a 
M F 
result of shift in D , in the free market, grain demand D shifts back to 
p' FF
D Immediately, the equilibrium price P^  goes down to Pg, and the 
equilibrium quantity goes down to Qg. In the international market, 
because of changes in the planned balance rather than real balance of 
grain demand and supply in the domestic state market, excess grain demand 
ED shifts back to ED'. The import grain demand is expanded to at the 
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given international grain price pj. 
2. The sales quotas. 
The sales quotas are set for agricultural households in the mixed 
economy. The government uses the sales quota to ensure planned grain 
supply in the state market. Figure 4.24 describes the impacts on the 
domestic markets and the international market when the government raises 
the sales quotas. 
I ,S P P' 
ES(R) 
ED 
S S «S Q 
,F P' 
F «F F 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4.24. The effects of a change in the sales quota in the mixed 
economy 
The beginning situations are as discussed before. As the government 
tries to increase the sales quota to Q^ g, both the grain supply and 
S s planned grain supply in the state market increase from to (Figure 
4.24b), Because the grain supply in the state market increases, that 
causes a decrease in grain supply in the free market. In Figure 4.24a, 
F F' S , grain supply in the free market, shifts to the left S and grain 
F ' P demand shifts to left D . Thus, the equilibrium price P^  is decreasing 
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F F to Pg but the equilibrium quantity, Q^ , is not certain and possibly de-
g 
creases. In the International market, an increase in P^  in the state 
I S 
market and a decrease in P^  ^ - P^  may cause a left shift in excess demand 
ED. Hence, import grain demand decreased from to Qg (Figure 4.24c). 
3. The state market price 
The state market prices are set for both domestic consumers and 
producers. By adjusting the state market price, the government can 
influence the situation in the markets. Figure 4.25 indicates the 
effects of a change in the state market price on the domestic markets and 
international market. 
I S P P 
ES(R) 
ED' 
M M „M S 
,F P 
F F 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4.25. The effects of a change in the state market price in the 
mixed economy 
The initial situations remain the same. Suppose the government 
S S decides to increase the state market price, say from P^  to P^ ; as a 
result, grain demand decreases from to in the state market (Figure 
4.25b). In the free market, D^  shifts left but shifts right. The 
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equilibrium quantity is not certain, but the equilbrium price increases 
I S (Figure 4.25a). Keeping constant as P^  ^ rises, the price difference 
I S 
?! - Pj^  may decrease, and, hence, the MOFT may suffer more loss in 
importing grain. If this is true, the excess grain demand ED shifts 
back, and the import grain demand decreases from to Qg (Figure 4.25c). 
International policy jnefrumenta In the international grain 
markets, the main policy instruments used by the Chinese government are 
the exchange rate, the import quotas, and the export quotas. Comparative 
studies of these three policy instruments are discussed next. 
X. Exchange rate 
The exchange rate is used to shift excess grain demand in the 
international grain market. Because of the bonus, if the government 
raises the exchange rate in yuan/dollar, the MOFT may earn more profit 
from importing grain, hence more bonus from the State Council. Thus, the 
excess grain demand shifts up. On the other hand, an increase in the 
exchange rate causes the government to reduce its purchasing interest in 
the international market, then shifts ED down, the final results is not 
certain. There is no change in either the domestic state market or free 
market (Figure 4.26). 
2. The import quota 
We discuss the impact of all import quotas for the total grain 
demand only. As Figure 4.27c shows, if the import quota Q increases, 
the excess grain demanded, ED, in the international market shifts to the 
right; the import grain demand is increasing from to Q^ . There is no 
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change in the domestic markets. 
ES(R) 
ED 
QÎ Q™ q» .M 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4.26. The effects of a change in the exchange rate in the mixed 
economy 
pS D« S« 
ES(R) 
(a) (b) 
Q? Q? Qo Q" 
Figure 4.27. The effects of a change in the import quota or export quota 
in the mixed economy 
3. The export quotas 
The impact of export quotas is similar to that of the import quotas, 
but in the opposite direction. As the government increases all export 
quotas for grain together, it results in a left shift in excess grain 
demand, ED, and a decrease in import grain demand (Figure 4.27c). 
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CHAPTER V. MODELING THE CHINESE GRAIN ECONOMY 
In keeping with the objective of this study to assess the Impacts of 
government policy on China's grain trade and domestic grain consumption 
and production, and in attempting to develop empirical analyses of the 
Chinese grain economy in the future, this chapter will first formulate a 
complete grain model for China, covering both periods of planned and 
mixed economy. The differences of Individual corresponding equation(s) 
between the two periods are Illustrated; and, therefore, the differences 
between corresponding submodels for both planned and mixed economy also 
are Illustrated. The most important Impact channels in this model are 
via the domestic grain prices in both the state market and the free 
market, as well as international grain prices. In addition, the other 
government policy Instruments, such as ration coupons and sales quotas in 
the domestic grain market(s), and import quotas and export quotas in the 
international grain market(s), are built into the model so that their 
impacts also can be further evaluated by estimating this model. 
The grain model for China, CHNGMODI, includes four sections: 
domestic grain demand, domestic grain supply, international grain trade, 
and government grain price subsidy. The first two sections deal with the 
domestic markets. The market equilibrium conditions are given for the 
state market and the free market. In the third section, which treats the 
international markets, import grain demand/export grain supply are 
specified. Finally, the fourth section is used to simulate the govern­
ment grain price subsidy. 
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To close this chapter, a brief summary about the components of the 
model is provided. In particular, flexibility of the model GHNGMODI is 
discussed first. After that, classifications of the equations and 
variables within GHNGMODI are given in this section. 
Domestic Grain Demand 
The submodel of domestic grain demand in China is divided into four 
parts: domestic food grain demand, domestic feed grain demand, domestic 
seed grain demand, and, finally, domestic inventory grain demand. 
Food grain demand 
Because of the differences in the government's grain policy between 
the urban and the rural areas in China, the domestic food grain demand 
(GFOOD) consists of domestic urban food grain demand (GFOODUB) and 
domestic rural food grain demand (GFOODRU); 
GFOOD - GFOODUB + GFOODRU (5.1) 
Urban food grain demand The urban food grain demand (GFOODUB) is 
the sum of the urban food grain demands in the state market and the free 
market (GFOODUBSM and GFOODUBFM): 
GFOODUB - GFOODUBSM + GFOODUBFM (5.2) 
The equations for GFOODUBSM and GFOODUBFM are given by 
GFOODUBSM - f(Pgsc' ^ cross' ^ GU' ^ BPOP, UBPM) (5.3) 
and 
GFOODUBFM - f(PQp, P^ j^ g^g, Rgy, UBFOP, UBPM, DUM) (5.4) 
where P^ g^  and P^ p represent own price of grain to the consumer in the 
state market and to the consumer and producer in the free market, 
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respectively, P^ j-^ gg represents the prices of other relevant goods, 
represents the average annual amount of ration coupons per urban person, 
and UBFOF represents the number of the urban population. UBFH represents 
income per urban consumer and DUM represents a dummy variable for the 
structural change. 
Obviously, the difference between the explanations of urban grain 
demand in the planned economy and in the mixed economy is formula (5.4). 
In particular, there are two new factors, P^ p and DUM, appearing within 
(5.4). The former implies the emergence of the free market after the 
economic reform, and the latter is used to distinguish the periods of the 
grain economy before and after the reform. 
Rural food grain demand Similar to the urban food grain demand, 
the rural food grain demand is the sum of the rural food grain demand in 
the state market (GFOODRUSM) and rural food grain demand in the own (and 
the free) market (GFOODRUOH). By the own market we mean the self-
production and self-consumption of grain by many agricultural households, 
as described in Chapters III and IV. Thus, we have 
GFOODRU - GFOODRUSM + GFOODRUOM (5.5) 
The functional forms of GFOODRUSM and GFOODRUOM are given by 
GFOODRUSM - f(Pgsc' ^ GR' ^ P^OP, WI) (5.6) 
and 
GFOODRUOM - f/R^ gC' ^ GF' ^ cross' R^ PM, DUM) (5.7) 
where R^ j^  represents the amount of ration per rural person, RUPOP 
represents number of rural population, WI represents a weather condition 
index, and RUPM represents real income per rural consumer. The other 
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variables, F" P„, P _ and DUM, are the same as described earlier 
ubL Vf Cross 
in this section. 
Clearly, there is no change in formula (5.6) in going from the 
planned economy to the mixed economy. On the other hand, within formula 
(5.7), Pqp and DUM are used to illustrate the difference between the 
rural grain demand in the own market and the free market, and, therefore, 
the difference between the rural grain demands in the planned economy and 
the mixed economy. 
Food grain demand in the state market The total food grain 
demand in the state market (GFOODSH) is provided by 
GFOODSM - GFOODUBSM + GFOODRUSM (5.8) 
where GFOODUBSM and GFOODRUSM are previously specified. 
Food grain demand in the own market (and free market) The total 
food grain demand in the own (and the free) market (GFOODOM) is provided 
by 
GFOODOM - GFOODUBFM + GFOODRUOM (5.9) 
where GFOODUBFM and GFOODRUOM are as previously specified. 
Feed grain demand 
Importance of feed grain Feed grain is very important within the 
Chinese grain economy because China has one of the world's largest year-
end livestock inventories, especially inventories of hogs, which provide 
over 90 percent of the meat in China and consume a relatively large 
amount of feed grain to compete with human needs. For example, according 
to a study by the World Bank (1987), about 87 million tons of grain. 
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Including cereals, tubers, and soybeans, was used to feed livestock in 
China in 1984. This was equivalent to about 33 percent of the total 
Chinese human grain consumption in the same year. 
Circulation of feed grain In general, the government assigns 
feed grain rations for the production teams or rural households, but does 
not provide feed grain to them from the state stock. The feed grain will 
mainly depend upon the collective reserve system or private households. 
In case of an emergency, with the government's permission, the household 
may buy feed grain from the state market. In the mixed economy, however, 
the rural households may purchase additional feed grain from the free 
market. 
Additionally, the government applies rationing policy to sell feed 
grain to those state farms, or collective farms, or individual house­
holds, that are specialized in livestock production and deliver meat 
products to the state market. 
Feed grain demand Because feed is used as input in livestock 
production, the theoretical specification of feed demand follows the 
derived demand approach, which has been developed in both the agricul­
tural production team model and the agricultural household model in this 
study. 
In addition, the feed grain demand (GFEED) is separated into two 
subparts: the feed grain demand in the state market (GFEEDSM) and the 
feed grain demand in the own (and free) market (GFEEDOM). Thus, 
GFEED - GFEEDSM + GFEEDOM (5.10) 
Furthermore, GFEEDSM is specified as a function of price of grain in 
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the state market (P^ gc), price of livestock product (P^ g), meat consumed 
in the urban area (UBMC), per capita income of urban residents (UBPM), 
and number of livestock (LN). Thus, the functional form of feed demand 
in the state market is 
GFEEDSM - f(Pggc, P^ g, UBMC, UBPM, LN) (5.11) 
Similarly, GFEEDOM is specified as a function of grain price in the 
state market (P^ gg), grain price in the free market (Pgp). meat price in 
the state market (P^ g), meat price in the free market (P^ ), meat 
consumed in the rural areas (RUMC), per capita Income in the rural area 
(RUPM), number of livestock (LN), and dummy variable (DUM). Thus, the 
functional form of feed demand in the free market is 
GFEEDOM - f(PQgg, Pgp, Pjjg, Pjjp, RUMC, RUPM, LN, DUM) (5.12) 
Needless to say, P^ p and DUM are factors newly added to formula 
(5.12) because of the economic reform. 
Seed grain demand 
The demand for seed grain (GSEED) is specified as a function of 
sown area (GAS) and a time trend (T). The behavioral relationship is 
given as 
GSEED - f(GAS, T) (5.13) 
Inventory grain demand 
Total grain inventories in China (GSTOÇK) are further disaggregated 
into the state inventory (GSTOCKS) and the rural inventory (GSTOCKRU). 
The state inventory managed by the state plan is mainly used for nation­
wide disasters and other unpredictable events such as war. The rural 
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inventory owned and managed by production teams or agricultural house­
holds is mainly used to compensate their losses in bad harvests. Thus, 
GSTOCK - GSTOCKS + GSTOCKRU (5.14) 
The behavioral relationship for the state stock is specified as 
GSTOCKS - f(UBPOP, GSQ, WI) (5.15) 
where GSQ is grain sales quota, and the other variables, UBFOP, , and 
WI, are the same as in earlier equations. 
The behavioral function for the private stock is specified as 
GSTOCKRU - f(RUPOP, GPROD, GSQ, WI) (5.16) 
where GPROD is grain production and the other variables are remaining the 
same as before. 
Domestic Grain Supply 
The submodel of domestic grain supply in China consists of three 
parts; grain production, grain supply in the state market, and grain 
supply in the own market (and the free market). 
Grain production 
The grain production part includes three equations explaining area 
sown to grain, grain yield, and grain production, respectively. 
Area sown to grain Area sown to grain in China (GAS) is expres­
sed as a function of sown grain area planned by the government (PGAS), 
the state grain market price for producer, P^ gp. the free grain market 
price, Pgp, and the structural dummy variable, DUM, in other words, 
GAS - f(PGAS, Pggp, Pgp, DUM) (5.17) 
The variables P^ p and DUM are newly added to explain GAS within the 
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mixed economy. 
Grain yield Grain yield in China (GY) is expressed as a function 
of the state market price Pggp. the free market price P^ p, input uses X, 
the sales quota GSQ, a time trend, T, to represent technical change, a 
dummy variable, DUH, to represent structural change, and a weather index, 
WI: 
GY - fXPggp, Pgp, X. GSQ, T, DUM, WI) (5.18) 
Undoubtedly, P^ p and DUM, of course, are new variables added in 
formula (5.18) for GY in the mixed economy. 
Grain production China's grain production (GPROD) is expressed 
as a product of area sown to grain (GAS) and grain yield (GY): 
GPROD - GAS * GY (5.19) 
grain supply in the state market 
Grain supply in the state market (GSSM) is expressed as the sum of 
sales quota (GSQ), and imports (GIM): 
GSSM - GSQ + GIM (5.20) 
where the sales quota is a function of urban population (UBPOP), rural 
population (RUPOP), and grain production (GPROD). Thus, 
GSQ - f(UBPOP, RUPOP, GPROD) (5.21) 
Grain SUPDIV in the own market (and the free market) 
Grain supply in the own (and the free) market (GSOM) is the dif­
ference between grain production and the sales quota. Thus, 
GSOM - GPROD - GSQ (5.22) 
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International Grain Trade 
The international grain trade submodel for China represents the 
market linkage between grain markets of China and the rest of the world. 
This submodel approaches a partial equilibrium because only grain com­
modities are included. To simplify the model, the international grain 
prices are assumed to be exogenous because the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
is assumed to be either a perfect competitor or a price follower in the 
international grain markets. 
The submodel is formed by two parts: net grain import (export) and 
domestic quantity balance. 
Net grain import (export) 
For a specific grain commodity i, its import demand (GlMi) or export 
supply (GXPi) can be specified as a function of its international market 
price (PgiQi), its state market price (Pggi), the international market 
price and the state market price of other relevant goods and 
cross xiN 
PcrossS^ ' domestic excess demand/supply of grain in the state market 
(EXGFOODSM) and dummy variable (DUM). Thus we have 
GIMi (GXPi) - PQSJL. ^ crossIN' ^ crossS' 
EXGFOODSM, DUM) (5.23) 
Note that the P^ g^  and PgpQggg are new variables added to (5.23) due 
to policy change within the mixed economy. In addition, EXGFOODSM is 
defined by 
EXGFOODSM - GFOODSM + GFEEDSM - GSSM (5.24) 
where all variables, GFOODSM, GFEEDSM, and GSSM, are specified the same 
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as before. 
The net grain import (export) NGIM (NGXP) is the sum of all GIMi and 
GXPi, i.e., 
NGIM (NGXP) - S (NGIMi - NGXPi) (5.25) 
i 
Domeatic quantity balance 
It is known that the domestic state market is usually in disequi­
librium. However, there is a quantity balance for the volume traded in 
the state market as well as that in the whole domestic market. 
Domestic quantity balance The domestic quantity balance is 
expressed by the following equation: 
NGIM (NGXP) - GFOOD + GFEED + GSEED + GSTOCK - GPROD (5.26) 
It is said that NGIM (NGXP) is the sum of all domestic grain 
demands, including GFOOD, GFEED, GSEED and GSTOCK, minus domestic grain 
production (GPROD). 
Domestic quantity balance in the state market The equation of 
domestic quantity balance in the state market is expressed as the 
following: 
NGIM (NGXP) - GFOODSM + GSTOCKS - GSSM (5.27) 
where GFOODS, GSTOCKS, and GSSM are the same as given before. 
Domestic quantity balance in the own market (the free market) 
The equation of domestic quantity balance in the own market (the free 
market) is expressed as the following: 
GSOM - GFOODOM + GFEEDOM + GSEED + GSTOCKRU (5.28) 
where all the variables are defined the same as before. 
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Government's Grain Price Subsidy 
Because the Chinese government wants to keep political stability 
within the country, it provides heavy subsidies in the form of a dif­
ference between its purchase price and sale price for grain in the state 
market; and, therefore, it is bearing a great pressure to balance its 
budget. The government's grain price subsidy can be classified into two 
categories: 1) grain price subsidy to the Ministry of Food (MOF) due to 
its, grain trade in the domestic state market, and 2) grain price subsidy 
to the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) due to its grain trade in the 
international market. 
Obviously, the total government's grain price subsidy (GPS) is the 
summation of the above two parts of the grain price subsidies: 
GPS - GPSMOF + GPSMOFT (5.29) 
where GPSMOF is the government's grain price subsidy to the MOF and 
GPSMOFT is the government's grain price subsidy to the MOFT. 
Grain price subsidy to the Ministry of Food 
In the domestic state grain market, the government has to maintain 
the lower stable consumer price in order to win the support from the 
urban consumers; on the other hand, the government has to increase the 
producer price in order to stimulate the rural producers' incentive to 
expand their production. The difference in the consumer price and the 
producer price in the state grain market has created a financial problem 
in the government's budget. 
The function explaining the grain price subsidy to the MOF (GPSMOF) 
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is given as 
GPSMOF - (Pggp - Pggg) * GSQ (5.30) 
where Pggp. P^ gg and GSQ are the same as before. 
Grain price subsidv to the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
In the international market, the government has made grain trades 
without paying much attention to the domestic state market price, 
especially in the planned economy. But the price difference between the 
domestic state market and the international market may create a loss (or 
an earning) to the HOFT on its internal account. Thus, the MOFT receives 
a grain price subsidy, if any, (or has given a grain price credit), to 
compensate (or to turn over) its loss (or earning) from the grain trade. 
The function explaining grain price subsidy to the MOFT (GPSMOFT) is 
given by 
GPSMOFT - S (PgiQi - Pggci) * NGIMI, (5.31) 
and the function explaining the grain price credit from the MOFT (GPC-
MOFT) is given by 
GPCMOFT - S (PciNi - Pcgci) * NGXPi (5.32) 
where Pg^ ^^ , P^ g^ ,^ NGIMI and NGXPi are the same as before in this model. 
A Brief Summary 
Flexibility ?£ the grain model for China 
The grain model for China, CHNGMODI, is built to include both 
periods of the planned economy and the mixed economy by distinguishing 
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different explanatory variables and time dummy variables. Thus, it can 
be used to project China's grain demand, grain supply, and foreign grain 
trade by using time-series data simulating the structural change within 
the economy. 
In addition, by taking out all added new variables and equations 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, CHNGMODI can be adjusted to become 
CHNGHODIA, which can be well fitted to the case of the Chinese planned 
grain economy only. For the case of the Chinese mixed grain economy 
only, our model CHNGMODI is identical with CHNGMODIB, which can be esti­
mated by using time-series data covering only the period of the mixed 
economy. 
Classification of equations 
CHNGMODI consists of 18 (19) behavioral or technical equations (B-
type) and 14 (15) identities (I-type) that are arranged in the sections 
set out next. 
No. of relationship 
Section name B-Type I-Type 
Domestic Grain Demand 9 7 
Food Grain Demand 4 5 
Feed Grain Demand 2 1 
Seed Grain Demand 1 0 
Inventory Grain Demand 2 1 
Domestic Grain Supply 4 2 
International Grain Trade 2(3) 4(5) 
Government's Grain Price Subsidy 3 1 
TOTAL 18(19) 14(15) 
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Classification of variables 
CHNGHODI contains 32(34) endogenous variables and 25 exogenous vari­
ables. The variables are classified and listed below: 
Endogenous variables The endogenous variables include: GAS, 
EXGFOODSM, GFEED, GFEEDOM, GFEEDSM, GFOOD, GFOODOM, GFOODRU, GFOODRUOM, 
GFOODRUSM, GFOODSM, GFOODUB, GFOODUBFM, GFOODUBSM, GIM, GIMi, GSOM, GPS, 
GPSMOF, GPCMOFT, GPSMOFT, NGIM, (NGXP), GPROD, GSSM, GSEED, GSTOCK, 
GSTOCKS, GSTOCKRU, GXP, GXPi, GY, GSQ, and P^ p. 
Exogenous variables The exogenous variables in CHNGMODI include : 
GPAS, DUM, LN, Pg^ oss' ^ crossIN' ^ crossS' ^ GIN' ^ GINi' ^ GSC' ^ GSCi' ^ GSP' 
Pggpi, Pjjp, Pjjg, Rqj^ , Rgy, RUMC, RUPM, RUPOP, T, UBMC, UBPM, UBPOP, WI, 
and X. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Summary 
The Chinese grain economy is one of the most important and complex 
in the world. The main objective of this study is to develop a theoreti­
cal framework for analyzing the Chinese grain model in both planned and 
mixed economy regimes, in order to understand changing relationships 
among the government, the firms, and the households, and, furthermore, to 
understand the changing features of the operational mechanism of the 
socialist economy. 
Generally speaking, the Chinese grain economy was/is formed and 
operated by the government and by basic economic units--urban households 
(as consumers) and rural firms (as producers and consumers). By inspect­
ing the changing organizations of these basic units and exploring the 
changing behaviors of the households, the firms, and the government, a 
theoretical model was constructed and used to evaluate the impacts of 
changing government policies in both the domestic and international 
markets. The development of the theoretical model is, in a certain 
sense, a breakthrough and is quite successful. By analyzing the separate 
parts of the model, we determine the nature of the whole. To reflect and 
stress the changes over time due to economic reform, the theoretical 
discussions of the Chinese grain economy under two scenarios were sep­
arated into Chapters III and IV. The former focused on the operational 
mechanism of the planned grain economy, and the latter emphasized the 
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operational mechanism of the mixed grain economy. 
The discussion In each Chapter (III or IV) was naturally divided 
Into two sections: the domestic economy and International trade. The 
domestic economy was Separated Into urban and rural parts, because of 
dual feature of the domestic grain economy. Furthermore, the rural 
economy was broken Into two subparts for state farms (state farm house­
holds) and agricultural production teams (agricultural households) due to 
the different features of ownerships of production means and resources. 
Within the domestic economy, first of all, different types of 
behavior of urban consumers, as well as rural producers and consumers, 
were analyzed, and different demand/supply functions were derived 
according to their activities In the market(s). Second, these Indi­
vidual demand/ supply functions were synthesized to determine the effects 
of some government policy Instruments. Particularly, In contrast to 
previous studies, the method of two-stage aggregation was used to obtain 
the total grain demand and supply functions. That Is, we aggregated 
demands or supplies of Individual units Into group demands or supplies by 
the behavioral classifications, then those group demands or supplies were 
aggregated Into a total grain demand or supply. 
In our sections on International trade, the different behaviors of 
the MOFT were classified and aggregated Import grain demand/export grain 
supply functions were derived for both the planned economy and the mixed 
economy. 
By using the method described, In the Chinese grain economy, the 
roles of key policy Instruments, which mainly Include the ration coupon, 
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the state market price, the sales quota, and the import/export quota, 
were fully and clearly recognized. 
To complete this theoretical study, in Chapter V, a grain model for 
China was formulated by combining the results obtained in Chapters III 
and IV. This model has several features that were neglected in previous 
studies by others. First, it covers periods of both planned economy and 
mixed economy by using a time dummy variable as well as other distinc­
tive variables. Second, it contains the international markets and either 
two (planned economy) or three (mixed economy) domestic markets with 
different market characteristics. Third, the differences in methods of 
determining the domestic market prices (endogenous or exogenous) and 
international market price (exogenous) associated with the different 
market characteristics are explicitly presented, and, of course, these 
three different prices are not necessarily equivalent. Fourth, the model 
embodies a structural feature that is very important for the purpose of 
assessing the impacts of rationing policy. Overall, this model provides 
a theoretical foundation for a full understanding of the Chinese grain 
economy and (in principle) empirical measurement of the impacts of 
government policy. 
For the associated objectives, this study provides a tool to analyze 
the interactions of domestic and international markets under both planned 
and mixed economy assumptions and to assess the impacts of rationing 
systems, domestic prices (including state market prices and free market 
prices) and international prices on China's grain trade and domestic 
market. The grain model for China incorporates all required instruments 
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and variables; therefore, such impacts can be evaluated theoretically 
with the model. 
Conclusions 
The theoretical understanding and findings gained from the study of 
the features of the Chinese economy can be summarized in the following 
categories. 
The basic features of the market economy may be presented by using 
these key words: private ownership, market mechanism, and government's 
regulation. Despite some different opinions, in general, economists 
think that the price mechanism (the market mechanism) in its micro aspect 
leads private firms to the efficient allocation of resources in the 
market economy. On the other hand, the government sets policies to deal 
with problems of macro stability in the economy. In other words, the 
private firms and households have a right to make their own decisions for 
their consumption, production, and distribution, whereas the government 
uses regulation to influence and change the economy. This is the general 
framework of the market economy in today's world. 
Planned economv 
The basic features of the planned economy may be described by these 
key words: state or collective ownership, government's central plan, and 
the state market. Yun Chen (1984), a Chinese communist leader and 
authority on the planned economy, vividly depicted the planned economy as 
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"the economy of the bird cage." That means, the bird can live within the 
cage, but cannot fly out of the cage. In the planned economy, the 
government uses the central plan plus the state market, that is, the 
cage, through state or collective firms to allocate resources to achieve 
its national economic goals. On the micro level, within the cage, either 
state or collective firms have a limited freedom to decide what, how, and 
how much to produce because the main signals in the economy are not 
market prices but the government's plans, and the means of production are 
owned by either state or collective firms. The market mechanism plays no 
role, or a relatively small one, in such an economy. 
Plan and domestic state market The key to understanding the 
planned economy is the state market. The state market, controlled and 
operated by the state government, is not a market In the usual sense, and 
can be seen as an extension of the government's plan. The prices in the 
state market are not determined by market forces but by the government's 
sole opinion. 
For the Important commodities such as grain, cotton, and steel, the 
government uses additional policy instruments to guarantee volume traded 
in the state market. On the demand side, the government uses rationing 
to restrict consumers' demand. On the supply side, the government uses 
output targets and sown area plans to lead firms' production and uses 
sales quotas to guarantee producers' supply. 
Usually, there is a disequilibrium in the state market because of 
the exogenous character of the state market price, which cannot drive an 
equilibrium in the market. The concept of equilibrium used by communist 
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economists means only equilibrium for quantity but not necessarily for 
price. 
In the state market, for those Important goods, the government 
usually sets a relative low price, which Is believed to be below the 
equilibrium price and which will create a shortage problem. In this 
sense, some economists call the planned economy a shortage economy. 
Additionally, the procurement price may not be equal to the retail 
price In the state market. In most cases, the procurement price is 
higher than the retail price, because the government faces the pressure 
from the producer to raise the former and from the consumer not to raise 
the latter. As a result, the government has to cover a large subsidy in 
its budget. 
The new findings in this section are: (1) either the ration or the 
state price has only a partial effect on the consumer demand if the 
ration is not fulfilled, (2) the state price has only a partial effect on 
the producers' supply. 
Plan and the international market(s) In the international 
market, the government reserves for itself the exclusive right to 
purchase or sell Important goods such as grain. The government makes a 
foreign trade plan to set import and export quotas and targets. Given 
the plan, assuming the HOFT is either a price taker or a price follower 
in the international market, it may adjust the real volume traded 
according to the given International prices and other factors such as 
balance of foreign currency reserves. An equilibrium exists in the 
international market. The equilibrium quantity is determined by the 
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MOFT, whereas the equilibrium price is determined by the rest of the 
world. 
The new findings in this part are that, (1) the international price, 
but not the domestic state market price, can affect the quantity traded 
in the international market, (2) the domestic balance in the state market 
but not in the united market, can directly affect the quantity of the 
foreign trade, and (3) the domestic balance of composite grain commodity, 
but not the domestic balance of a single grain commodity, is the main 
concern in the foreign grain market. These findings are consistent with 
the conjectures in previous studies and are clearly expressed in the 
mathematical analysis. 
Mixed economy 
The basic features of the mixed economy are dual ownership, govern­
ment's central plan, and a dual market (a triple market if the own market 
is included). The most remarkable changes in the mixed economy are 
emergence of semi-private/private enterprises and the free market. 
Although the government now still uses a central plan, plus the state 
market through the state, collective, or even semi-private/private 
ownership of production means, to allocate resources to achieve its 
national goals, the former rigid control over the economy has been 
somewhat loosened because of reopening of the free market. From the 
micro view, within the cage, the state, collective, and private firms 
have more freedom to make their own decisions on their consumption, 
production, and distribution, especially in the free market. The 
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activities in the free market are mainly led by the market mechanism. 
Obviously, the mixed economy possesses dual features of both planned 
and market economy. Hence, it can be seen as transitional between the 
planned economy and the market economy. The exact location of mixed 
economy between the two, roughly speaking, will mainly depend upon the 
proportions of state and private ownership and the relative sizes of the 
state market and the free market within the economy. At this moment, the 
Chinese mixed economy still belongs to the socialist category because the 
central plan, plus the state ownership, still plays a dominant role, and 
the free market is only an adjustment and supplement to the state market. 
In this sense, the mixed economy can be considered an enlarged "economy 
of the bird cage." 
Plan and domestic state and free market The coexistence of the 
state market and the free market, especially the coexistence of the state 
market price and the free market price, has brought some changes in the 
government plan and the situation in the state market. Based on politi­
cal considerations, the government has to maintain the price differences 
between the state market and free market and to create price differences 
between consumers and producers for the necessary goods such as grain in 
the state market. Thus, it has to set income subsidy plans to carry this 
heavier burden. In addition, some government officials may use their 
power to buy goods in the state market then sell goods in the free market 
to make their own profits. This may partly damage the government plan in 
the state market. 
The free market within the mixed economy is somewhat different from 
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the free market in the usual sense. In fact, it is a residual market to 
the state market, especially for the most important commodities. The 
government can directly influence consumer demand and producer supply in 
the state market but not in the free market. However, through the 
Interaction of the state market and the free market, the demand and 
supply in the free market may be affected indirectly. In addition, the 
price difference between the state market and the free market may lead to 
flows from the state market to the free market, therefore changing the 
situation in the free market. 
There is no change from disequilibrium situation in the state 
market. However, an equilibrium for both price and quantity may exist in 
the free market because of effects of market forces. Although the excess 
demands for those important goods still exist in the state market within 
the mixed economy, overall, the nationwide shortage situation has been 
somewhat improved by the price mechanism of the free market. 
The new findings in this section are: (1) the ration level, or the 
state price, or the free market price plays only a partial role in 
affecting the consumers' demands and (2) the state price has no effect on 
the producers' supplies, but the free market price does. 
Plan and the International marketfs) The government still has 
monopoly power in the international market. The plan procedure and 
policy instruments used are basically unchanged. The market situation 
also is assumed to be the same as before. Hence, the exchanged quantity 
is decided by the government, given the exchange price in the interna­
tional grain markets. 
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The Important new finding for the mixed economy In this section is 
that both domestic price and international price can influence the 
quantity exchanged in the international market. This is different from 
the first corresponding finding in the planned economy and provides 
mathematical support for the hypotheses in previous studies. Other new 
findings for the mixed economy are the same as the second, and the third 
listed for the planned economy. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Although the results of this study were theoretically satisfactory 
and all the objectives were accomplished, there are still some areas 
that can be explored for further research. First, an empirical econo­
metric model can be implemented based on the theoretical model developed 
in Chapter V. At present, an empirical model is more important than ever 
for the following purposes: (1) to fill in the element missing from the 
previous studies with the first econometric model covering both the 
planned economy and the mixed economy on a theoretical basis, (2) to be 
used statistically to test and examine the validity of the theoretical 
model, (3) to explore the relationship between availability of data and 
rationality of the empirical model, (4) to evaluate and estimate the 
policy instruments impacts on both the domestic and International 
market(s), (5) to evaluate policy alternatives for structural changes 
within economies, and (6) to estimate and to project China's grain demand 
and supply in the domestic market(s) and grain trade in the international 
market(s). 
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The empirical work can be done in alternative ways: (1) by con­
structing and estimating a simplified grain model for China, CHNGRMODI, 
then developing it into a more detailed grain model for China, CHNGR-
MODII, or (2) constructing and estimating several different grain crop 
models such as a wheat model for China, CHNUHHOD, a rice model for China, 
CHNRIMOD, etc.; and then combining them to form a grain model for China, 
CHNGRMODIII. 
Second, within the crop sector, this study can be extended to 
Include commercial crops such as cotton. Although we have considered 
prices of commercial crops in our model, the roles of commercial crops in 
the grain economy were not thoroughly explored. It is acknowledged that 
the commercial crops are competitive with grain crops. This is espe­
cially true in China because all cultlvatable lands are extensively sown 
each year. In addition, China has been the largest consumer and producer 
of cotton in the world since 1982. Thus, it is very important to 
construct a cotton submodel to associate with the grain model to evaluate 
the Interactions of the cotton model and the grain model in both domestic 
market(s) and international market(s). 
Third, within the agricultural sector as a whole, this study also 
can be extended to include the livestock sector. Even though feed grain 
was built into the model, the role of the livestock sector in the grain 
economy was not sufficiently investigated in both theoretical and 
empirical studies. On the basis of this study, a theoretical livestock 
model can be developed to fit the policy environment of the livestock 
sector. Furthermore, the empirical livestock model can be merged with 
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our grain model to evaluate their relations and Interactions In the 
market(s). By doing this, better estimations and projections of demand, 
supply and foreign trade for both feed grain and food grain In the 
Chinese grain economy can be obtained. 
Fourth, within the national economy as a whole, this study can be 
further developed to Include the industrial sector, as well as other 
sectors of the economy. Although the agricultural sector as a whole has 
been considered, the model is still 4 partial equilibrium model. To 
Improve the situation, detailed domestic markets for each Important good 
(or composite good) within the country should be constructed, and the 
corresponding international markets can be treated in the same way used 
in this study. Thus, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model can be 
formulated and estimated so that interactions among the plans, domestic 
markets and International markets can be further recognized. 
Last, this study should be extended to connect the proposed model 
with the world market(s). Although world grain prices have been con­
sidered in the model, the model is still national. To Improve the situa­
tion, a detailed domestic market for each major country or group of 
countries should be Included. Import demand/export supply can be formu­
lated by using the. definition of excess demand/excess supply in each 
domestic market. In comparison with our national model, such a non-
spatial model provides more realistic information for international trade 
and policy analysis. 
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APPENDIX 
A Glossary of Some Economic Terms 
Used In the Text 
The following economic terms are either commonly used in China or 
defined by the author in this study. The meanings of the terms are 
briefly explained in order to familiarize the readers with the text of 
this study. 
Agricultural household 
Agricultural household is defined by the author as a type of rural 
household that is a basic unit of production and consumption and belonged 
to the agricultural production team before the economic reform. 
Bao Can Dau Hu 
A form of the responsibility system in agricultural production with 
the character of individual operation. By contract, each household uses 
land owned by the collective and has to pay the state tax and fulfill the 
state procurement quotas in specified crops. 
Bonus 
A method practiced by social enterprises or administrators to give 
workers and staffs material incentive or additional income according to 
their work. In general, bonuses are given as rewards to those who 
overfulfill their tasks and make special contributions. 
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Combined market 
A market that Is assumed to combine both the state market and the 
team market in the planned economy. 
Dual market 
Dual market implies the state market and the free market in the 
mixed economy. 
Dual market %raDh 
Dual market graph is a graph created in this study to describe the 
coexistence of dual markets. 
Free market 
Free market is a form of commodity exchange among indviduals and/or 
firms under the state administration. Prices in the free market are 
negotiable between buyer and seller. 
Free market analysis 
A market analysis is used to describe the exchange activities in the 
free market only. 
SEâln 
Grain, as defined by the Chinese State Statistics Bureau, includes 
rice, wheat, corn, soybeans, sorghum, millet, sweet potatoes, and other 
coarse grains. 
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Grain price subsidy 
Grain price subsidy is the subsidy to either the Ministry of Food or 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade to compensate their loss in exchanging 
grain due to the difference between their purchase price and the sale 
price. 
Household market 
A market that is assumed to have all agricultural households' own 
consumption occurring. 
Household-own market 
A market that is assumed to have an agricultural household's own 
consumption occurring. 
Market mechanigm 
The process by which individuals and firms carry out economic 
activities on the basis of information provided by the market. The 
market mechanism is capable of balancing supply and demand in the market. 
Mixed economy 
Mixed economy is a transitional economy between planned economy and 
market economy. The basic features of a mixed economy are coexistence of 
state/ collective ownership and private ownership and coexistence of the 
state market and the free market. 
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Own market 
A market that is assumed (in Chapter V) to circulate own-consumed 
grain for either production teams or agricultural households without 
going through the state market and/or the free market. 
Planned economy 
Planned economy is/was an economy set in the socialist country. The 
basic features of a planned economy are that, the government applies the 
central plan through the state market to lead the state firms or collec­
tive firms to allocate resources and to distribute products and incomes 
in order to achieve its national goals. 
Production responsibility system 
A system that links labor management and evaluation, and results in 
proper labor payments from collective according to the job or the final 
output. 
Production team 
The production team is generally the basic collective accounting and 
production unit in rural areas in the planned economy. The team owns 
some collective properties such as land, draft animals, and production 
means, and, under the guidance of local government, takes care of its own 
operations and distributes income among its members. 
Ration coupons 
Ration coupons are used by government to limit distrubution of a 
certain good(s) such as grain in the state market. According to the 
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government's rule, the residents (or urban resident only) may obtain a 
certain amount of coupons, and buy the good In the state market only with 
both money (by price and quantity) and coupons (by quantity). The 
coupons may not be permitted to exchange In the market. 
State farm 
A state farm Is an agricultural enterprise under public ownership. 
The state owns all means of production on the farm, and controls all the 
products. The workers and staffs of the state farm are paid In wages. 
State farm household 
A state farm household Is defined by the author as a type of rural 
household that is a basic unit of production and consumption and belonged 
to the state farm before the economic reform. 
State market 
The state market is a market operated and controlled by the govern­
ment. The prices in the state market are decided by the government's 
opinions. 
State market analysis 
A market analysis is used to describe the exchange activities in the 
state market. 
Team market 
A team market is the market assumed to have all grain distribution 
activities in all of the team-own markets be added together. 
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Team-own market 
A team-own market Is the market assumed for the distribution 
activities within the production teams. 
Urban household 
Urban household is the household that lives in an urban area by the 
government's permission and has the right to share some benefits such as 
ration coupons provided by the government. 
United market 
United market is the market assumed to combine both the free market 
and the household market in the mixed economy. 
